Time is short and the demands are enormous. Following the landslide victory of Péter Magyar and the TISZA Party in Hungary’s parliamentary elections on 12 April 2026, the new government must demonstrate that its commitment to reform extends beyond mere rhetoric and translates into tangible changes that improve the everyday lives of Hungarians. With a two-thirds majority in Parliament, the new governing party seems to have the power to implement all the policies on its political wish list. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that hard limits are set by EU law, particularly by Article 2 TEU (in the new and not uncontroversial interpretation by the ECJ), and soft limits are set by best practice in European constitutionalism. When theoretically unlimited possibilities meet with vaguely worded standards, it is helpful to have an Archimedean point outside the system from which to assess which reforms will be helpful and sustainable during the transition period, and which may exacerbate existing problems or unnecessarily weaken the system.

The Role of the Venice Commission in Hungary’s Re-Transition

During the long years of the Orbán regime, when Hungary drifted further and further away from common European perceptions and values, the Venice Commission was frequently asked to review new legislation. It was an “unwelcome friend”, “unwelcome” to the Orbán regime because of its critical stance, but at the same time a “friend” of Hungary as it sought to uphold its links to the European heritage of democracy and the rule of law.

There are good reasons to believe that the Venice Commission could play a significant, potentially even decisive, role in Hungary’s reform process in the coming years.

First, since 2011, the Venice Commission has adopted 27 opinions, critically assessing all major constitutional and legal reforms in Hungary. As a long-term observer, the Commission has developed special insight, expertise and a deep understanding of the reasons for the backlash in the country. Topics assessed include constitutional reforms, reforms to the court system (including changes to age limits and salaries in ordinary and administrative courts, as well as the Constitutional Court), election laws, laws on national education and the media, religious freedom, and the status of churches. Of particular importance are the opinions on ideological topics such as legislation on foreign influence, homophobic laws, a special immigration tax, and the “Stop Soros” legislative package.

Second, the Venice Commission has been and remains a major actor in the process of restoring the rule of law in Poland following the victory of the pro-European coalition led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk. The transfer of concepts and ideas from Poland to Hungary is possible, and experience is valuable. However, the differences and similarities between both the backlash and the restoration of the rule of law and democracy in the two countries must be taken into account. In both countries, key state positions are still occupied by individuals who are said to be loyal to the previous regime and therefore block reforms. Corruption and abuse of authority seem to be widespread, but difficult to grasp. Legal changes have been far-reaching, often touching fundamental elements of the state’s architecture. At the same time, the influence of the ECtHR and ECJ jurisprudence on judicial reform was much stronger in Poland than in Hungary. While the Orbán government adopted a new constitution, the P.I.S. in Poland left the constitution untouched but reinterpreted substantial provisions and implemented institutional changes below the constitutional surface. Last but not least, the Tusk coalition would dream of Hungary’s two-thirds majority; many of their reform initiatives are blocked by the President’s veto, which the governing coalition cannot overcome.

Third, the Venice Commission has a diplomatic-legal mission and does not threaten to interfere with national sovereignty. It is an arbitrator coming from outside, but engaging in dialogue with all relevant inside actors such as the constitutional court, the President, the Parliament (majority and opposition), the ombudsperson, the prosecution, the courts, and civil society. The Commission is flexible and can react quickly to demands, providing urgent opinions within a few weeks if necessary. While the Venice Commission’s authority and high reputation are widely recognised, its opinions are not legally binding, but form part of soft law. Nevertheless, the Venice Commission observes and comments on the follow up. If the opinions are integrated into the judgments of the ECtHR or taken to define progress in the accession process to the EU, Venice Commission standards can even be transformed into “hard law”. Although the Venice Commission cannot develop case law or jurisprudence, it emphasises consistency in its assessments and recommendations. With regard to questions concerning the rule of law, it has created a normative framework in the form of the Rule of Law Checklist, which was revised in 2025 adding reflections on the best practice in restoring the rule of law.

