The Messiah and His Oligarchs
Last Sunday, somewhere between 33rd Street and 6th Avenue, we found ourselves among thousands of people in MAGA hats and red T-shirts waiting to attend Donald Trump’s rally – block by block, hour after hour. The attendees came from Upstate New York or even other boroughs of the city, feverishly excited to finally see Donald Trump in person at Madison Square Garden. Some of them, as they told us, regularly travel around the country to attend his rallies.
We decided to queue with them to catch a glimpse of an event marking a particularly pompous and dark ending to the campaign season. Trump is by no means predicted to win the state of New York (according to recent polling, he trails Harris here by almost 20%). However, speaking in Manhattan, the epicenter of coastal elitism, was meant to be a show of power and confidence. It was also meant to demonstrate Trump’s success at building a movement, fueled by grievance politics, racist demagoguery, and his questionable talent for mainstreaming the formerly unutterable. The rally featured a nonetheless shocking amount of inflammatory, racist rhetoric on immigrants, “stolen elections,” “the enemy from within,” and a general disdain for what he portrays as a broken system of government in this country. Above the arena floated a large, messianic sign, promising that “Trump will fix it.”
This “it” can mean many things: democracy, inflation, immigration, the economy. It renders Trump and his movement a broad and inclusive canvas upon which a surprisingly diverse range of people – young, old, rich, poor, white, and non-white – can project whatever grievances they might hold. It is true that voters in the U.S. are discontent with a variety of very fundamental issues: 50% of Americans do not believe in democracy, 55% of Americans want immigration reduced. In swing states, as many as eight out of ten people say the economy is only “fair” or “poor”. Trump’s supporters believe that he will “fix” whatever issue they deem most important.
When we asked a young woman in line why she supported Trump, she answered plainly and calmly: “Because he makes me feel safe. He puts ‘the people’ above ‘the government.’ He stands for harmony, peace, and success.” To many, this sentiment will seem absurd, given that Trump has promised to use the judicial system to persecute and deport his opponents, deploy the military on “the enemy from within,” and use troops to physically harm both “violent protesters” and undocumented migrants at the border. For his supporters, however, he can “get things done.” Their devotion to Trump is not so much motivated by a specific political issue as it is by Trump as a person and by the movement that has grown around him.
So, while last week’s editorial was all about the electoral system’s institutional peculiarities, this week, we want to focus on the people – the personalities – that fundamentally shape this election. This is, first and foremost, Donald Trump himself. Trump’s persona is arguably what matters most to voters. When we asked a man standing in line whether he cared to see any of the other speakers at the rally, he laughed and said: “No. Only Trump. He’s the main guy.” Yet, there are other significant personalities shaping this election, too, most notably Elon Musk, who also spoke at the rally at Madison Square Garden.
To better understand Trump’s enigmatic appeal, its implications for American democracy, and the oligarchic structures shaping this election, we spoke with people from two very different perspectives: dedicated Trump supporters at the rally and prominent legal scholars such as Sam Issacharoff of New York University and Julie Cohen of Georgetown University.
Personality Cult and Populism
To many of the people queuing around us in front of Madison Square Garden, Trump is a messiah; some even compared his rally in New York to a march to “Mecca.” His rallies are ecstatic events; people cheer and laugh as they condemn and insult their various enemies. They are themselves mesmerized by the size of the crowd. People documented the masses by video and camera, joined in on patriotic chants like “USA! USA! USA!” every time the line moved an inch, and collegially distributed MAGA merchandise. When a pedestrian asked the crowd if they were “ready to vote for a dictator,” the sea of red hats and T-shirts uniformly shouted to “Lock him up!” The uniformity – in quite literal uniform, but also in belief and obedience – of mass movements and their unsettling dimension became particularly evident as we stood in line. Being part of a cult, we understood, ultimately means to feel empowered, special, one of the chosen ones, close to the person who has all the answers.
To large parts of the electorate, Trump seems to be much more than a politician. To many, he seems to embody an evident truth, an obvious, almost spiritual call for justice. In Trump’s own words, he claims to be the “retribution” of “the forgotten men and women of America.” That truth, in the minds of many Americans, seems so evident that any election that does not certify Trump as a winner is illegitimate, explicable only through “rigging” by the other side.
This false narrative of “stolen” elections has also intensified Trump’s already poignant personality cult, elevating him from just another politician that can be voted out of office to a leader who cannot lose. This switch from politician to leader renders Trump a populist, but a particularly dangerous one. Instead of trying to win in a democratic system through populist promises, Trump intends to shatter the democratic system by laying claim to power and office through means other than the ballot box. In Trump’s telling, electing him only formalizes a status he already has: the leader of the people, the good and righteous Americans.
