The European Court of Human Rights’ April 9 Climate Rulings and the Future (Thereof)
By recognizing the responsibility they have toward future individuals who will be standing in their shoes, current decision-makers are encouraged to adopt long-term perspectives and consider the broader implications of their actions beyond the immediate. This responsibility is echoed in numerous statements by the ECtHR in its rulings about how it understands its own role in European society and the world, and about the deference it believes it owes to domestic decision-makers on the one hand, and to its own past and future work on the other hand. In this light, the ECtHR has struck a pragmatic yet slightly cynical balance between the great demands it was faced with and the great responsibilities it owes to European citizens, to other institutions, and to itself. Continue reading >>In Dubio Pro Futura
This post introduces a proposal to promote the long-term interests of humanity and to avert existential and other catastrophic risks, such as those resulting from extreme climate change, pandemics and unaligned artificial intelligence, through the adoption of a novel legal decision rule: in dubio pro futura. In the face of legal indeterminacy, when the law does not provide a single correct answer but a range of several acceptable answers, courts should choose the one most favorable to the future of humanity. Continue reading >>Long-term Constitutional Law for Global Public Goods
The rules-based order necessary for realizing the sustainable development goals (SDGs) requires antagonistic, perennial struggles for justice challenging abuses of power and struggling for collective protection of the SDGs. Without such a ‘Sisyphus morality’ and stronger leadership from constitutional democracies for improving multilevel governance of global public goods, realization of the SDGs and protecting ‘human rights of all’ risk remaining a utopia. Continue reading >>Extratemporal Jurisdiction
When may a court legitimately rule over affairs of the future at all? Before thinking about how to resolve such cases, we need to clarify the conditions legitimatising the exercise of judicial authority. My (necessarily cursory) argument in this blogpost is twofold. First, I argue that it is both useful and conceptually apt to think about legitimate authority as a jurisdictional question. Second, I propose a heuristic condition that justifies the judicial exercise of extratemporal jurisdiction over future events: preserving choice.
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