Preconditions and Forms of Support for the Reform Process

The Venice Commission never acts on its own motion; it needs a request from an authorised person, either from within the country (such as the Minister of Justice or the Speaker of Parliament) or from outside the country. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is one of its best “customers”. During the Orbán regime it was almost exclusively the Parliamentary Assembly requesting the assessment of the new Hungarian laws.

In a situation where a constitutional system needs not only cosmetic, but surgical interventions after a rule of law backlash, there are undeniably dilemmas between legal certainty and constitutional guarantees on the one hand, and effective transformative measures on the other hand. For the Venice Commission, it is important that the measures aimed at restoring the rule of law are, as a rule, themselves compatible with the overall standards of the rule of law. However, exceptions are permitted when adherence to existing legislation would perpetuate an unacceptable status quo. The aim of preventing a relapse into illiberalism should always be kept in mind.

The following principles are relevant: The reforms should be built on a comprehensive diagnosis of the reasons and consequences of the rule of law regression; it is necessary to have both short-term and long-term plans for the restorative measures to be taken. Priority should be given to international obligations such as the obligation to implement judgments of the ECtHR under Article 46 ECHR or the obligation to follow up on judgments of the ECJ. The compatibility of the restorative measures with the Constitution must be verified; in case of discrepancies the long-term consequences of amendments should be carefully analysed. For example, terminating the mandates of sitting Constitutional Court judges could create the impression that judges’ mandates are not independent of politics. This would undermine the credibility of the institution of constitutional justice. If possible, broad public participation should be ensured in deciding how to restore the rule of law. At the same time, bureaucratic and delayed decision-making processes should be avoided. Whatever the measure, its proportionality must be carefully assessed. The restoration of the rule of law is a very important aim, but it does not necessarily justify the most radical measures, especially if less radical measures could also lead to good results. Thus, the Venice Commission – as well as the ECtHR – has held that the departure from the principle of irremovability of judges can exceptionally be justified by a pressing need; but it depends on the context and the concrete circumstances.

Recourse to Existing Venice Commission Opinions

As already stated, the relationship between the Venice Commission and Hungary does not begin on a clean slate. Therefore, especially in the first period of transition, the Hungarian authorities can build on the recommendations given by the Venice Commission on the reform laws adopted during the Orban regime. As already emphasized by Pál Sonnevend, the rule set out in Article XVI (1) of the Fundamental Law, which places the very broadly defined rights of children above all other fundamental rights with the exception of the right to life, can lead to absurd results. The Venice Commission recommended to repeal or modify this amendment “to avoid the risk of systemic violation of other fundamental rights on account of the failure to conduct a balancing exercise between competing fundamental rights, including the rights of LGBTI persons.” Other recommendations are less strongly worded, e.g. when a new constitutional provision is criticized, but is considered compatible with European standards only when interpreted in a certain way. This applies for example to another ideologically motivated amendment to the Constitution, the first paragraph of Article L of the Fundamental Law. According to this provision “human beings shall be male or female”. In the Venice Commission’s opinion this provision “should not serve as a legal basis for prohibiting the legal recognition of gender identity”. Another example for the Venice Commission’s balanced approach is the comment on the new definition of the criteria for becoming a judge of the Constitutional Court. The provision that legal experience must have been acquired in a position ”for which a law degree was required by law” was abolished. The Venice Commission stressed that such a provision was a “unique specification that does not seem to exist anywhere else”. Therefore, it held, the amendment did not go against international standards and practice, but warned against excessive discretion in interpreting the relevant criteria for becoming a constitutional court judge.

These examples show that the Venice Commission’s opinions subtly differentiate between norms that should be repealed, norms that can be interpreted in line with European standards, and norms that are acceptable, but can be misused in practice. These specifications make it possible to define priorities in the reform processes and can thus help to structure it.

Despite the pressure on the new government to repay the voters’ confidence, the reform process will take years. However, the most important thing is to get off to a good start. The Venice Commission may be a good companion and a critical advisor. More than that, it may also support the reform process in the long run.