07 November 2022
With or Without Hungary
By December 2022, the Council must vote on the Commission's proposal to withdraw EU budgetary funds from Hungary under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. Without a legal basis for its exclusion, Hungary will cast its vote on that proposal. Obviously, the participation of a Member State in a vote that decides on the consequences of its own rule of law violations seems paradoxical. There should be a general Treaty rule that prevents a Member State from voting in the Council when their own alleged misconduct is at stake. Continue reading >>
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31 October 2022
Hungary’s Shambolic Anticorruption Proposals
The Article Useless and Maybe Unconstitutional: Hungary’s Proposed Judicial Review of the Prosecutorial Decisions by Kim Lane Scheppele, Petra Bárd and Gábor Mészáros gives a detailed account of the proposed legislation on amending the Hungarian Criminal Procedure Code. The conclusions of the article are correct and most of the criticism is accurate. Yet the article misses some real weaknesses of the Hungarian government’s proposal. This article aims to point out these weaknesses from the viewpoint of a practicing Hungarian criminal lawyer. Continue reading >>
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26 October 2022
Useless and Maybe Unconstitutional
In part III of our analysis of the anti-corruption framework, we will look at another aspect of the Hungarian “reforms”: a new procedure that seems to allow the general public to challenge in court the decisions of Hungarian public prosecutors to drop corruption cases. The new procedure is nearly impossible to use and adds little value to existing controls on the public prosecutor. In addition, the Hungarian Constitutional Court may declare it unconstitutional in any event. Continue reading >>
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06 October 2022
How NOT to Be an Independent Agency
The Hungarian government is trying to convince EU institutions that it is taking adequate steps to ensure proper spending of EU funds going forward. At the center of this effort is a new ‘Integrity Authority’. The law establishing this authority, Bill T/1260, just passed the Hungarian Parliament on 3 October 2022. We have carefully read the laws enacted so far that establish a new anti-corruption framework and can confidently say that neither the Commission nor the Council should accept what the Hungarian government is offering because the proposed changes do not begin to alter business as usual in Hungary. In this blogpost, we will analyze the ‘Integrity Authority’ which forms the centerpiece of the government’s program, showing that it is not independent from the government nor are its powers real. Continue reading >>
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05 October 2022
Sham and Smokescreen
Since 27 April 2022, Hungary has been under the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism, introduced by the Conditionality Regulation. After various debates and considerations, and in the light of the blackmailing potential of the Hungarian prime minister, the Regulation, in a weaker form than initially proposed, works as a preventive tool for ensuring the protection of the EU budget and sound financial management of EU resources. The Hungarian government has a record of misleading (and betraying) the European Union, and apparently, it is not different now. Continue reading >>
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27 September 2022
Coping Strategies of the Hungarian Constitutional Court since 2010
The very first step of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party after its 2010 electoral victory towards an ‘illiberal’ constitutional regime was to substantially limit the once very broad review powers of the Constitutional Court. The Fidesz government also started to pack the formerly activist Court with loyalist. By 2013 was appointed by Fidesz. Before 2013, the Court used some cautious strategies to keep a certain autonomy in the midst of threats to lose its independent status altogether by becoming part of the Supreme Court. Continue reading >>
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26 July 2022
Beyond Constitutional Doctrine?
In a recent post on Verfassungsblog, Michał Stambulski and Karol Muszyński make a number of wide-ranging statements and stinging criticisms of what they believe to be the shortcomings of “doctrinal constitutionalism”, “legal constitutionalism” and “doctrinal legal constitutionalism.” What the authors fail to do at any point, however, is define what they mean by these terms. Furthermore, their attack on doctrinal constitutionalism - which includes ad hominem attacks while ironically calling for a more serious engagement and less ‘emotional’ or ‘easy moral evaluation’ - fails to offer any alternative solutions to a rule of law crisis that the authors themselves readily acknowledge to be a problem. Aside from a plea to pay closer attention to economic, social and political context, it is by no means clear what they would put in place of the doctrinal/legal constitutionalism that they appear to be so passionately opposed to. Continue reading >>
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12 July 2022
Hungary, Poland and the “Community of Fate”
In February 2022, the ECJ delivered a ruling in cases brought by Hungary and Poland against the European Parliament and Council. Not only did the ruling uphold the regime of conditionality for the protection of the EU budget; it also entered into the domain of European constitutional identity. Instead of undermining the European commitment to the rule of law, Poland and Hungary may have inadvertently consolidated the place of rule of law in the heart of EU identity. Continue reading >>
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02 June 2022
Competition and Conditionality
On 5 April 2022, just two days after the Hungarian national elections, the European Commission formally announced that it would apply the conditionality mechanism enshrined in Regulation 2020/2092 in relation to Hungary. In the past the Commission has frequently addressed issues related to “systemic irregularities, deficiencies and weaknesses in public procurement procedures”. In Hungary, however, it has not probed the enforcement of competition (cartel) law in public tender procedures. The Commission should seize the opportunity to act in this area. Continue reading >>08 April 2022
Hungary’s Lesson for Europe
There seems to be a disturbing discordance in the European Commission’s response to the Hungarian elections. On the one hand, the Commission triggers the rule of law mechanism. On the other, it refuses to comment on the fairness of the Hungarian elections. This contradicts the fact that, just like the rule of law, democracy is also part of Europe’s constitutional identity. But what does democracy require from Member States? Hungary’s elections make clear that the value of democracy, as given expression in Article 10 TEU, should be justiciable. Continue reading >>
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