This article belongs to our Spotlight Section » Higher Education and Democratic Resilience
16 November 2026

Resisting the Chainsaw

Argentina’s Public Universities under Milei

Since Javier Milei took office in December 2023, the budget of Argentina’s national universities has lost more than a fifth of its value in real terms. University funding has fallen from 0.72% to about 0.53% of GDP, and by May 2026, university salaries had lost more than a third (34.7%) of their purchasing power. These numbers reflect a hostility towards public universities that austerity alone does not explain. We argue that Milei, like many of his peers on the new right around the world, treats the university as a useful adversary; in his case, it is one more face of “la casta”, the political caste he ostensibly set out to fight. Free public higher education is, however, too popular in Argentina to be challenged directly, so his government has strategically oscillated between open attacks on academics and the quiet attrition of university budgets. Argentine institutions, backed by broad public mobilisation, have used every available channel to hold back the chainsaw, yet have failed, at least for now, at the last mile. Protests, legislation, and court rulings have kept the university public, tuition-free and widely supported, but they have not protected students and professors from the cuts, which are slowly emptying lecture halls and laboratories of the people who made them work.

What is Being Chainsawed

Few cuts in Argentina’s democratic history have been this deep or this fast. Within two and a half years, university salaries had fallen below their level of 2002, at the bottom of the country’s worst economic crisis. Even after a partial wage agreement in June, university salaries remain some 22% below their level of November 2023. Science fared even worse: public spending on science and technology fell by almost half in real terms, to about 0.15% of GDP, the lowest level since the series began in 1972, and some 6,400 jobs have disappeared from the national science system, more than 2,000 of them at CONICET, the National Scientific and Technical Research Council. Since much of the universities’ full-time research staff is employed by CONICET, this cut, too, falls on the universities.

What is being chainsawed is an unusually egalitarian system, of which Argentines are especially proud. Argentina’s public universities charge no tuition for undergraduate studies and, as a rule, admit anyone who has finished secondary school, without entrance exams or quotas. The result is a mass system, especially in the first years. In 2023, Argentine universities had 2.75 million students, almost three quarters of them in public institutions, in a country of 46 million people. According to UNESCO data, 41% of Argentines of university age attended higher education in 2021, against a regional average of 30.5%.

Resistance in the Streets, in Congress, in the Courts

Free public higher education is one of the most entrenched commitments in Argentine democracy. University fees were abolished in 1949, and the 1994 constitutional reform wrote “the principles of free and equitable state public education” and university autonomy into Article 75(19). Generations of Argentines, many of them the first in their families to study, have gone through these classrooms, and in 41 of the 57 national universities most new students are still first-generation today.

Argentines’ pride in this system may help explain how forcefully they have defended it in the streets, in Congress and in the courts. Millions have joined five nationwide marches for public universities, some of the largest demonstrations Argentina has seen in decades. At the first of them, some one million people took to the streets in more than twenty cities. Every national university but one formally joined the protests, and governors from across the political spectrum voiced their support. Such near-unanimity in the public sphere left the government little room, and even Milei felt compelled to declare his own commitment to free public universities.

That consensus reached Congress, too. In 2025 it passed the University Funding Law, which updated university salaries and student grants, and when the President vetoed it, both chambers overrode the veto by the two-thirds majorities the Constitution requires. Congress had not overridden a presidential veto since 2003. Those majorities were only possible because many legislators who support the broad lines of Milei’s programme refused to follow him on this, as did many of their voters. The vote cut across party lines and marked out one of the basic consensuses of Argentine society.

The universities then took the fight to the courts. A federal judge ordered the government to apply the law, the Court of Appeals upheld the order, and the Supreme Court dismissed the government’s appeal. Yet the order has not been enforced. The government keeps appealing, argues that a partial wage agreement amounts to compliance, and has shifted the dispute to the 2027 budget debate in Congress. More than a year after the law was promulgated, it has still not been applied in full.

The University as Adversary

The government’s attack is partly based on Milei’s libertarian creed. The university is part of the big state that the Argentine president has said plainly he wants to destroy. In June 2024, he described himself as “the mole who destroys the state from within”. On a libertarian reading, universities and research councils are one more line in a budget the government wants to shrink, and easier to cut than most. But that reading fits poorly. The attack on universities is not a libertarian peculiarity.

In recent decades, new right leaders around the world have made universities a favourite target, despite their differences. Donald Trump froze $2.2 billion in federal grants to Harvard, Jair Bolsonaro froze 30% of the federal universities’ discretionary budgets while his education minister denounced the “balbúrdia”, the mayhem, on campuses. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dismissed thousands of academics by decree after the 2016 coup attempt, and Viktor Orbán forced the Central European University out of Budapest. In all these cases the leader treats the university as an adversary, a relatively autonomous source of knowledge, criticism and prestige that he does not control.

What these leaders share is perhaps best captured by the strategy Murray Rothbard set out in “Right-Wing Populism” (1992), a text that has become essential for understanding the new right. (Milei named one of his five dogs after Rothbard – one of the living ones, that is, not the dead dog the president is said to regard as still present.) For Rothbard, the ruling class includes a “new Class of technocrats and intellectuals, including Ivy League academics and media elites, who constitute the opinion-molding class in society”. Persuading this class is pointless, Rothbard argued, because “the intellectual elites benefit from the current system; in a crucial sense, they are part of the ruling class”. The task is then to expose “how they are ripping us off” and to reach the masses directly, “to short-circuit the dominant media and intellectual elites”. The Argentine government’s rhetoric follows this script closely, describing universities as “centres of indoctrination” (Milei as a candidate, in 2022), public education as “brainwashing” (April 2024), the public university as one that only serves the rich, and university authorities who refuse audits as thieves. Milei represents an extreme version of this current, and academics are central to his narrative of “la casta”, the political caste, in a way that has little to do with the size of the state.

