03 December 2020
On Collision Course with the Material Core of the Slovak Constitution
Last week on Tuesday, the Constitutional Committee of the Slovak Parliament discussed the most extraordinary subject in a meeting attended by a most extraordinary guest. The Committee was reviewing a draft constitutional amendment on judicial reform that would, among other things, take away the power of the Constitutional Court to review constitutional amendments. At the meeting, the Minister of Justice and MPs discussed potential benefits and drawbacks of stripping the Court of the jurisdiction to review constitutional amendments, with the President of the Court seated next to them. The proposal represents the last escalation in the conflict about who has the final word on the contents of the Constitution. Continue reading >>
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18 November 2020
A New Chapter in the Hungarian Government’s Crusade Against LGBTQI People
On 10 November 2020 - the same day the Hungarian National Assembly authorized the Government to rule by decree for 90 days in the state of danger - the Minister of Justice submitted a whole package of legislative reforms. Among them, the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary. Two proposed amendments would directly detrimentally affect the rights of the LGBTQI community, which, we argue, would make it extremely difficult to deconstruct the institutionalized trans- and homophobia which the government has been further entrenching for years. Continue reading >>12 November 2020
Power Grab in Times of Emergency
In the late hours on 10 November, the National Assembly adopted an Enabling Act authorizing the Orbán cabinet to govern by decree for 90 days, even though the executive already had very broad legislative power due to the introduction of the medical state of emergency. The ink was barely dry on the approval of the delegation of extraordinary legislative power to the government, when the Minister of Justice introduced several bills on important legislative reforms, such as the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law and changes to the electoral system. Continue reading >>
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03 November 2020
Stabilizing the US Judiciary by Threatening to Pack It
Reforming the judicial appointment process in the US will take a constitutional amendment. Without it, reform attempts are likely to fail. For conservatives especially, altering the courts now, after securing a very conservative majority unprecedented in recent history, will seem unappealing. They may (perhaps correctly) conclude that, given their systematic advantages in the Senate and therefore electoral college, endless escalation is a game they may be able to win. This blog post proposes a simple mechanism that aims to force a stabilizing constitutional amendment forward while preserving the option to escalate if they cannot secure cooperation from the Republican party. Continue reading >>
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09 October 2020
Rule of Law as Ideology
On pride, humility and German-American constitutional friendship Continue reading >>
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02 July 2020
Farewell to the European Constitutional Tradition
On 1 July 2020, with Russia’s coronavirus cases passing 650,000 and following an elaborate spectacle of public affirmation, the Russian electorate eventually confirmed the constitutional amendments. First proposed by Russian president Vladimir Putin in January, the 2020 Russian Constitutional Amendments were initially planned to enter into force only three months later upon approval in an ‘all-Russian vote’ scheduled for 22 April 2020 but had to be postponed due to the spread of the coronavirus. Although many of these amendments have to be considered mainly symbolic, they constitute the most fundamental changes of Russia’s Constitution in its 26-year history. Continue reading >>
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20 January 2020
Personal instead of Institutional Power
The gist of the constitutional reform suggestions in Russia is to cement the power of Vladimir Putin once he leaves the office, and to make this in a safe, controlled environment. The latter aim cannot be achieved within the boundaries established by the Constitution. Thus, the constitutional requirements are thrown into the litter bin of necessity. However, circumventing formal procedures still calls for a sort of justification. That is why the proposed plan relies on substitutes that would mask its deficiencies. Continue reading >>
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07 January 2020
Once Again, a Laboratory for What Is to Come
The 1980 Constitution of Chile contained different “locks” that have entrenched some of the core social, political, legal and economic arrangements inherited from the dictatorship. While some parts of the original constitution (those most obviously connected to the authoritarian regime) have been changed in the years following its enactment, almost all the “locks” remain in place. The issue with the legitimacy of the Chilean constitution is twofold: its legitimacy is questionable both in terms of its pedigree and in terms of its capacity to keep open the space for political action. Continue reading >>28 March 2019
Is This President Erdogan’s Last Term in Office? A Note on Constitutional Interpretive Possibilities
Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected as president in 2014. In 2018, he was elected to the same position for a second term. The Turkish Constitution, aside from one exceptional case, is clear in its command that no-one may serve as president for more than two terms. Is this, then, President Erdogan’s last term in office? The short answer is maybe. Continue reading >>25 October 2018