20 August 2026
Constitutional Politics in Action – Part I
The Fidesz-KDNP parliamentary group submitted petitions to the Constitutional Court in July 2026 challenging Hungary’s newly adopted Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments. The petitions demonstrate how constitutional doctrine can be strategically reconfigured when political actors move from exercising constitutional power to challenging its exercise by others. After losing control of constitutional power, Fidesz strategically reconfigures elements of domestic doctrine that had been used to resist its own autocratization. Continue reading >>
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19 August 2026
Towards Qualified Majority Voting in EU Foreign Policy
For several years, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) appeared to have a Hungary problem. More fundamentally, however, it has a Treaty-design problem. Article 31(1) TEU establishes unanimity as the default decision-making rule for the European Council and the Council in CFSP matters, subject to specified exceptions. We argue that the standard justifications for unanimity do not outweigh its structural costs and that the existing Treaties leave more room for qualified majority vote than current practice suggests. Continue reading >>15 July 2026
The New Constitutional Amendment and the Removal of the President
On 13 July 2026, the Hungarian Parliament enacted the 17th Amendment to the Hungarian Fundamental Law. In line with the TISZA Party’s election manifesto, the Amendment ends the current President of the Republic’s, Tamás Sulyok’s, term of office. This is undoubtedly an extraordinary measure. Given the President’s apparent partiality and his failure to respond consistently to earlier illiberal constitutional developments, I consider the exceptional and temporary constitutional change to be justified as part of the broader effort to lay the foundations of a renewed constitutional order. Continue reading >>
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03 July 2026
The Constitution Always Speaks in the Present
The newly elected Hungarian Parliament approved the Sixteenth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary on 15 June 2026, now awaiting the President’s signature before entering into force. Specifically, the Amendment limits the prime Minister’s term of office to eight years, calculated from 1990 onwards. Effectively, this change prevents Orbán from returning to the office. I argue that the Amendment may be justified in the specific Hungarian context to prevent the consolidation of power of one-man. Moreover, I contest that the Amendment is retroactive and, for that reason, ad personam. Continue reading >>
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29 May 2026
Restoring Constitutional Justice in Hungary
On 12 April 2026, Hungarian voters rendered their judgment on the regime that could be described in many ways, but certainly not as a well-functioning liberal democratic constitutional order. Today, the constituent power shall aim at restoring liberal democratic constitutionalism, and more narrowly, constitutional justice. The root of the problem is the current composition of the constitutional court stemming from the winner-takes-all approach of the previous regime. The problematic question, however, is how this can be addressed in line with European constitutionalism. Continue reading >>
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29 May 2026
Three Readings of One Decision
The dominant reading of the December 2023 unfreezing of funds for Hungary – most recently restated on this blog, following Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta’s February Opinion proposing its annulment – describes that release as “clearly a political ploy at European Council level to get Orbán to lift his veto for support to Ukraine”. The authors argue that the mechanism must be insulated from political bargaining if it is to retain credibility. Their diagnosis of what went wrong is sharp. Their assumption about what would constitute going right may be less secure. Continue reading >>
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28 May 2026
Fixing the Hungarian Bench
Péter Magyar swept away Fidesz and won a constitutional majority. Yet Orbán packed the courts with his people in the meantime. Should Magyar resort to another round of court-packing? First, legitimate court-packing must have a just cause and must be proportional. Second, the proportionality of such reactive court-packing should in general respect the “paired effect”, although a stronger response may sometimes be justified. Finally, Magyar should not aim just for returning to the status quo but should innovate and build a resilient judiciary that enjoys the trust of the Hungarian people. Continue reading >>
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27 May 2026
On the Renewal of Media Regulation
The opposition’s two-thirds electoral victory has opened the way for a comprehensive renewal of media regulation. Although the legislator must respond to the legacy of the past sixteen years, lasting success can only be achieved if we are also able to learn from the thirty years of experience with Hungarian media governance. Then the harder part will begin: ensuring that the system of media governance operates in accordance with an institutional culture committed to pluralism, dialogue, constitutional values, and sound public policy. Continue reading >>
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22 May 2026
The Missing Dimension
Public discourse on the repair of constitutional democracy tends to focus on its political dimensions. The Fidesz period, however, demonstrated that markets and democratic governance are deeply interconnected. The restoration of constitutional democracy, which will inevitably involve the reorganisation of the economy, should therefore prompt reflection in public law discourse on the ways in which markets ought to be structured in democratic societies. Public law scholars must engage seriously with the role that competition law reform can play in this process. Continue reading >>19 May 2026
Rebuilding Markets, Restoring Democracy
After sixteen years, Hungary emerges from an era characterised by illiberal governance, democratic backsliding, and the systematic weakening of rule of law institutions. Rebuilding a credible, stable, and predictable legal system will be essential not only for restoring democratic legitimacy internally, but also for reconnecting Hungary to the core economic structures and values of the European Union. Such a transition requires a broader understanding of the rule of law that extends beyond public institutions to the governance of markets and economic relations. Continue reading >>
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