This is, of course, deeply troubling. As Samuel Issacharoff, Professor of Constitutional Law at New York University, explains, a key feature of democracy is a commitment to “repeat play” as well as an institutional system designed so that the majority can prevail, but not too much. Meanwhile, key to populism as a political strategy is an assault on those institutions – including those designed to ensure that “repeat play” in fact occurs, that is, elections followed by a peaceful transfer of power. Populists, in turn, insist that such institutions are unnecessary to realize the real and unmediated will of the people of which they are the expositor. What is particularly worrying about Trump in this regard is that he creates a sense of cataclysmic elections, both through his rhetoric and actions. Issacharoff is uncertain whether a democracy, however resilient, can survive several elections in a row seen in these terms. For if “the apocalypse” is upon us, neither respect for institutions nor “repeat play” is seen as worth preserving.
The G.O.P. on the Verge of Democracy
But Trump’s personality cult does not only sway his supporters. It has also taken hold of his own party, the G.O.P., whose political culture he has permanently transformed. Members of the party who have spoken out against him, like Liz Cheney, who voted to impeach him after the January 6th attack, have been exiled from the party. When Trump speaks of the “enemy from within,” he not only means Democrats but also members of the party who dare to express the slightest form of dissent.
The breakdown of the Republican Party is indeed a development that Issacharoff considers both distinctive and deeply worrisome about Trump’s populism. Contrary to populist movements elsewhere, the U.S. is the only country in which hardcore populism captured one of the established parties rather than rebelling against them and going out on their own. Trump’s staggering success at capturing the G.O.P. has turned the party into his obedient vehicle, with no inner core, that has trouble performing even the most basic functions, such as electing a House leader. Whether the G.O.P.’s Trumpian capture has moved it outside of the democratic system remains to be seen. However, Issacharoff worries that the party’s acceptance of January 6th as an article of faith may be a bad omen. One litmus test, he points out, will be whether the party rises in rebellion against a transfer of power if Harris prevails.
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American Oligarchy
Now, enter the (other) billionaires. Trump aside, American politics is also increasingly shaped by a few ultra-rich individuals – all men – who wield an unrivaled amount of money, infrastructural control, discursive power, and socio-cultural status. Chief among them is Elon Musk, the richest man on earth. Like Trump, he sharply divides public opinion, particularly among the intelligentsia. Known for his Twitter spats, Martian ambitions, and electric vehicles, Musk has recently taken a hard right. His contributions to the Trump campaign now total tens of millions, and he has, arguably illegally, put up a million-dollar prize for Pennsylvanians who register to vote and sign a conservative petition. This degree of involvement in an election cycle, coupled with that of other high-profile billionaires, reveals not just a play for deregulation but an ambitious, ideological set-up that seeks to overcome the state and democratic governance altogether.
Of course, Musk is by no means the only billionaire pouring money and resources into this election. The 2016 Clinton, 2020 Biden, and 2024 Harris campaigns have far outspent the respective Trump campaign, in no small part due to the generous donations of America’s business elites. Such contributions, however, arguably came predominantly with more “traditional deregulatory” policy demands than what people like Musk have in mind.
Silicon Valley’s Ideological Project
Yet, Musk and his billionaire peers’ overt political influence – think of the recently retracted presidential endorsements of major newspapers like The Washington Post and The Los Angeles Times – may be the visible tip of a broader ideological transformation, particularly coming from Silicon Valley. To better understand this, we spoke with Georgetown University’s Julie Cohen, a leading scholar on the information economy. Cohen calls the Silicon Valley elite “Trump-curious.” For many in tech, she argues, Trump represents not just deregulation but a chance to question the legitimacy of government oversight altogether.
The libertarian impulse is nothing new in American politics. Yet, traditionally, that impulse was largely limited to advocating for personal choice and privatized services. But today’s tech “oligarchs,” as Cohen terms them, aim not just to shape policy but to rethink the very mode of decision-making on fundamental societal matters. Many of their ideas sound fantastical, envisioning a world where AI and private colonies (on Mars and Earth) eclipse democracy, and digital currencies replace government money.
But it is precisely this over-the-top ambition, bolstered by the cult of personality surrounding figures like Musk, that makes their ideology a potent – if perilous – counterpart to Trump’s populism. If you are in the mood for a horror story, take a look at the “Techno-Optimist Manifesto” penned by two (in)famous Silicon Valley magnates. Fantasies about a “rational” world governed by technology and private property might sound far-fetched, but they are fueled by a conviction that an alternative to the current system is not just desirable – it is necessary.
