Angelika Nußberger
Time is short and the demands are enormous. Following the landslide victory in Hungary’s parliamentary elections, the new government must demonstrate that its commitment to reform extends beyond mere rhetoric. Nevertheless, hard limits are set by EU law, and soft limits are set by best practice. When theoretically unlimited possibilities meet with vaguely worded standards, it is helpful to have an Archimedean point outside the system from which to assess which reforms will be helpful and sustainable, and which may exacerbate existing problems or unnecessarily weaken the system.
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Michal Bobek
The last decade has demonstrated what role the Union and in particular the Court of Justice can play in keeping a Member State “within the orbit” of the rule of law. Within that process, the case law of such bodies established numerous red lines as to what practices are not acceptable in a rule of law governed liberal democracy. But will the same red lines now be applicable also to the “good guys”? If yes/no, what will that mean for the legitimacy of those bodies, in particular the European Union?
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Katarzyna Łakomiec, Barbara Grabowska-Moroz
Women’s rights turned out to be the litmus test for harms caused by the rule of law backsliding. That is why it is worth analysing the effectiveness of the post-2023 restoration of the rule of law in Poland, focusing specifically on what was visibly undermined by the populists: women’s rights. We argue that the pre-populist negligence in recognising the constitutional status of women’s rights made it easier for populists to attack them. Such negligence can also be identified in the Hungarian context.
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Renáta Uitz
Hungary’s experience with illiberal democracy exposed several uncomfortable truths about constitutional democracy, including vulnerabilities at the foundations. Higher education is a case in point. If the Magyar government chooses to engage in constitution making, it will face a robust architecture created by illiberal knowledge politics and nestled in transnational networks. It may decide to seize a historic opportunity to set a constitutional script that provides protection for academic freedom and safeguards university autonomy for a post-illiberal constitutional democracy.
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Edit Zgut-Przybylska
Hungary’s democratic renewal cannot succeed through constitutional restoration alone. The durability of the Orbán regime stemmed not only from formal institutional capture, but from deeply embedded informal power throughout society. Rebuilding democracy therefore needs more than legal repair: it requires institutionalized participation, decentralized power, and directly embedded civil society into governance. Thus, transitional justice cannot be reduced to constitutional restoration or elite replacement. It must also address the underlying social logic of authoritarian governance.
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Márta Pardavi
Hungary’s April 2026 elections that ended 16 years of Viktor Orbán’s autocratic rule have rightly generated urgent debate about constitutional repair. Beyond rebuilding the rule of law and democratic institutions, a successful transition will also need an engaged citizenry who value and trust these institutions and are eager to participate in public life. The transition therefore presents a critical opportunity to rebuild the legal, policy, and financial frameworks needed for an independent civil society to flourish. Achieving this requires a coherent package of legislative, institutional, and financial measures.
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Marcin Szwed
One of the most pressing challenges for the new Hungarian authorities will be the future of the Constitutional Court, perceived as a captured institution. The new authorities may be tempted to adopt amendments aimed at a complete overhaul of the Constitutional Court, although such radical actions risk being seen as a violation of judicial independence. However, sometimes radical steps in response to captured apex courts can be both justified and necessary, provided that they form part of a broader reform genuinely aimed at strengthening the institution’s independence.
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Anna Wójcik
If Hungary under Péter Magyar and the TISZA party is to learn from the democratic repair pursued under Donald Tusk in Poland since December 2023, it is that a comprehensive and swift reform of the media ecosystem is crucial. Such reform does not simply entail taking control of public service media but rather transforming the broader ecosystem to enhance media freedom and pluralism. Crucially, the reform should not only be lawful but also perceived as legitimate.
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László Detre
On 12 April 2026, Hungarian voters rendered their judgment on the regime that could be described in many ways, but certainly not as a well-functioning liberal democratic constitutional order. Today, the constituent power shall aim at restoring liberal democratic constitutionalism, and more narrowly, constitutional justice. The root of the problem is the current composition of the constitutional court stemming from the winner-takes-all approach of the previous regime. The problematic question, however, is how this can be addressed in line with European constitutionalism.
