26 January 2017
Money Makes the Court Go Round: The Russian Constitutional Court’s Yukos Judgment
On 19 December 2017 the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) ruled that payment of just satisfaction in the Yukos case was contrary to the Russian Constitution. It is the first time the apex court of a Council of Europe member state concluded that it should not pay just satisfaction. This blog post provides the background of the case, sums up the reasoning of the RCC and assesses the implications of its judgment of 19 December 2017. Continue reading >>
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11 January 2017
Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal under PiS control descends into legal chaos
Immediately after the governing Law and Justice party in Poland established its control over the Constitutional Tribunal, the court has plunged into a whole number of legal imbroglios undermining its authority and calling into question the legality of its verdicts. The new President's nomination is contested even by a supposed ally, and the remaining "old" judges seem to have adopted a strategy of passive resistance. This is probably what Law and Justice wanted to achieve: it is much easier to govern without a strong constitutional court. Continue reading >>04 November 2016
Enemies of the People?
"Enemies of the People": that is, according to the Daily Mail, what the High Court judges are. Joseph Stalin would have been wildly amused by this way of putting things… Leaving aside such 30s reminiscences, it seems to me too simple to reduce this phenomenon solely to the disgracefulness of the British boulevard press and Tory backbenchers. There is something more fundamental going on. Not only in the United Kingdom. But in the entire Western democratic constitutional space. Continue reading >>09 July 2016
Farewell to the Polish Constitutional Court
The Law of July, 7th 2016 on the Polish Constitutional Court leaves no doubts that the parliamentary majority lead by Law and Justice party (PiS) is not holding back and is determined to see its plan through to make sure that Court is finally tamed and incapacitated. The Law signals the death knell for the Court. The institution once recognized as powerful, efficient and independent from whatever powers that be is left at the mercy of the politicians, and unable to effectively wield its power of judicial review. Most importantly, the Law will make it impossible for the Court to provide an effective check on the excesses of parliamentary majority. Continue reading >>05 July 2016
Political Reductionism at its Best: the EU Institutions’ Response to the Brexit Referendum
In their reaction to the Brexit referendum, some EU institutions have shown a troubling understanding of law – law as the mere crystallisation of power relationships, norms as just technicalities, annoying obstacles standing between the political actors and their legitimate goals. This is profoundly wrong and dangerous. Continue reading >>03 June 2016
Für eine Verfassungskrise gibt es keine politische Lösung
Was Polen will, kann die EU-Kommission nicht akzeptieren, und umgekehrt. Nach Wochen des "konstruktiven Dialogs" (Kommissionsvize Frans Timmermans) gibt es immer noch überhaupt kein Zeichen des Aufeinanderzugehens. Ist das schlimm? Im Gegenteil. Continue reading >>15 April 2016
Die Kanzlerin schützt den Rechtsstaat. Oder wie?
In einem Rechtsstaat, so Kanzlerin Angela Merkel in Sachen Böhmermann, sei „es nicht Sache der Regierung, sondern von Staatsanwaltschaften und Gerichten, das Persönlichkeitsrecht und andere Belange gegen die Presse- und Kunstfreiheit abzuwägen“. Wieso eigentlich nicht? Warum gibt es dann überhaupt ein einschlägiges Ermächtigungsdelikt? Tatsächlich ist nach Art. 1 Abs. 3 GG die Bundesregierung durchaus verpflichtet, eine entsprechende Grundrechtsabwägung vorzunehmen. Continue reading >>31 March 2016
How to protect European Values in the Polish Constitutional Crisis
Does the Polish development concern us — the European citizens and the European institutions we have set up? There is a functional and a normative argument to state that it does. The normative argument is that the European Union organizes a community of states that profess allegiance to a set of fundamental values—among others, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The functional reason is that the European legal space presupposes mutual trust. European law operates on the presumption that all institutions are law-abiding. Otherwise, the legal edifice crumbles. Continue reading >>30 March 2016
Paradoxes of Constitutionalisation: Lessons from Poland
This comment aims to explain a number of paradoxes of constitutionalization on the example of the current constitutional crisis in Poland. It attempts to demonstrate that this crisis is not only political in its nature, but structural as it results from the inherent tension between the concept of rule of law, democracy and human rights. It is also argued that the success of constitutionalization as a global project depends on strong social endorsement of constitutional institutions and practices, including judicial review. Continue reading >>
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