17 November 2026

Delisted in Brussels, Sanctioned in Tallinn

Who Decides on EU Financial Sanctions?

On 22 September 2026, the Council of the European Union removed Russian businessmen Mikhail Fridman and Alisher Usmanov from its sanctions list. The decision formed part of a political compromise extending the remaining individual sanctions against Russia for three years. While France reportedly advocated Usmanov’s delisting, Luxembourg supported removing Fridman, who is pursuing a $16 billion investment arbitration claim against the Grand Duchy over the freezing of his assets.

For Fridman and Usmanov, however, the lifting of EU sanctions did not end financial restrictions throughout the Union. That same day, Latvia imposed national financial sanctions against Fridman and corresponding measures against Usmanov. Estonia followed on 23 September. Its Foreign Minister criticised the Council’s decision, maintaining that both businessmen continued to support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Latvia’s Financial Intelligence Unit confirmed that its national financial restrictions were substantively identical to the previous EU measures.

As Güneş Ünüvar has recently discussed, Fridman’s investment arbitration claim may have influenced Luxembourg’s negotiating position, illustrating a possible administrative chill resulting from investor-State arbitration.

Yet the national sanctions raise a distinct question of EU constitutional law: Can Member States independently freeze the assets of persons whom the Union has deliberately removed from its sanctions regime?

The Union’s Competence over Financial Sanctions

At first sight, national sanctions may appear compatible with the structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Unlike the common commercial policy, the CFSP retains a predominantly intergovernmental character and does not fall within the categories of exclusive or shared competences under Arts. 3 and 4 TFEU. Member States therefore retain considerable autonomy in foreign affairs, subject to their obligations under the Treaties, notably Arts. 24(3) and 29 TEU.

The economic implementation of foreign policy objectives, however, is governed by a different legal framework. Art. 215(2) TFEU provides a specific legal basis for restrictive measures against individuals following a CFSP decision. Targeted financial sanctions are implemented through directly applicable Council regulations, such as Regulation 269/2014 concerning Russia, which identify the persons whose assets must be frozen and prohibit making further resources available to them.

The precise allocation of competences under Art. 215 TFEU remains contested. The prevailing view in legal scholarship considers economic sanctions to fall within the Union’s exclusive competence under Art. 3(1)(e) TFEU concerning the common commercial policy. Others, however, argue that such measures do not necessarily constitute commercial policy measures and should instead be regarded as falling within shared competence (see Schütze, p. 458).

Advocate General Medina adopted a differentiated approach in her recent Opinion in KX (C-378/25, paras 62–71). She distinguishes restrictive measures according to their subject matter, considering the sectoral procurement restrictions at issue to fall within shared competence. By contrast, she considers additional national listings of individuals more problematic, given their effects on capital movements and payments and the resulting risks to the uniform application of EU sanctions (para. 71).

The European Commission has taken a clearer position on autonomous national asset freezes. In its Opinion C(2019) 8007 final, it considered such measures incompatible with Union law where they pursue objectives covered by Art. 215 TFEU. It emphasised the risks of fragmenting the internal market and undermining uniform sanctions implementation, while rejecting Art. 65 TFEU (justified derogations from the free movement of capital) as an alternative legal basis for pursuing the same CFSP objectives.

Although not legally binding, the Commission’s interpretation supports the argument against autonomous national asset freezes. Importantly, that argument does not necessarily depend on exclusive Union competence: rather, existing EU sanctions regulations may also preclude national measures under a shared-competence model.

Delisting Does Not Undo Pre-emption

Under Art. 2(1) TFEU, only the Union may adopt legally binding acts in areas of exclusive competence. Member States may act only if empowered by the Union or when implementing Union acts. This restriction also covers autonomous administrative decisions imposing individual asset freezes. Since exclusive competence precludes national action irrespective of whether the Union has exercised its powers, delisting terminates individual restrictions, not the Union’s exclusive competence to impose them.

Yet national measures may also be precluded under a shared-competence model. Under Art. 2(2) TFEU, Member States may exercise their competence only insofar as the Union has not exercised its own or has decided to cease doing so. Protocol No. 25 confines the resulting pre-emption to the elements governed by the relevant Union act.

As Advocate General Medina recalled in KX (C-378/25, para. 66), pre-emption may result from exhaustive Union regulation (field pre-emption), national measures obstructing EU legislation or its objectives (obstacle pre-emption), or a conflict with a specific EU rule (rule pre-emption).