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David Kosař
Péter Magyar swept away Fidesz and won a constitutional majority. Yet Orbán packed the courts with his people in the meantime. Should Magyar resort to another round of court-packing? First, legitimate court-packing must have a just cause and must be proportional. Second, the proportionality of such reactive court-packing should in general respect the “paired effect”, although a stronger response may sometimes be justified. Finally, Magyar should not aim just for returning to the status quo but should innovate and build a resilient judiciary that enjoys the trust of the Hungarian people.
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Bernát Török
The opposition’s two-thirds electoral victory has opened the way for a comprehensive renewal of media regulation. Although the legislator must respond to the legacy of the past sixteen years, lasting success can only be achieved if we are also able to learn from the thirty years of experience with Hungarian media governance. Then the harder part will begin: ensuring that the system of media governance operates in accordance with an institutional culture committed to pluralism, dialogue, constitutional values, and sound public policy.
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Maciej Bernatt
Public discourse on the repair of constitutional democracy tends to focus on its political dimensions. The Fidesz period, however, demonstrated that markets and democratic governance are deeply interconnected. The restoration of constitutional democracy, which will inevitably involve the reorganisation of the economy, should therefore prompt reflection in public law discourse on the ways in which markets ought to be structured in democratic societies. Public law scholars must engage seriously with the role that competition law reform can play in this process.
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Kim Lane Scheppele
As Péter Magyar and his Tisza government took office on 9 May, ending sixteen long years of autocratic capture, the crowds outside the Parliament danced and cheered. Now the new government has a constitutional supermajority and a massive democratic mandate. But unlike Orbán’s supermajority, Magyar’s still has to confront veto players. The Hungarian government has a speedy and lawful option for realising its mandate without lurching into extreme scenarios: Using European law as an interim constitution to evade the roadblocks left in place by the Orbán government.
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Kati Cseres
After sixteen years, Hungary emerges from an era characterised by illiberal governance, democratic backsliding, and the systematic weakening of rule of law institutions. Rebuilding a credible, stable, and predictable legal system will be essential not only for restoring democratic legitimacy internally, but also for reconnecting Hungary to the core economic structures and values of the European Union. Such a transition requires a broader understanding of the rule of law that extends beyond public institutions to the governance of markets and economic relations.
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Marcin Barański
At first glance, the over two-thirds majority that TISZA is set to enjoy in the new National Assembly seems to make the Hungarian transition 2.0 look much easier than might have been expected. And yet, this does not mean that there are no vital pitfalls. These challenges lie, namely, in restoring robust and meaningful accountability standards for both past and future power holders and, relatedly, in resisting the temptation to hold onto unconstrained power inherited from the predecessors under the guise of political necessity or expediency.
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Beáta Bakó
This is the fifth election in a row in which a party has gained a two-thirds majority. A two-thirds majority has long been the magic of Hungarian politics. Namely, it means domestically unlimited power. But the magic of the two-thirds majority is based on an assumption that has turned out to be a lie: that such a special majority guarantees compromise. As a first step towards a truly functioning pluralist democracy, it is time to disenchant the two-thirds majority.
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András Jakab
Academic literature and international legal documents on transitional justice have concentrated on transitions from dictatorships or armed conflicts, while neglecting hybrid regimes. In such regimes, corruption, state-organised plunder of resources, and the gradual demolition of democracy and the rule of law during the ancien régime require exceptional transitional measures. Just as the questions of democracy and the rule of law are not binary, transitional measures after hybrid regimes should also be proportionate. In European cases, the case-law of the ECtHR is mostly relevant.
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Adam Bodnar
The victory of Péter Magyar and TISZA Party in the parliamentary elections of 12 April 2026 may be seen as a useful illustration of the theory of competitive authoritarianism developed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. It suggests that even under uneven political conditions, electoral victory remains possible when an opposition movement is well organized, presents a credible program, and effectively capitalizes on the weaknesses and mistakes of the incumbent government. Consequently, claims about the demise of liberal democracy appear to be premature.
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Pál Sonnevend
In this post I shall attempt to map some of the most important points where constitutional repair is necessary as well as the limits of such repair that follow from common European standards. This text is emphatically not a summary of a comprehensive constitutional reform, nor is it a proposal at the level of legislative text. Rather, it outlines fundamental issues which, following discussions and the taking of fundamental political decisions, could lead to a proposal for a correction that needs to be adopted within a short timeframe.
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