29 May 2026

Restoring Constitutional Justice in Hungary

On 12 April 2026, Hungarian voters rendered their judgment on the regime that could be described in many ways, but certainly not as a well-functioning liberal democratic constitutional order. Today, the constituent power shall aim at restoring liberal democratic constitutionalism, and more narrowly, constitutional justice. The root of the problem is the current composition of the constitutional court stemming from the winner-takes-all approach of the previous regime. The problematic question, however, is how this can be addressed in line with European constitutionalism. Continue reading >>
0
28 May 2026

Fixing the Hungarian Bench

Péter Magyar swept away Fidesz and won a constitutional majority. Yet Orbán packed the courts with his people in the meantime. Should Magyar resort to another round of court-packing? First, legitimate court-packing must have a just cause and must be proportional. Second, the proportionality of such reactive court-packing should in general respect the “paired effect”, although a stronger response may sometimes be justified. Finally, Magyar should not aim just for returning to the status quo but should innovate and build a resilient judiciary that enjoys the trust of the Hungarian people. Continue reading >>
0
27 May 2026

Vetoing the President?

Following Fidesz's electoral defeat, the country's new political leadership has pledged to dismantle the legal and institutional structures that enabled sixteen years of democratic backsliding. Yet one of the most powerful obstacles to that project may be hidden in plain sight: the constitutional powers of the President of the Republic. If President Tamás Sulyok chooses to use them aggressively, Hungary could soon find itself facing an unprecedented constitutional crisis. Continue reading >>
0
22 May 2026

The Missing Dimension

Public discourse on the repair of constitutional democracy tends to focus on its political dimensions. The Fidesz period, however, demonstrated that markets and democratic governance are deeply interconnected. The restoration of constitutional democracy, which will inevitably involve the reorganisation of the economy, should therefore prompt reflection in public law discourse on the ways in which markets ought to be structured in democratic societies. Public law scholars must engage seriously with the role that competition law reform can play in this process. Continue reading >>
21 May 2026

Hungary’s European Rebirth

As Péter Magyar and his Tisza government took office on 9 May, ending sixteen long years of autocratic capture, the crowds outside the Parliament danced and cheered. Now the new government has a constitutional supermajority and a massive democratic mandate. But unlike Orbán’s supermajority, Magyar’s still has to confront veto players. The Hungarian government has a speedy and lawful option for realising its mandate without lurching into extreme scenarios: Using European law as an interim constitution to evade the roadblocks left in place by the Orbán government. Continue reading >>
0
19 May 2026

Rebuilding Markets, Restoring Democracy

After sixteen years, Hungary emerges from an era characterised by illiberal governance, democratic backsliding, and the systematic weakening of rule of law institutions. Rebuilding a credible, stable, and predictable legal system will be essential not only for restoring democratic legitimacy internally, but also for reconnecting Hungary to the core economic structures and values of the European Union. Such a transition requires a broader understanding of the rule of law that extends beyond public institutions to the governance of markets and economic relations. Continue reading >>
0
16 December 2025

Populism Is Here to Stay

Following the presidential defeat of his preferred candidate in June 2025, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk, a former president of the European Council, recalibrated – or, more precisely, intensified – his strategy of imitating illiberal political forces, to the extent that his political rhetoric could easily be now mistaken for Orbán’s. What are the implications of this troubling development for what is, in fact, at least in the recent European context, a Polish speciality: the process of democratic restoration? Continue reading >>
Go to Top