Between Open Attack and Quiet Attrition

In a democracy, a government may argue for a smaller state, tuition fees, entrance exams or a different model of higher education. This government does none of that. It attacks universities and academics head-on, portraying them, as Rothbard would, as an elite that is ripping off the taxpayer, and cuts their funding year after year. Yet Milei has promised more than once that the university “will remain public and tuition-free; that is not up for discussion”. The contradiction is only apparent. Free public higher education enjoys such broad support that the government cannot afford to question it openly, so it goes after the universities themselves and the people who work in them, insinuating that most of them are thieves, though never quite all.

Alongside the open attacks runs a quieter, and perhaps more effective, strategy of attrition. In 2024 it did not pass a budget; it rolled over the 2023 one while prices more than doubled. Inflation did the cutting. No vote was needed, no law was changed, no university was closed, and salaries and operating funds bought less every month. The mechanism is not really new. University salaries also lost ground between 2015 and 2019 and remain more than 40% below their 2011 peak in real terms; university funding as a share of GDP has been falling since 2017. Argentine governments of different stripes have let inflation adjust what they did not want to adjust openly. What changed in 2024 was the scale, the speed and the purpose.

The University Funding Law made attrition harder. Once Congress had legislated and the courts had ordered payment, the government could no longer cut by default. It had to choose between paying and openly defying the other two branches, and so far it has chosen defiance. It suspended the law by decree (Decree 759/2025) until Congress identified funding sources, a requirement drawn from its own reading of budget law. Its 2027 budget bill asks for the power to halt transfers to universities that do not report their spending to the Ministry of Human Capital. By suspending a law passed over its veto and ignoring court orders the Supreme Court has left standing, the executive is testing whether the separation of powers binds it.

Open defiance puts this double strategy to a test, one that Jon Elster’s idea of the “civilizing force of hypocrisy” helps to describe. Actors who must argue in public have to dress their interests in impartial terms, and that dressing ends up constraining what they can do. The marches, Congress and the courts have built that kind of public stage. The government still professes its commitment to free public universities even as it insinuates, in line with Rothbard’s script, that everyone who works in them is ultimately stealing from the taxpayer. Every month of non-compliance makes the gap between word and deed harder to hide, and with court orders unenforced, its political cost is, for now, the main constraint on the government.

The Reform the Government Forecloses

The Argentine public university does need reform and has needed it for a long time. Since at least Carlos Menem’s structural adjustment in the 1990s, it has spent much of its energy defending its budget and its free and open character rather than rethinking itself. But a defence of the university that ignored its problems would convince no one who is not already convinced.

Governments have funded universities by historical inertia and political bargaining rather than by transparent criteria, and have let salaries slide for years. The universities, for their part, have low graduation rates, governance arrangements that often reward internal politics over academic merit, uneven accounting and a long resistance to external evaluation. In particular, universities have largely left the hiring of full-time academics to CONICET – Argentina’s National Scientific and Technical Research Council. In 2022, only about 10% of the 213,658 teaching positions in public universities were full-time, and almost 70% were part-time appointments of a few hours a week. Research careers were built in CONICET instead: many of its researchers work in university departments, but CONICET pays them, evaluates them and decides whom to hire. This weakened the universities’ capacity to set their own research agendas, and it gave the government an easy point of entry: by freezing CONICET’s hiring and salaries, it could hollow out university research without touching a single line of the university budget.

There is a real debate about the funding formula, the careers of teachers and researchers, and who should pay for it all (in our view, those who can, through progressive taxes rather than fees). One thing is clear, though: neither the open attacks nor the attrition reform any of this. The attacks discredit the university without proposing anything for it, and attrition cuts everywhere at once, hitting hardest where the university works best, since researchers with options abroad or in the private sector are the first to leave, and within the science budget, supplies and equipment have fallen far faster than salaries. Nor do they create the conditions for a reform debate. No university community can discuss a new funding formula while it struggles to pay its electricity bill. Reform requires a broad public debate that includes those who study and work in the universities, and decisions taken in Congress. That debate is what the government has chosen to avoid, and the reason is Rothbardian. If academics are part of a ruling class that cannot be persuaded, there is no point in deliberating with them: the goal is, precisely, to turn them into public adversaries.

Even so, Argentine democracy has shown real resilience. The streets, Congress and the courts have kept tuition fees off the agenda and made every cut politically costly. But they have failed at the last mile. The law is on the books and the rulings stand, yet the money has not arrived, and the universities remain in critical condition. Still, the conversation is not over. Oscillating between open attacks and silent attrition, the government has avoided a debate on the university in two ways, shouting it down and bypassing it. The defence of the public university, carried into Congress and the courts, has kept that debate open. That may be its greatest merit.

 


SUGGESTED CITATION  Maisley, Nahuel, Puga, Mariela; Gargarella, Roberto: Resisting the Chainsaw: Argentina’s Public Universities under Milei, VerfBlog, 2026/11/16, https://verfassungsblog.de/resisting-the-chainsaw/, DOI: 10.59704/3586bbf450ebc3d3.

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