17 Juli 2015

Greece: a constitutionalist’s two (euro)cents.

Greece is obviously at the forefront of many EU scholars’ minds over the past number of weeks.  There has been an avalanche of commentary and analysis on the Greek bailout negotiations both from those with intimate knowledge of the situation and familiarity with Greek politics, the EMU and sovereign debt crises as well speculation from the sidelines from those of us more ignorant of these matters. Therefore as someone whose credibility in the debate (such as it is) is limited to the expertise of the constitutional lawyer with a good familiarity of EU law generally, I have limited my two (euro)cents on the topic to a number of (mostly factual) propositions related to the crisis for what they are worth. Most I think are obvious and (hopefully) few are contentious but I think that they are worth (re)stating in the context of the war of words and recrimination from all sides present in the debate in recent days.

  • Greece went bust. The fallout from this was never going to be pretty. There were going to be losers, including losers in Greek society, whatever happened.
  • Debt relief in some shape or form has been part of Troika negotiations at least since 2012. This includes, significantly from the viewpoint of commentary in some media, debt relief on money owed to private investors who took a significant ‘haircut’ on their investments in 2012 as well as other means of extending Greece’s loans and lowering interest rates to lighten the debt burden. I will not comment as to whether debt relief should have been more prominent in negotiations now or before or whether private investors should/could have lost more on their investment other than to say that at least some private creditors should be counted amongst the losers of the crisis.
  • Losers generally complain and protest – it doesn’t mean that they have been dealt with unjustly. I will not comment on whether the actual losers in the Greek crisis were the ‘right‘ losers and/or whether they have been treated unfairly.
  • There is a strong case for a moral duty for all involved to mitigate the effects of Greece’s bankruptcy on the most vulnerable in Greek society.  I will not comment on whether this was actually achieved or could have been achieved more effectively.
  • Greece is a first world country. Even within the Eurozone there are poorer countries and more vulnerable people than Greece/Greeks, not to mention globally.
  • The Eurozone is not a (federal) state.
  • No country (or at least no pre-1995 accession country) was forced to join the eurozone. Even if we accept the argument that eurozone membership benefits one or one group of member states more than others – and is not entirely clear that it does – each EU Member state has to take responsibility for bringing its country into the eurozone.
  • There are 19 democracies in the Eurozone. It is arguable that this is perhaps too many. As the Eurozone negotiations revealed, what was possible in negotiating Greece’s latest package was contingent upon whether eurozone representatives had/could gain the support of national MPs in national governments and/or national public opinion. This arguably made the bailout negotiations much more complex and acrimonious than they might otherwise have been.
  • It is a truism that the eurozone was badly designed; although this may not have become so apparent so quickly had the global financial crisis not happened when it did. What this debacle has taught us is that the euro cannot live on rules alone.  We have known this for some time ever since eurozone states including Germany(!) started to breach the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Therefore further and deeper reforms to Eurozone governance are necessary and should be inevitable beyond drafting and attempting to enforce new fiscal disciplinary rules. There are many possible reforms, here are three:
  • Establish a new permanent mechanism to off-set the inability of individual eurozone economies to deal with major shocks due to their loss of monetary and fiscal sovereignty through some sort of fiscal transfer fund or otherwise. The ESM operates too much like an international organisation like the IMF, involving conditionality and MoUs. This model is unsuited to the more integrated condition of Eurozone states.
  • Establish independent EU financing through EU taxation to finance this fund.
  • Make the eurozone accountable to one democracy rather than 19 – i.e. the European Parliament so that EU taxpayers, as represented through the European Parliament, rather than national taxpayers, represented in national parliaments, shoulder the burden of bailouts (but only where absolutely necessary).

These proposals will require a(n) (even) greater sense of solidarity between Eurozone states than has been displayed since the eurocrisis began. However, it will need to be found, and quickly, if the euro is to survive.


SUGGESTED CITATION  Mac Amhlaigh, Cormac: Greece: a constitutionalist’s two (euro)cents., VerfBlog, 2015/7/17, https://verfassungsblog.de/greece-a-constitutionalists-two-eurocents/.

2 Comments

  1. Anders Larson Fr 17 Jul 2015 at 10:23 - Reply

    I agree wholeheartedly with this analysis.

  2. Accountablity So 19 Jul 2015 at 13:35 - Reply

    „Make the eurozone accountable to one democracy rather than 19 – i.e. the European Parliament so that EU taxpayers, as represented through the European Parliament, rather than national taxpayers, represented in national parliaments, shoulder the burden of bailouts (but only where absolutely necessary).“

    First: The European Parliament is the directly elected parliamentary institution of the European Union, not he Eurozone.
    Second: The seats to the European Parliament are distributed according to „degressive proportionality“. As a result, Maltese and Luxembourgish voters have roughly 10x more influence per voter than citizens of the six large countries. That’s to „One woman/man, one vote“. I couldn’t stomach a 10% voting power compared to voters from other countries. And taxation is for me the most important competence of a parliament.
    Have much fun with new EU treaties!

Leave A Comment

WRITE A COMMENT

1. We welcome your comments but you do so as our guest. Please note that we will exercise our property rights to make sure that Verfassungsblog remains a safe and attractive place for everyone. Your comment will not appear immediately but will be moderated by us. Just as with posts, we make a choice. That means not all submitted comments will be published.

2. We expect comments to be matter-of-fact, on-topic and free of sarcasm, innuendo and ad personam arguments.

3. Racist, sexist and otherwise discriminatory comments will not be published.

4. Comments under pseudonym are allowed but a valid email address is obligatory. The use of more than one pseudonym is not allowed.




