Poland’s Captured Judiciary and the Challenges of Repair
On 30 October 2026, Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, acting President of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, temporarily suspended the two judges hitherto exercising the functions of President and Vice-President. Her actions have generated considerable controversy. In an earlier post, we defended the orders as complying with European and Polish law, and we also defended the lawfully elected judges’ efforts to restore the Constitutional Tribunal’s functioning and status as an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
A critical chorus has attacked her actions. They include unlawfully appointed “judges” on other courts, such as the current President of Poland’s (also captured) Supreme Court, as well as illegal judges sitting on fake courts, such as the Extraordinary Chamber of Poland’s Supreme Court. (We use the term “pseudo-judges” to refer to those who were irregularly appointed by the captured National Council of the Judiciary as constituted under a manifestly unconstitutional law of 2017, a body that the Venice Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights held to lack basic independence in multiple respects.) Joining the pseudo-judges in criticising Judge Korwin-Piotrowska are some legal academics and representatives of Europe’s far right.
In this post, we counter this chorus of critics, in particular the recent pronouncements of Polish Supreme Court pseudo-judges; academic Marcin Szwed’s critique on this blog; and attempts by Europe’s far right to paint what has happened in Poland as a coup.
We do this because, confronted with competing accounts, the media have resorted to both-sides-ism. As The Economist, for example, put it, “the two sides are less interested in fixing the court than in controlling it and scoring points ahead of elections.” Alternatively, the media confused procedure and substance. The Financial Times, for example, opined that “bypassing constitutional procedures … creates precedents that could be abused by illiberal leaders in the future.” The FT paints supporters of restoration as well-intentioned people using dubious methods, while their opponents are principled proceduralists following the rules regardless of the consequences. The apparent paradox—must restoring the rule of law involve breaking it?—makes an irresistible story in addition to offering an easy dichotomy.
Both framings are misleading. This is not a political game. Nor is it a “he said, she said” uncertainty about where legal truth lies. To make that point, we must confront the critics.
Dueling Decisions in Poland
On 6 November, Zbigniew Korzeniowski, a lawful Supreme Court judge appointed before the National Council of the Judiciary was compromised, held that the Court’s “Professional Liability Chamber” (a body the European Commission argued is not a lawful court in proceedings before the CJEU) lacked jurisdiction to review Korwin-Piotrowska’s orders and referred the matter to the Constitutional Tribunal (hereinafter the CT). He invoked a straightforward application of the relevant statute. Article 24 of the Act on the Status of CT Judges (the CT Act) makes them disciplinarily accountable only to the Tribunal itself while Article 25 assigns disciplinary adjudication involving constitutional judges to panels of their CT colleagues. The CT is not just another court within a hierarchy headed by the Supreme Court: its disciplinary jurisdiction is expressly and separately regulated and therefore cannot be performed by another court.
On 10 November, however, the effects of judicial capture by the former ruling coalition became apparent again. The pseudo-Supreme-Court-judge Maria Szczepaniec, sitting alone, “reversed” Korzeniowski’s ruling so that her Professional Liability Chamber could hear the case. She reasoned that, because CT President Korwin-Piotrowska relied on a power contained in ordinary-court legislation applied through statutory cross-references to suspend the CT judges, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction. (One should recall that as a matter of ECHR law, this pseudo-Supreme-Court-judge cannot lawfully adjudicate as she does not meet, inter alia, the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.)
A second “decision” then set aside Judge Korwin-Piotrowska’s orders and ordered the original CT president and vice-president reinstated. The three judges making that decision were Szczepaniec, Marek Dobrowolski (another pseudo-judge), and a lay adjudicator. (One should recall that as a matter of EU law, decisions of pseudo-Supreme-Court-judges must be declared null and void in any EU-related case due to their appointments having been marred by manifest and serious irregularities.)
In short, unlawfully appointed Supreme Court “judges” demanded that their colleagues on the CT be restored to positions to which they had been unlawfully elected so as to prevent the restoration of the CT as an independent and lawful court as required, inter alia, by multiple judgments of the ECtHR and the CJEU.
On our reading, the pseudo-judges’ understanding of the disciplinary provisions in the CT Act is untenable. The cross-references from the CT Act to the Ordinary Courts Act that permitted an immediate, temporary interruption of judicial duties at the CT filled a gap in the CT Act. The the Ordinary Courts Act did not displace the explicit language of the CT Act which expressly assigns first-instance disciplinary adjudication to a panel of three CT judges selected by lot and therefore does not assign determination of the status of the CT judges to the Supreme Court.