Both field and obstacle pre-emption are relevant here. Regulation 269/2014 does not merely establish minimum standards for national asset freezes. Art. 2 links the freezing obligations to the persons listed in Annex I, while Art. 14 entrusts decisions on their inclusion to the Council. The Regulation thus establishes a uniform mechanism for determining both the consequences and the personal scope of EU asset freezes, without providing for additional national designations. This supports the argument that the Union has exhaustively regulated this particular element of the sanctions regime.

Importantly, delisting does not necessarily amount to the Union ceasing to exercise its competence under Art. 2(2) TFEU. The sanctions framework remains in force, and the Council continues to determine its personal scope. Removing Fridman and Usmanov was therefore an exercise of that authority, rather than its relinquishment.

Even if autonomous national listings were not generally precluded, their reinstatement following an express EU delisting raises concerns of obstacle pre-emption. Admittedly, additional national sanctions may advance the Union’s broader objective of exerting pressure on Russia. Yet that objective is pursued through a regulatory framework in which the Council determines which individuals are subject to financial restrictions. National measures reversing an individual delisting may therefore interfere with the operation of that framework, even if they serve its broader political purpose.

This concern finds support in the Court’s case law. In Stichting Al-Aqsa (Joined Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10 P, paras 85–88), the Court emphasised the limits on parallel national measures affecting the scope of directly applicable EU regulations. Although that case concerned the repeal of national sanctions following EU listing rather than their imposition after delisting, it illustrates the importance of preserving the uniform application of EU restrictive measures. If parallel national freezes may interfere with EU law even where they reinforce parallel Union sanctions, that concern applies a fortiori where they counteract an express delisting decision.

The practical consequences reinforce this concern. National asset freezes would make the financial effects of a Council delisting dependent on the Member State concerned, risking fragmentation of the internal market. The Court recognised the risks of such fragmentation in Kadi I (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, para. 230).

Finally, Art. 215 TFEU, together with the relevant CFSP provisions, establishes a specific Union procedure for imposing financial sanctions. Allowing Member States to reinstate equivalent restrictions would risk circumventing that procedure.

Whether based on exclusive competence or the pre-emptive effect of existing Union legislation, there are therefore substantial grounds for questioning the legality of the Baltic asset freezes. Any exception would require a distinct basis in EU law, notably Art. 347 TFEU.

The National Security Exception: Art. 347 TFEU

Art. 347 TFEU preserves limited national powers in exceptional security situations, including serious international tension constituting a threat of war. It allows Member States to take unilateral measures even in areas otherwise falling within the Union’s exclusive competence. Member States enjoy a certain margin of discretion when assessing such threats, but must consult one another to minimise adverse effects on the internal market. Art. 348 TFEU provides mechanisms addressing distortions and misuse.

Given Russia’s continuing aggression against Ukraine and the geographical proximity of Estonia and Latvia to Russia, the possible application of Art. 347 TFEU deserves serious consideration. Yet establishing a threat of war is not the same as justifying any measure adopted in response to it. As a derogation from the ordinary competence allocation, Art. 347 TFEU remains subject to restrictive conditions and proportionality requirements. The national measures must be justified by the exceptional circumstances invoked.

Thus, even assuming that the security situation of Estonia and Latvia satisfies Art. 347 TFEU, a further question remains: why would freezing Fridman’s and Usmanov’s assets individually be necessary to address that threat, particularly when the Union maintains an extensive sanctions regime against Russia? The publicly available national decisions do not establish that an Art. 347 TFEU justification has been invoked or that its requirements, including consultation, have been satisfied.

Nor can mere disagreement with the Council’s assessment suffice. Estonia and Latvia could have challenged the delisting as privileged applicants under Art. 263 TFEU. Their disagreement alone cannot establish the exceptional circumstances required to justify independent national measures under Art. 347 TFEU.

Who Decides Whom to Sanction?

The Fridman and Usmanov cases expose a tension in EU sanctions policy: Member States participate in determining whom the Union sanctions, yet some seek to reverse the outcome through national measures. Whether Union competence is exclusive or shared, the Treaties and the resulting rules on pre-emption place limits on such unilateral action. Unless an exception such as Art. 347 TFEU applies, disagreement with a Council decision cannot justify circumventing those limits. A common sanctions policy must be common not only in whom it sanctions, but also in whom it decides to delist.


SUGGESTED CITATION  Hubbes, Maxima: Delisted in Brussels, Sanctioned in Tallinn: Who Decides on EU Financial Sanctions?, VerfBlog, 2026/11/17, https://verfassungsblog.de/delisted-in-brussels-sanctioned-in-tallinn/, DOI: 10.59704/853e8509bdba81fb.

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