Explore posts related to this:
Euro, democracy, eurozone, federal Europe, fiscal union, solidarity


Other posts about this region:
Europa, Griechenland

Explore posts related to this:
Euro, democracy, eurozone, federal Europe, fiscal union, solidarity


Other posts about this region:
Europa, Griechenland
2 comments Join the discussion
17 Juli 2015

Greece: a constitutionalist’s two (euro)cents.

Greece is obviously at the forefront of many EU scholars’ minds over the past number of weeks.  There has been an avalanche of commentary and analysis on the Greek bailout negotiations both from those with intimate knowledge of the situation and familiarity with Greek politics, the EMU and sovereign debt crises as well speculation from the sidelines from those of us more ignorant of these matters. Therefore as someone whose credibility in the debate (such as it is) is limited to the expertise of the constitutional lawyer with a good familiarity of EU law generally, I have limited my two (euro)cents on the topic to a number of (mostly factual) propositions related to the crisis for what they are worth. Most I think are obvious and (hopefully) few are contentious but I think that they are worth (re)stating in the context of the war of words and recrimination from all sides present in the debate in recent days.

  • Greece went bust. The fallout from this was never going to be pretty. There were going to be losers, including losers in Greek society, whatever happened.
  • Debt relief in some shape or form has been part of Troika negotiations at least since 2012. This includes, significantly from the viewpoint of commentary in some media, debt relief on money owed to private investors who took a significant ‘haircut’ on their investments in 2012 as well as other means of extending Greece’s loans and lowering interest rates to lighten the debt burden. I will not comment as to whether debt relief should have been more prominent in negotiations now or before or whether private investors should/could have lost more on their investment other than to say that at least some private creditors should be counted amongst the losers of the crisis.
  • Losers generally complain and protest – it doesn’t mean that they have been dealt with unjustly. I will not comment on whether the actual losers in the Greek crisis were the ‘right‘ losers and/or whether they have been treated unfairly.
  • There is a strong case for a moral duty for all involved to mitigate the effects of Greece’s bankruptcy on the most vulnerable in Greek society.  I will not comment on whether this was actually achieved or could have been achieved more effectively.
  • Greece is a first world country. Even within the Eurozone there are poorer countries and more vulnerable people than Greece/Greeks, not to mention globally.
  • The Eurozone is not a (federal) state.
  • No country (or at least no pre-1995 accession country) was forced to join the eurozone. Even if we accept the argument that eurozone membership benefits one or one group of member states more than others – and is not entirely clear that it does – each EU Member state has to take responsibility for bringing its country into the eurozone.
  • There are 19 democracies in the Eurozone. It is arguable that this is perhaps too many. As the Eurozone negotiations revealed, what was possible in negotiating Greece’s latest package was contingent upon whether eurozone representatives had/could gain the support of national MPs in national governments and/or national public opinion. This arguably made the bailout negotiations much more complex and acrimonious than they might otherwise have been.
  • It is a truism that the eurozone was badly designed; although this may not have become so apparent so quickly had the global financial crisis not happened when it did. What this debacle has taught us is that the euro cannot live on rules alone.  We have known this for some time ever since eurozone states including Germany(!) started to breach the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Therefore further and deeper reforms to Eurozone governance are necessary and should be inevitable beyond drafting and attempting to enforce new fiscal disciplinary rules. There are many possible reforms, here are three:
  • Establish a new permanent mechanism to off-set the inability of individual eurozone economies to deal with major shocks due to their loss of monetary and fiscal sovereignty through some sort of fiscal transfer fund or otherwise. The ESM operates too much like an international organisation like the IMF, involving conditionality and MoUs. This model is unsuited to the more integrated condition of Eurozone states.
  • Establish independent EU financing through EU taxation to finance this fund.
  • Make the eurozone accountable to one democracy rather than 19 – i.e. the European Parliament so that EU taxpayers, as represented through the European Parliament, rather than national taxpayers, represented in national parliaments, shoulder the burden of bailouts (but only where absolutely necessary).

These proposals will require a(n) (even) greater sense of solidarity between Eurozone states than has been displayed since the eurocrisis began. However, it will need to be found, and quickly, if the euro is to survive.


SUGGESTED CITATION  Mac Amhlaigh, Cormac: Greece: a constitutionalist’s two (euro)cents., VerfBlog, 2015/7/17, https://verfassungsblog.de/greece-a-constitutionalists-two-eurocents/, DOI: 10.17176/20170228-143636.

Leave A Comment

WRITE A COMMENT

1. We welcome your comments but you do so as our guest. Please note that we will exercise our property rights to make sure that Verfassungsblog remains a safe and attractive place for everyone. Your comment will not appear immediately but will be moderated by us. Just as with posts, we make a choice. That means not all submitted comments will be published.

2. We expect comments to be matter-of-fact, on-topic and free of sarcasm, innuendo and ad personam arguments.

3. Racist, sexist and otherwise discriminatory comments will not be published.

4. Comments under pseudonym are allowed but a valid email address is obligatory. The use of more than one pseudonym is not allowed.




Explore posts related to this:
Euro, democracy, eurozone, federal Europe, fiscal union


Other posts about this region:
Deutschland

Explore posts related to this:
Euro, democracy, eurozone, federal Europe, fiscal union


Other posts about this region:
Deutschland
No Comments Join the discussion
Go to Top