Despite the enormous delegation of power under the recent emergency legislation, the Hungarian parliament is still able to exercise parliamentary scrutiny and its constitutional prerogatives.
Continue Reading →Were we ready for the crisis? I do not mean whether Switzerland had enough hospital beds and ventilators, but whether its Federal Constitution was ready. Arguably, the former are vital, and as regards the latter, Switzerland is under no suspicion of losing its quality as a democracy and a Rechtsstaat. Still, the constitutional questions raised by the Corona crisis are troubling. The federal government is applying emergency powers unheard of since WW2, and which were previously unimaginable for most. Legal scholars are only starting to grapple the full implications of the crisis.
Continue Reading →The present pandemic affects our ways of life and acts as a magnifying glass: It helps us to see the main features of our political and legal systems better. In France, the Act of Parliament from March, 23 reveals a well-known feature of the French fifth Republic: Parliament is not considered as a major political institution. Furthermore, it reveals yet again that the state of emergency has become common since 2015.
Continue Reading →On 21 April, 41-year-old actor and comedian Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who entered the political scene only in January 2019, won the second ballot of Ukraine’s presidential election with 73 percent of the national vote. Ukrainians are placing high hopes on their new President to improve the country’s politicial and economic situation. But political games and Ukraine’s constitution will make it difficult for Zelenskiy to bring about the change he was elected for.
Continue Reading →The UK House of Lords has adopted amendments to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill that would make the conclusion of a withdrawal agreement contingent on parliamentary approval. It is not at all clear which, if any, of the Lords amendments will survive in the House of Commons, and we may not find out for a while. It may be premature to conclude that Parliament is now fully in charge of the Brexit process. What the amendments show, however, is that Parliament can assert control if it chooses to do so.
Continue Reading →Die G 10-Kommission kann nicht in Karlsruhe überprüfen lassen, ob die Bundesregierung ihr zu Recht die Herausgabe der NSA-Selektorenliste verweigert. Diese Entscheidung des Zweiten Senats des BVerfG ist nicht überzeugend, schwächt die institutionelle Kontrolle exekutiven Handelns und liegt quer zu der Linie des Ersten Senats.
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