Peace and Security for Ukraine and Europe are not Created on the Drawing Board of the West
Viewing Ukraine as an object rather than a subject of negotiations is not an unfamiliar pattern of international security policy. It goes hand in hand with the dangerous tendency to turn Russia’s ‘Near Abroad’ ultimately into a ‘buffer zone’ even in Western political and academic discourses. This pattern has been at work in the course of the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Donbas over the past eight years. Continue reading >>
The Security-Oriented Turn in Energy Law
The full range of strategic aspects should be taken into account by the Federal Government in developing its „national defence strategy“. Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris have already described the strategic importance of economic policy and especially energy policy measures as „war by other means“. Accordingly, redefining security policy must not stop solely at the selection of new weapons systems. Rather, the German government faces the task of also realigning its energy policy with the changed strategic situation in accordance with the European energy policy. Continue reading >>
“A Voice Crying in the Wilderness”
This post will reveal the history of Ukraine's continuing warning to Europe, and in particular to German authorities about the security dangers of the violent Russian regime and politics. It will demonstrate how the ignorant and weak reaction of German politics to these threats (given the prevalence of economic interests over security and European values) indirectly supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and how the Russian regime abused European languidness and neutrality to launch a large-scale war in Europe. This blogpost is not so much about condemning the mistakes of European politicians, but about suggesting ways to solve these problems, taking into account the experience with obvious mistakes. Continue reading >>
A National Peace and Security Strategy after the “Turning Point”
Military armament has been happening not just since the so-called “turning point”. Ultimately, a better equipped Bundeswehr alone cannot lead to sustainable peace. The concept of human security and a national security strategy raised by the Foreign Minister must not be based on a purely militarised concept of security. The Federal Government ought to align its actions accordingly. Continue reading >>
International Legal Order as a National Security Interest
The "Zeitenwende" of 27 February 2022 is, in effect, an admission of a gap between long-recognised interests in multilateralism and international law, on the one hand, and the sufficiency of foreign and defence policy strategies for upholding them on the other. A primary commitment to the modes of multilateralism and underlying legal obligations is no longer sufficient—if indeed it ever was—and Germany’s forthcoming National Security Strategy must address the more arduous political and military obligations necessary to make such a system possible. The turning point is, in short, the realisation of commitments deeply embedded in national foreign policy identity, which emerges as the foundation for broad legitimacy in the policy revolution. Continue reading >>
A Constitutional Framework for Bundeswehr Operations Abroad Based on International Law
The postulated „Zeitenwende“ should not be understood simply as a historic opportunity to quickly pass the proposed reform in parliament. Even beyond the specific occasion of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the substance of the constitutional provisions on defence appears to be in need of reform. According to the opinion expressed here, the Basic Law should tie Bundeswehr missions abroad to their compliance with international law. Continue reading >>
Russia’s Eurasian Großraum and its Consequences
The available options for the German and Western policy towards Russia have to be based on the correct diagnosis of the causes of the conflict. The purpose of this analysis is to shed some light on the structural reasons for the Russian expansionism and make some projections on the possible long-tern consequences. The rivalry between the Russian-dominated space (Großraum – greater space) and the EU/NATO systems fuels an intense geopolitical antagonism in Europe, which can be transformed into actual conflict. I understand the Großraum in the sense of Carl Schmitt as a tightly managed sphere of interests, under the direct or indirect control of an authoritarian Great Power (infra II).
Continue reading >>The National Security Strategy and the Zeitenwende in German Foreign Policy
The “Zeitenwende” in German foreign policy continues to require justification and facilitation, strategic and material underpinning, as well as structural and procedural changes. But time and again, it will require critical reflection. After years of partial denial of reality and misinterpretation of behavioural patterns of key international actors, there is a risk that everything will now be pressed into the scheme of great power and systemic rivalry, and that a new bipolarity between the Western world and the authoritarian states centred around China and Russia is conjured.
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A Strategic Culture Must be Part of the National Security Strategy
The handling and development of the war in Ukraine will be a test of the effectiveness of Germany's role in the EU and the world. The most important part of the turning point must be a return to Realpolitik and the development of a national security strategy based on smart power. The turning point in Germany concerns four areas in particular: 1) German armed forces (Bundeswehr) 2) strategic culture 3) National Security Strategy 4) strengthening crisis prevention and the development of a "civilian reserve". Continue reading >>
The Third Caesura in German Security Policy
The sudden announcement of a „special fund“ for the, admittedly, lagging overhaul of the German armed forces, and the permanent increase in the defense budget (the „2 percent“ target of the NATO agreements of 2002) should be understood for what they are – a grasping for the emergency brake and not an „arms race.“ Continue reading >>