Since assuming the CT presidency, Judge Korwin-Piotrowska broke with a decade of grotesque secrecy that had accompanied this captured court and livestreamed the random drawing of the disciplinary panels. When she herself was selected for one panel, she recused herself because she had issued the order under review. She was subsequently replaced through a further draw. In short, proper procedures were followed under the CT Act to establish the panels that will assess the status of the suspended CT judges.
So while it might appear that “the Supreme Court ruled against Korwin-Piotrowska,” what happened was something more disturbing: a lawful judge applied ordinary interpretive rules to decline jurisdiction, and pseudo-judges then purported to reverse him by disregarding the express statutory allocation of authority in the CT Act in order to seize jurisdiction in the case.
President Korwin-Piotrowska announced that she would not give effect to these decisions by the pseudo-judges. In keeping with her by-the-book approach to the whole matter, she also returned to the public prosecutor one of the requests for the lifting of the criminal immunity of one of the suspended judges on the grounds that formal procedures were not correctly followed. Her actions show her commitment to uphold the rule of law.
Academics Join the Fray
Well-meaning academics have also condemned the suspension of the CT “leadership” as a violation of the rule of law. One of them, Marcin Szwed, has criticised our analysis on this blog. Szwed is associated with the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, whose board also opposed Korwin-Piotrowska’s intervention. That position prompted most of its supervisory council—including distinguished constitutionalists Andrzej Rzepliński, Mirosław Wyrzykowski, and Wojciech Sadurski—to resign in opposition.
We agree with Szwed on a number of points. For example, we agree that PiS bears responsibility for the CT’s capture and that lasting restoration requires more than replacing officeholders. We also agree that autocratic rule brings grim consequences, as Poland knows well. A decade of judicial capture inevitably creates uncertainty and anguish for litigants. (Just to give a figure, the Strasbourg Court has over 1,200 pending cases against Poland due to the former ruling coalition’s “repeated breaches of the fundamental principles of the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary”). But we part ways when it comes to claiming that these consequences require recognition of unlawful officeholders and their decisions.
Szwed warns of the potentially dangerous consequences of invalidating the CT’s decisions that were issued with the participation of pseudo-judges because this act would violate legal certainty. But European jurisprudence does not treat legal certainty as the only value to be considered. On the contrary, it is well established that the fundamental right to a tribunal established by law may justify departures “from the principle of legal certainty and the force of res judicata and from the principle of irremovability of judges”, especially in a situation where we are dealing with pseudo-judges. Furthermore, as a matter of EU law, it is an obligation for any national court to consider null and void any “output” originating from a body that does not constitute a lawful court: “No consideration based on the principle of legal certainty” can stand in the way of such a consequence whenever required to ensure the primacy of EU law. And it is similarly well-established that as a matter of ECHR law, any pseudo-judge’s participation in CT proceedings is “by itself capable of vitiating the legal force” attached to it.
Our view – that it is lawful and indeed, a legal obligation, to set aside decisions reached by unlawfully appointed judges/leadership – simply sides with this line of jurisprudence.
On the leadership appointments, Szwed focuses on the absence of a final judgment specifically invalidating former President Święczkowski’s and former Vice-President Sochański’s appointments. But this does not answer our central argument. Article 194(2) of Poland’s Constitution assigns the nomination of candidates for the Tribunal’s presidency and vice-presidency to its General Assembly. We argue that an assembly unlawfully constituted through the participation of pseudo-judges cannot supply that nomination. Without it, the subsequent appointment cannot confer lawful title.
Indeed, the Court of Justice’s judgment of 18 December 2025 directly supports our analysis. It found that the appointment of former President Święczkowski’s PiS-handpicked predecessor as CT president occurred “in manifest breach of Article 194(2) of the Polish Constitution” due to the participation of pseudo-judges in the General Assembly that nominated her.
Szwed reads that judgment narrowly, as though its holding depended entirely on the pseudo-judges’ votes being numerically decisive for the prior CT president’s nomination. But the judgment does not establish that limitation. Even on that narrow reading, the argument faces an evidentiary problem: Święczkowski’s nomination ballot was secret, so the published totals do not reveal whether the pseudo-judges’ votes were decisive.
More fundamentally, members of a deliberative body do not simply vote. They influence nominations, participate in discussions, persuade colleagues, and shape the available choices. Article 194(2) requires a nomination by the lawful General Assembly—not merely a tally in which enough lawful judges might have supported the eventual candidate.
The commonsense starting point is therefore that participation by unauthorised persons usurping judicial functions renders the resulting nominations prima facie invalid. The less obvious proposition—that their admitted illegality leaves those nominations unaffected—requires an explanation. That burden cannot be discharged by invoking European judicial silence or criticising the brevity of our argument.
