18 June 2026
Hungary and the Venice Commission
Time is short and the demands are enormous. Following the landslide victory in Hungary’s parliamentary elections, the new government must demonstrate that its commitment to reform extends beyond mere rhetoric. Nevertheless, hard limits are set by EU law, and soft limits are set by best practice. When theoretically unlimited possibilities meet with vaguely worded standards, it is helpful to have an Archimedean point outside the system from which to assess which reforms will be helpful and sustainable, and which may exacerbate existing problems or unnecessarily weaken the system. Continue reading >>
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17 June 2026
Restoring Academic Freedom in Hungary
Hungary’s experience with illiberal democracy exposed several uncomfortable truths about constitutional democracy, including vulnerabilities at the foundations. Higher education is a case in point. If the Magyar government chooses to engage in constitution making, it will face a robust architecture created by illiberal knowledge politics and nestled in transnational networks. It may decide to seize a historic opportunity to set a constitutional script that provides protection for academic freedom and safeguards university autonomy for a post-illiberal constitutional democracy. Continue reading >>
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28 May 2026
Fixing the Hungarian Bench
Péter Magyar swept away Fidesz and won a constitutional majority. Yet Orbán packed the courts with his people in the meantime. Should Magyar resort to another round of court-packing? First, legitimate court-packing must have a just cause and must be proportional. Second, the proportionality of such reactive court-packing should in general respect the “paired effect”, although a stronger response may sometimes be justified. Finally, Magyar should not aim just for returning to the status quo but should innovate and build a resilient judiciary that enjoys the trust of the Hungarian people. Continue reading >>
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04 February 2026
Immunising the Venice Commission Against Autocratic Contamination
The Venice Commission plays an important role in shaping standards of European constitutionalism. With greater influence, however, should come greater responsibility. As this post will outline, the Venice Commission suffers from one institutional flaw which concerns the method of selecting its members, a flaw which has been made worse by an unwillingness to enforce its own membership requirements and principles of conduct. Continue reading >>14 January 2026
Keeping Up with Changing Times
The Venice Commission’s Rule of Law Checklist is one of the most influential soft-law instruments for assessing constitutional governance in Europe and beyond. In December 2025, this comprehensive framework has recently undergone a significant update. The revised text reframes the rule of law in light of new challenges. The result is a complex document that captures the defining features of today’s digital constitutionalism, where constitutional democracies and human rights are not only threatened by public authorities, but also by private actors governing spaces which are formally private but practically functioning as public squares. Continue reading >>23 October 2025
The Pathologies of the Reformist Zeal
On 14 October 2025, the Venice Commission issued an Opinion No. 1247/2025 concerning the anticipated changes to Ukrainian judiciary legislation. The Opinion criticizes the proposed judiciary reform for being disproportionate or even erratic experimentation. Indeed, Ukraine’s judiciary reformers never rest – but perhaps that’s the problem. This blog post argues that a more measured, constructive path forward to proceed with the judiciary reform is now essential. Continue reading >>
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20 October 2025
No Skyfall
On 26 September 2025, the Slovak parliament adopted the 23rd amendment to the Constitution, introducing an explicit “national identity” clause and a series of provisions presented as measures to “protect the family”. The Venice Commission issued an Opinion two days earlier highlighting both procedural irregularities and substantive concerns. Yet, despite the alarm it has caused, the amendment’s immediate impact is likely to be limited: most of its provisions remain largely symbolic without accompanying legislation or supportive judicial interpretation. Instead, the real battleground will unfold in legal disputes over the amendment’s meaning and reach – with the Constitutional Court expected to play a decisive role. Continue reading >>
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24 March 2025
Restoring Polish Judicial Independence
Restoring the Polish rule of law without doing more damage to it is a vexing challenge. Building Back Better becomes even more complex when the current president – part of the autocratic Law and Justice (PiS) party, which lost the previous elections – refuses to sign off on any law. Yet few would have expected the Venice Commission (VC), of all institutions, to make things even more complicated. This contribution first tracks the state of play in Poland following the VC Opinions of October 2024 and December 2024. Given the central role of the VC’s thinking in Polish efforts to find a way out, it then goes on to critique the Opinions on legal and strategic grounds before proposing an alternative route. Continue reading >>03 January 2025
Can the Rule of Law Be Restored by Violating Its Principles?
This post concerns one of the crucial problems of transitional constitutionalism after a period of democratic and rule of law backsliding: how to restore the principle of the rule of law? Are there circumstances when, during this restoration, the principles of the rule of law are allowed to be violated? For instance, when the violation of the rule of law was an important tool to exercise arbitrary power, as was the case before the 1989-1990 East-Central European democratic transitions? Continue reading >>
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23 December 2024



