08 October 2020
Finally: The CJEU Defends Academic Freedom
The CJEU’s judgment against Hungary in the CEU case is the first major judicial pronouncement by a European court on the institutional dimension of academic freedom as a fundamental human right. Infringement action has become the surprise weapon in the Commission’s rule of law toolbox. The initial surprise is a thing of the past: over the years the Hungarian government has built some defenses of its own, using familiar components of the European constitutional architecture in service of illiberal democracy. Continue reading >>
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22 June 2020
Defending the Open Society against its Enemies
On 18 June 2020, in the case of Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations), the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held that Hungarian authorities “introduced discriminatory and unjustified restrictions on foreign donations to civil society organisations” when it adopted a new legislation on NGO in 2017. How will the Hungarian government react? Six potential scenarios can be outlined from not doing anything (scenario 1) – an unlikely option due to the threat of pecuniary sanctions – to full and good faith compliance with the judgment resulting in the total repeal of the Lex NGO (scenario 6) – equally unlikely. Between these two, four additional ones may be foreseen. Continue reading >>
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29 May 2020
Unquestioned supremacy still begs the question
Earlier this week, 32 leading scholars of EU law and politics signed the statement that national courts cannot override CJEU judgments, in response to a demonstration by the BVerfG that it actually can. We share the signatories’ concern that Weiss might (and most probably will) be used as a pretext for refusing to comply with the CJEU’s rulings and the EU rule of law requirements in Member States such as Poland or Hungary. We are also critical of the conclusion to which the BVerfG arrived in its decision, though we accept some of its premises (i.e., that the national disapplication of EU acts may be justified in some rare and exceptional cases). However, even though we are not all constitutional pluralists, we take issue with some aspects of the reasoning behind the original statement and question the doctrinal and empirical arguments it invokes in favour of EU law’s unconditional supremacy. Continue reading >>26 May 2020
The European Court of Justice Enters a New Era of Scrutiny
Among the many unintended consequences of the PSPP judgment, the most unforeseen of all was to thrust the Court of Justice of the European Union into the limelight. All of a sudden, the media coverage is no longer limited to what the CJEU decides but how it decides and operates. Continue reading >>22 May 2020
Squaring the PSPP Circle
The PSPP judgment made a core problem of the European Union painfully visible as the supremacy of EU law clashed with national constitutional identity. There is, however, a possibility to square this circle: national apex courts could be empowered to issue ‘declarations of incompatibility’ under Article 4(2) TEU as an alternative to the disapplication of EU law. Continue reading >>20 May 2020
From Dialogue to Trialogue
The current clash between the Federal Constitutional Court and the ECJ should not obscure the fact that none of the two courts fits the cliché they are often turned into. A view at some ECJ decisions regarding criminal law makes this clear. Nonetheless, the dynamic between the courts must change – maybe the European citizen can step in and offer help. Continue reading >>
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20 May 2020
When is a Court a Court?
The PSPP decision is not the first time a national court objected the CJEU. In Ajos, for example, the Danish Supreme Court rebelled against conform interpretation. The PSPP decision is nonetheless different: It is a challenge on a whole new level. Continue reading >>
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05 February 2020
You Can’t Forbid Judges to Think
The Polish judiciary is split apart. One part adheres to the ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU of 19th November 2019, another does not. This legal chaos and catastrophe was caused by the recent judicial reforms and it deprives citizens of the most important right – to be certain what their legal situation in court is. Continue reading >>
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23 January 2020
Only a Court Established by Law Can Be an Independent Court
In A.K. and others, the European Court of Justice established a detailed method for assessing the independence (or lack thereof) of courts. The judicial independence test laid down by the ECJ, however, may not be entirely fit for the purpose of assessing the lawfulness of courts and judges which are established and appointed on the basis of flawed procedures by bodies arguably violating basic judicial independence requirements as established in EU law. The ECJ appears to limit the required verification under EU law to the issue of independence only. Instead, the reviewing body should, first, check whether the challenged court (judge) is “established by law” and only then, if necessary, follow up on the examination of its independence. Today the Polish Supreme Court has the opportunity to step up and give full effect to that criterion. Continue reading >>
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18 December 2019