It is our position, not that alternative, that relies on well-established legal principles ensuring the rule of law and compliance with multiple judgments from both European and Polish courts.
Is Compromise Possible?
Turning to the political effects of the orders to suspend the leadership of the CT, Szwed argues that President Korwin-Piotrowska’s intervention obstructs a constitutional compromise which he regards as preferable.
We share the aspiration for a durable settlement. Two of us defended that approach in Let’s Agree on Poland. A properly structured compromise could establish a Tribunal accepted across Poland’s political divide. The disagreement concerns how to reach it—and what lawful judges should do while it remains unavailable.
Szwed himself acknowledges that Polish President Nawrocki’s unlawful obstruction of newly elected judges by refusing to receive their oaths protected his political camp’s interests. We noted that President Nawrocki also violated the interim measure issued by the ECtHR and forced his way into the CT on the night the suspension orders were issued where he threatened the lawful judges. This is not a promising start to a political compromise.
Well-intentioned lawyers beseeching politicians to behave responsibly cannot substitute for hard political incentives to prefer agreement to continued confrontation.
Why would PiS and Nawrocki accept a “constitutional reset” now while the existing arrangement remains so heavily—and unlawfully—skewed in their favour? If they can hang onto control of the Tribunal until next year’s election, why compromise today if continued obstruction might allow them to complete their autocratic revolution tomorrow?
By contrast, President Korwin-Piotrowska’s intervention may change that calculation. Disrupting an unlawful status quo can make a settlement more—not less—attractive. It is no coincidence that the conversation about a “reset” became much more pronounced after her suspension orders.
Thus, while our legal justification stands independently, we respond to Szwed on his own terms: lawful action need not obstruct compromise and may actually help create its preconditions. Even Szwed anticipates better performance of the CT under President Korwin-Piotrowska. Already, we have seen more transparent case allocation, and we can reasonably expect an end to the “state of continued non-compliance” with European rule of law requirements organised by the CT under its unlawful leadership. These are improvements to the Tribunal’s core functions, not peripheral benefits.
For now, the relevant comparison is not with an ideal settlement, but with readily available alternatives. Should lawfully elected judges remain indefinitely excluded? Should those permitted to adjudicate acquiesce in manipulated panels, the Tribunal will continue to violate European legal obligations and consistently attempt to undermine and prevent the execution of Polish and European judgments relating to Poland’s pseudo-judges and pseudo-courts. Is that really preferable?
Like the proverbial lost traveller, we would not have chosen to start from here either. But an imperfect starting point does not make continued acquiescence in unlawful activities the legally or politically superior alternative.
Hypocrisy and the Rule of Law
Europe’s far right has been less restrained in their attacks on the CT suspension orders. Marine Le Pen, French National Rally leader and a pillar of the far-right Patriots for Europe party, said that the tribunal controversy “resemble[d] a forcible takeover of a constitutional body.”
The Hungarian Conservative, a mouthpiece of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, cheered the recent decision of the pseudo-Chamber of Professional Liability that ordered the reinstatement of the suspended judges and supported President Nawrocki’s description of the matter as a coup.
Hungary’s MEP (and former right-hand man to Viktor Orbán) Balázs Orbán (no relation) drew parallels between what happened in Poland and what happened in Hungary, where the new Tisza government led by Péter Magyar removed the president and six constitutional judges through constitutional amendments.
Domestically, PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński – who previously made Poland the world’s “most autocratising country” – described a coup d’état and raised the possible future application of the “Nuremberg principles.”
Attacks coming from Europe’s far-right in response to attempts to restore the rule of law are pure hypocrisy. When the PiS government shovelled unlawful judges onto the courts and the Hungarian government packed the Constitutional Court, PiS and Fidesz supported each other’s actions without qualification. Those actions violated EU and ECHR law, which require commitments to democracy, rule of law and human rights. Now that democracy, rule of law and human rights are being restored, the losers are claiming to defend the values that they themselves had deliberately and persistently violated.
Contrary to the conventional framing (even in the liberal press), President Korwin-Piotrowska’s October orders are best defended not by their desirable consequences, but through straightforward domestic legal interpretation, supported by the European courts’ extensive Poland-related jurisprudence, as we have done. Legal certainty and national reconciliation are serious considerations, and we have engaged those arguments on their merits. But appeals to them cannot substitute for explaining who was lawfully appointed, which body possessed jurisdiction, and what the applicable provisions and binding judgments of Polish and European courts require.
The rule of law is not a right of its violators to remain in control of the institutions they captured.



