The announcement by Faber, the publishers of Sally Rooney’s novels, that her books will no longer be available for sale in the UK has been met with surprise in the UK and elsewhere. While some in the British media have downplayed this announcement, labelling it as “borderline offensive” to suggest that her books have been banned in the UK, it is nevertheless the case that Britain’s pervasive counter-terrorism laws have made it de facto impossible for Faber to continue selling them to a British audience. At considerable personal cost, Rooney is exposing how far the UK’s counter-terrorism regime reaches, and how much it depends on the government’s discretion and restraint. This reminder could hardly come at a better time.

Proscription and Palestine Action

Central to this case was the Government’s decision in July 2025 to proscribe Palestine Action – a direct action group that is opposed to Israel’s actions in Gaza which the International Association of Genocide Scholars have stated amount to genocide. In general, Palestine Action targeted the premises of one specific arms manufacturer in the UK – EBIT systems – but it would also target other businesses with connections to Israel too – like Barclay’s banks. Its actions tended to include smashing windows, spray-painting buildings, and, in damaging the manufacturing equipment of EBIT systems. They were proscribed in 2025 when they broke into an RAF base and spray-painted two military aircraft which the government alleged caused hundreds of thousands of pounds of damage.

Proscription in the UK triggers several offences such as membership, declaring support for an unlawful organisation, and wearing a uniform or displaying a sign in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable suspicion that you support a proscribed organisation. It was this offence that has seen over 3,500 people arrested at various protests across the UK against the banning of Palestine Action. To put this figure into context, the period from the banning of Palestine Action in July 2025 to 31^st March 2026 saw 92% of all terrorism-related arrests linked to this proscription. This amounted to a 1,186% increase in the number of terrorism-related arrests when compared with the previous year.

Financing Terrorism

Irish author Sally Rooney has not been seen on the streets of the UK waving a placard declaring her support for Palestine Action. Instead, she has declared her support from her home in Ireland, and stated that she would donate proceeds from her books to their cause. If Sally Rooney were a British citizen or ordinarily resident in the UK she would be committing an offence, as the UK’s counter-terrorism laws apply beyond the state’s borders.

Despite her Irish citizenship and residency, however, Rooney’s actions have illustrated the pervasive effects of a hitherto under-appreciated aspect of the UK’s counter-terrorism laws in the form of offences for financing terrorism. Section 15 of the Terrorism Act 2000 creates three offences regarding fundraising for terrorism. In Rooney’s case, Section 15(3) is particularly relevant:

A person commits an offence if he –

(a)provides money or other property, and

(b)knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism.

Section 15(4) further clarifies that:

In this section a reference to the provision of money or other property is a reference to its being given, lent or otherwise made available, whether or not for consideration.

Section 15 offences are not proscription-related; the apply to any potential terrorist purpose, regardless of whether they are linked to a proscribed organisation. What proscription has done, however, is make contributions to Palestine Action meet the Section 15(3) offence. The parliamentary explanatory notes to sections 15-17 of the 2000 Act make it clear that “for the purposes of terrorism” can be taken to include “for the benefit of a proscribed organisation”. Under the old Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, making contributions to a proscribed organisation was a separate offence. For this reason, it is possible that Faber – Rooney’s publishers – when passing on the royalties from the sale of her books to her would be providing money when they know or have reasonable cause to suspect that it may be used for the purposes of terrorism.

The case law on this is sparse and certainly there is some ambiguity as to whether it applies to an act that is not directly contributing to a proscribed organisation such as in this case where Faber is giving money firstly to Sally Rooney who is then on the record as stating that she will give it to Palestine Action. Nevertheless, Section 15 offences are liable to imprisonment terms of up to 6 months on summary conviction, or 14 years on indictment.

In addition, the specific terrorist arrest power contained in the Terrorism Act 2000 triggers a stricter arrest and detention regime than the ordinary power of arrest under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). For instance, under the Terrorism Act, a person arrested can be detained for up to a maximum period of 14 days, in contrast to PACE’s maximum period of four days (96 hours). The process for examining detention is also significantly harsher with Parliament’s own Joint Committee on Human Rights finding that the judicial oversight of the detention regime fell far short of an adversarial hearing.

The ambiguity surrounding section 15, when understood in light of the possibility of arrest and criminal conviction does not suggest that Faber or Rooney are overplaying the pervasiveness of British counter-terrorism laws. It is simply unreasonable to expect somebody to risk the possibility of a criminal conviction or even arrest under counter-terrorism legislation, simply for the sake of bringing legal clarity to an issue.

Furthermore, legal ambiguity and the chilling effect it can have on freedom of expression and the enjoyment of other rights is a harm in its own right. Indeed, this ambiguity is not only useful to the state; it is the very essence of counter-terrorism law.

