26 May 2025
Fury and Surprise Anchored in Dogmas and Myths
The Court of Justice’s judgment in Commission v Malta has created quite some upheaval. That the judgment has caught so many legal commentators wrong-footed can be attributed to the fact that both sides overwhelmingly come from the premise that Member States are sovereign to decide who their nationals are and that there is no such thing as a genuine link requirement for nationality. This blog takes a closer look at these alleged certainties, and sets out why the judgment is not that surprising at all – lifting the veil of untenable dogmas and mystifications that have surrounded Declaration No 2 and the Court’s Micheletti judgment for too long along the way. Continue reading >>
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06 May 2025
What is Citizenship For?
Last week, the CJEU declared Malta’s citizenship for investment scheme incompatible with EU law. Setting aside the evidently highly questionable quality and defensibility of the Court’s legal reasoning, the decision clearly casts Union citizenship as a status constituted by meanings and norms specific to the European Union as a normative legal project. What are we to make of this conception of citizenship, and its use by the Court to strike down citizenship for investment schemes? Continue reading >>
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30 April 2025
The EU Free Market Does Not Extend to Citizenship
In the landmark Commission v Malta judgment of 29 April 2025, the European Union Court of Justice outlawed the “commercialisation” of EU citizenship, closing a door for corrupt actors. The Grand Chamber judgment not only bars the Maltese practice at issue, but also casts doubt on the legality of citizenship grants under that and similar schemes, while raising legal arguments for would-be citizens to challenge discriminatory laws. Continue reading >>25 February 2022
Claiming “We are out but I am in” post-Brexit
It is not often that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is presented with a case in which the law is so crystal clear, and so overwhelmingly contrary to the applicant’s claims, as in Préfet du Gers. The central question of the case is weather British nationals retain their EU citizenship and EU citizenship rights after Brexit. Given how straightforward the Treaties and the case-law are on this matter, it is unsurprising that AG Collins answered this question in the negative in a well-argued and straightforward Opinion. Continue reading >>
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30 January 2019
A Citizenship Maze: How to Cure a Chronic Disease?
European Union (EU) citizenship is in crisis. If the Eurozenship debate, composed of experts on EU citizenship, is analogized to a doctor’s diagnosis, the outcome is more extensively polarized than initially thought—a chronic disease, not just a temporary disorder. As I follow the debate, it is no longer clear what the problem is—there seem to be too many, real and imaginary—or how to heal it. Some issues seem to be “genetic,” part of the EU’s DNA, yet others resemble a concrete illness that may be cured, so the argument goes, by a “doctor's prescription,” which in law means a legal design. Continue reading >>
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29 January 2019
Member State and EU Citizenships Should be Strengthened Rather than Disentangled
While perhaps appealing as a gesture towards addressing problems such the anticipated deprivation of rights following Brexit, statelessness, or wide variation in Member State naturalization and denaturalization policies, these proposals are impracticable in the absence of international recognition of EU citizenship (which would normally require recognizing the EU as a state, which in turn should normally mean that the Member States cede competence over citizenship), challenge deeply rooted national stories of peoplehood with an emerging story of European peoplehood, and risk undermining fragile public support for EU rights. Continue reading >>
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28 January 2019
EU Citizenship as an Autonomous Status of Constituent Power
I would argue, however, that Kostakopolou’s argument for a “co-determined Eurozenship” would not go far enough in realising the potential of the status. This post develops this argument first by grounding the normative appeal of autonomous EU citizenship in the context of Member State withdrawal. Next, it is suggested that the co-determination of the status by Member States and the EU institutions would be incompatible with the current legitimacy foundation of the EU. The post concludes by considering the more radical alternative of EU citizenship being made autonomous so that individuals can exercise constituent power to re-establish these foundations of the European Union constitutional order. Continue reading >>
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28 January 2019
More Suffocating Bonds?! Conceptual and Legal Flaws of the Unnecessary Proposal
In this brief contribution I turn to Kostakopoulou’s text and briefly show that her proposal: 1) ignores the core aspects of EU citizenship’s added value; 2) is entirely unnecessary; 3) is not legally neat; and 4) is dangerous for the very nature of EU citizenship today as it essentially pleads for the recreation of the ‘suffocating bonds’ the EU was created to ease, only at a scale much more scary than Greece, Ireland or France, when taken one by one. Besides, it ignores every single outstanding problem actually posed by EU citizenship law as it stands. Continue reading >>
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25 January 2019
Eurozenship: always a bridesmaid?
I would be most happy if Dora Kostakopoulou’s vision of an autonomous EU citizenship came into being. However, there are two key normative and practical pitfalls of her proposal. First, the decoupling of statuses that she proposes poses the risk of ‘free riding’ on EU citizenship rights for those who had, at some point enjoyed, and then lost, this status. Second, having in mind the different definitions of residence across the Member States, linking the acquisition of EU citizenship to this status is like putting a roof on a house with uneven walls. Continue reading >>
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24 January 2019
On the Risk of Trying to Kill “Seven at a Blow”
I agree with Dora that political theorists should not be afraid of radicalism, as long as the proposed reform effectively achieves clearly defined and desirable goals (the utilitarian test) and is consistent with fundamental norms (the principled approach). Richard Bellamy already pointed to the potentially negative consequences of what he describes as a form of “mushroom reasoning” on some of the core principles underlying the European project, such as that of reciprocity. While I broadly share Richard’s conclusion, my main concern here is that Dora’s proposal may not entirely satisfy the utilitarian test requirements. In other words, instead of killing seven flies at a blow, it may end up killing none. Continue reading >>
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