Anti-Government as Government?
It is unclear what role such beliefs play for the electorate at large. People will vote for Trump for many reasons – economic policies, cultural or religious views, or out of fear of Democrats “Sovietizing” America. Few will actually care what Musk says at a rally or what he intends to do on Mars. As the Trump fan we talked to said: Trump is the main guy.
But most of these Trump fans will not be wielding power in a Trump administration. Their ideological conviction is, once the election is over, much less important than the ideological scaffolding of the people populating the highest echelons of power if the Republicans were to win on Tuesday.
The upper ranks of a Trump administration would likely be stacked with figures hailing directly from Silicon Valley. As key segments of the Valley align with Trump – not necessarily out of allegiance to his persona, but rather as a vehicle for their goal of diminishing public governance – the prospect of figures like Elon Musk taking aim at federal agencies could catalyze far more than a routine deregulation drive. Even the free-market zealots of the 1980s recognized some minimal role for public power. Today’s tech titans, however, seem increasingly intent on outgrowing the state itself, seeing it as little more than a relic. Cohen agrees. “This is qualitatively new,” she says.
Combine this aversion to public governance with the immense wealth and power concentrated in the hands of just a few men and add the Trump movement’s broad, fervent base, and you have a potentially explosive mix.
None of this is oversensitive fearmongering. For example, the Pentagon and the U.S. government in general are increasingly worried by their dependence on Musk’s satellite and rocket infrastructure, his very own shadow foreign policy (for example, he regularly speaks with Russian President Vladimir Putin), and the American state’s eroding sovereignty over these issues.
After Tuesday
For Trump, his followers, and the oligarchs, elections themselves may no longer be a marker of democratic legitimacy. Instead, for them, strong polling numbers and packed rallies translate directly into a claim to power. On this view, neither Trump nor his billionaire supporters need the norms of democracy, the state, or established institutions to validate their authority.
Quite the opposite: many Americans seem to see the institutional status quo, with all its flaws, more as a restraint than a channel for the popular will. Ironically, as we explored in last week’s editorial, there is a kernel of truth in the sense that something feels off with U.S. democracy. Yet the implications drawn from this instinct are troubling. In July, Trump said at a rally that if people vote for him in November, “in four years, you don’t have to vote again. We’ll have it fixed so good, you’re not gonna have to vote.” If elected, Trump will certainly try to fix “it.” The messiah promising the end of democracy.
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Editor’s Pick
by EVA MARIA BREDLER
Coming back from Venice, I realised that my life lacks pistachios. I could write many things about Italy at the moment, but I’m deliberately focussing on pistachios. The pistachio is the supreme nut, basta. There’s no point in debating, look at the colour. To celebrate it, I would like to encourage you to try this simple pistachio pesto. If you don’t have the time, just top your porridge with pistachios (or, even better: pistachio butter) to adorn the rather mundane breakfast. Then look at golden autumn trees. La grande bellezza!
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The Week on Verfassungsblog
… summarised by EVA MARIA BREDLER
If you have read our editorial and not just skipped right to our weekly summary (we don’t judge), you will know why the U.S. election will prove fateful for U.S. institutions and democracy. But it does not stop there. Who gets elected to the White House will also affect the rules-based international order, says TIM HEINKELMANN-WILD (EN), and considers Europe responsible for filling the gap.
Europe has another gap to fill, it seems: The Commission’s Annual Rule of Law Report, ironically, is missing an important chapter – the EU itself. The Rule of Law Clinic at the CEU Democracy Institute in Budapest has bridged this gap by publishing the first report on EU adherence to rule of law standards. JOELLE GROGAN and BARBARA GRABOWSKA-MOROZ (EN) outline the report’s main findings.
Within the EU, Italy seems to drift into its own rule of law crisis. One example of this is the Italy-Albania deal which has already been dealt its first blow in court. ANDREINA DE LEO (EN) analyses the nature and future of the deal’s externalization strategy.
Last month, the ECJ shook the world of football with its Diarra ruling. According to ANTOINE DUVAL (EN), “the chickens have come home to roost” and the football transfer system has been brutally set aside. He sees Diarra as an opportunity to reshape football – moving it away from pure financialization, speculation, and the treatment of players as mere commodities.
Who are the women and men making such far-reaching decisions, anyway? To learn about those powerful actors, “Borderlines archive” conducts exclusive interviews with judges and advocates general of the ECJ. For our blog, KATERINA LINOS and MARK POLLACK dive deep into the judges’ backgrounds, experiences, and jurisprudential philosophies.