The Essence of UK Counter-Terrorism Law

Rooney’s actions have shone a harsh light, not just on proscription but on the UK’s counter-terrorism apparatus more generally and the undue faith it places in the discretion of decision-makers to temper the law’s application. Much of this is linked to the UK’s broad definition of terrorism which unlocks a vast array of governmental and police powers, criminal offences, and judicial sentencing protocols. The definition includes, amongst other elements, politically motivated violence against persons, serious damage to property, and creating risks to the health and safety of the public.

Palestine Action were the first group in the UK to be banned on the basis that their actions caused “serious damage to property”. In contrast, other proscribed groups tend to cause, or call for violence against people. Worse still, according to the Home Secretary’s own assessment, only 3 out of Palestine Action’s 385 actions (or less than 1%) actually met the UK’s definition of terrorism. It is important to note at this juncture that simply because property damage does not meet the threshold for “terrorism” does not mean that it is lawful. Rather, the ordinary criminal law is still applicable and so members of Palestine Action engaging in such activities would still be committing crimes.

In the High Court challenge to Palestine Action’s proscription, this less than 1% figure was an important factor in that court’s finding that proscription was an unlawful and disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression and freedom of association under Article 10 and 11 of the ECHR. However, when the case reached the Court of Appeal, it effectively washed its hands of its responsibility to conduct a meaningful scrutiny of the Home Secretary’s assessment of this issue. Rather, it exercised an extreme level of deference and found that the Home Secretary was entitled to take into account any future possibility that Palestine Action would carry out attacks meeting the definition of terrorism too.

The scope of the UK’s definition of terrorism is amplified even further by the fact that it also includes acts committed abroad against other governments. This means that it captures every single group that fought in the Syrian civil war against the Assad Regime, including those groups which the UK provided military and financial support to. It is discretion, not the law that decided that individuals who travelled to the UK to join the so-called Islamic State were prosecuted for terrorist offences whereas those who joined other groups were not. Such is the confusion on this point that in 2015, the trial of Bherlin Gildo for terrorist acts in Syria collapsed when his lawyers argued that British intelligence agencies were supporting the same Syrian opposition group that he fought for.

In a very British way therefore, the UK trusts the “good chaps” of government not to abuse their power. Faith in decision-maker discretion to temper the breadth of the UK’s definition of terrorism is evident from the Terrorism Act 2000’s inception. When the definition was being debated by parliament the then Home Secretary Jack Straw sought to reassure the House of Commons that proscription powers would not be used against “so-called animal liberation” groups who “have engaged in actions that not only caused risks but resulted in the most serious violence to individuals, and have put people under threat of their lives”. Straw stated that:

Such circumstances may well fall within the ambit of clause 1 [the definition of terrorism]. Having said that, I believe that we must have some confidence in the law enforcement agencies and the courts. If we look back at the past 25 years, we can see that the powers have been used proportionately in the face of an horrific threat from terrorism in Ireland and a considerable threat from international terrorism.

These animal liberation groups not just damaged property but also conducted kidnappings and arson attacks. They were never banned because it was felt that terrorist offences should be reserved for more serious attacks, and also the government didn’t want to adversely increase support for their cause. Instead, faith was put in the ordinary criminal justice system that it could deal with such acts. Meanwhile, a government member sought to reassure the House of Lords that:

Action which seriously damages property but does not involve serious violence – for example, graffiti… – might seriously damage a building and deserve punishment, but we are not persuaded that in itself it reaches the threshold to be considered terrorism.

In 2013, however, the Supreme Court emphasised that Parliament’s reliance on decision-maker discretion to temper the effects of the section 1 definition was illegitimate owing to the vagueness and uncertainty it engendered. However, the Supreme Court also stated that there was nothing that it could do about it, kicking the issue back to Parliament to rectify. Parliament, however, has failed to act.

Moreover, elements of the judiciary, most notably the Court of Appeal in Ammori now seems more sanguine with such discretion, exercising an exceptionally high degree of deference towards the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action, as well as rejecting any idea that Home Office guidelines as to how the power ought to operate could also limit discretion.

Conclusions

The Court of Appeal’s judgment hallows out the last vestiges of legal constraints on the executive’s proscription power. A Supreme Court appeal on this proscription will be heard in November with judgment most likely following in January. Meanwhile, a potential government in waiting could include a political party whose front bench members have called for “lethal force” to be used against migrants in the English channel, and activists who have called for migrants to be kept in concentration camps and executions for grooming gang members.

While some may criticise Rooney’s actions as merely a publicity stunt or Rooney herself as a “posturing ingrate”, she is shining a light on the pervasiveness of the UK’s counter-terrorism apparatus, and its undue faith in the good chaps of government at a time when this reminder is sorely needed. She has done so at considerable personal expense, like many of the some 3,500 people arrested following Palestine Action’s proscription.