In the meantime, Pakistan is undergoing a process of authoritarian consolidation under the civilian and military hybrid ruling coalition, using electoral engineering and constitutional entrenchment. YASSER KURESHI (EN) shows that the constitution provided little protection against the regime’s capture.
Afghanistan is suffering under the Taliban regime – especially women. Since 2021, the Taliban have issued over 80 decrees aimed at gradually restricting women’s rights in Afghanistan, including access to secondary education, justice, and public spaces. Australia, Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands are now seeking to bring a case against Afghanistan before the International Court of Justice for violations of the CEDAW. HANNA WELTE (GER) considers the case legally promising and a politically important signal.
Speaking of innovative legal proceedings: On 23 October 2024, Friends of the Earth Germany and several individuals filed a constitutional complaint that mirrors the Neubauer case but is directed at the biodiversity crisis. The claimants seek a declaration from the German Federal Constitutional Court that the lack of a coherent scheme for the protection of biodiversity infringes fundamental rights and seek an order from the Court for the legislature to take the necessary measures to adopt an appropriate, legally binding protection scheme within a clear timeline. For LAURA HILDT (EN), this case is the “Urgenda” of biodiversity litigation.
Innovative legal proceedings should not be initiated by judges themselves, argues ANDREAS FUNKE (GER) in the context of the now infamous Erfurt Regional Court rulings recognising rights of nature. They not only raise the question of whether nature truly has rights but also concern the professional role of judges. Funke argues that the single judge ruling the cases misunderstood his judicial responsibility – and was not allowed to sit as a single judge anyway. ANDREAS GUTMANN (GER) takes a closer look at the criticism the two Erfurt rulings received, arguing that much of it is unfounded.
Last week, a broad civil coalition proposed a draft to reform German abortion law. According to the proposal, abortions should be legally permitted up to and including the 22nd week after conception, as well as until the onset of labour in cases of medical necessity, with costs covered by statutory health insurance regardless of income. LAURA ANNA KLEIN (GER) summarizes the proposal and the relevant constitutional law and believes there is momentum for reform, both politically and socially.
This week, we’ve also launched our symposium “Europe’s Foundation and its Future: The EU Charter in Focus” (EN), co-funded by the European Union. On paper, the fundamental rights found in the EU Charter have undergone a remarkable journey, evolving from soft general principles of law into a transformative force shaping EU law. But the Charter has failed to become a document that European citizens have embraced as their own. This symposium, edited by Jakob Gašperin Wischhoff, is the first of several that aim to change this. FRANCESCO SAITTO warns that the Charter risks marginalising national constitutional courts and argues that the solution lies in a highly differentiated consolidation of constitutional legalities. PIETRO FARAGUNA’s three seemingly trivial observations inform three substantive proposals regarding the protection of fundamental rights within the EU. EMILIA SANDRI sees in Real Madrid vs Le Monde a significant shift, prioritising fundamental rights protection over the traditional objective of seamless judicial cooperation across the EU. TOBIAS LOCK dives into how the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 places greater constraints on national procedural autonomy than any other Charter right. SIONAIDH DOUGLAS-SCOTT reflects on the journey of the Charter and concludes that it became a powerful instrument. In the same vein, JAKOB GAŠPERIN WISCHHOFF views the Charter as both a source and a vision for the future.
We’ve also kicked off our symposium on „Europe’s Geopolitical Coming of Age: Adapting Law and Governance to Harsh International Realities“ (EN). SOFIA VANDENBOSCH, KERTTULI LINGENFELTER und CAROLYN MOSER open the debate by exploring the profound changes in European security and defence law following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. ROBERT STENDEL looks at the plans to establish a tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine under the auspices of the Council of Europe. KERTTULI LINGENFELTER maps the efforts of the EU to prosecute core crimes committed in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. LEON SEIDL highlights the leading role of the EU in coordinating international assistance for the reconstruction of Ukraine. MACIEJ GRZESKOWIAK looks into the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which significantly weakens the safeguards for asylum-seekers in the name of “security”. EMMA BOLOPION examines how the EU has become a key player in the field of climate change and security, despite the political and military realities. JASMINE SOMMARDAL explores the Religious Movement Advisory Opinion, where the ECtHR introduced new risk and proportionality criteria, marking a shift from its previous case law. MARIA BEBEC devotes her piece to the case-law of the CJEU on restrictive measures that will shape the scope of its jurisdiction in CFSP matters. SOFIA VANDENBOSCH has a closer look at the role of the political question doctrine within the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR. CAROLYN MOSER examines the EU’s path toward a European Defence Union.
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That’s it for this week! Take care and all the best.
Yours,
the Verfassungsblog Team
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