Marta Cartabia, Daniel Halberstam, Anna Śledzińska-Simon, Antoine Vauchez, Armin von Bogdandy
We are debating the specter of German Legal Hegemony. It’s a new dimension for most German lawyers. The prevailing view has been that Germany is at the receiving end and losing out. Many consider Germany as making a too small impact on European law because it’s too inflexible for its federalism and too inhibited for many reasons. Quite a few see the 2nd Senate of the BVerfG as the last institution defending law and reason against overbearing European institutions as Berlin politicians have largely given up. The symposium has provided a different picture. How to deepen learning from it? Today we propose a discussion which is both analytical and normative.
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Daniel Halberstam
Long before the fighting ceased, Jean Monnet was already planning to integrate a defeated Germany into “a Europe united on terms of equality.” The idea had been brewing in the French and Italian resistance during World War II, even since Germany had been defeated last time around, and before then, in other forms, too. The key to bringing the warring nations together in solidarity was, as the Schuman Declaration would explain, taming the age-old animosity between Germany and France in a supranational project “open to all countries willing to take part.” The aim, in the words of the Treaty of Rome would be an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”
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Anna Śledzińska-Simon
In this post, I argue that: (I) the influence of German jurisprudence on the legal systems in Central and Eastern Europe results from transfers of legal knowledge and “cooperative adaptation” of elites in the new democracies; (II) the German legal hegemony is in fact a hegemony of reason and a culture of justification; (III) the decision of Bundesverfassungsgericht in PSPP is an attempt to maintain the culture of justification in view of its inevitable end.
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Pál Sonnevend
I have to start with a confession: if it was not for the Bundesverfassungsgericht and German legal scholarship, I would have not become the lawyer I am today. Writing a PhD in the Max-Planck-Institute in Heidelberg, attending classes by giants of German public law taught me to appreciate the famous German “Rechtsdogmatik”, a term that can only be poorly translated by “legal doctrine”. The conceptual sophistication and clarity of thoughts, the persuasive power of reasoning, the attention for details and the elegance with which the lack of answers to certain questions is concealed created for me an aura of infallibility and self-evident truth. I also remember my condescending attitude when I met foreign guests in the Max-Planck Institute who were not familiar enough with this constitutional language, or even dared to challenge some of its conclusions. Being inside this world felt reassuring, safe and also elevating. After wandering through the legal education of post-communist Hungary I finally saw the light.
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Russell A. Miller
The novel’s two ugly Americans provide useful models for two facets of hegemony as Gramsci theorized it. Hegemony, he insisted, is more than a state of cultural domination. It is better understood as a process of socio-historical change that takes place before power is institutionalized. The two drivers of the hegemonic process Gramsci theorized are consensus and coercion.
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Mirosław Wyrzykowski
The question about the legal hegemony of Germany was raised by comments from lawyers, but also politicians, in connection with the - undoubtedly - controversial decision of the German Constitutional Tribunal in the PSPP case. Armin von Bogdandy’s introduction refers primarily to the problem of the Europeanization of Germany vs. the Germanization of Europe in the context of European integration and Sabino Cassese’s description of “some specific decisions of these more recent EU-specific decisions of the Second Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court as an attempt to put a German dog leash on European institutions". But it also refers to the past of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the "imposition" of "an enlightened, soft neo-liberalism" on the countries of this region (Bogdan Iancu). In the case of Poland, because Kaczyński’s government seems to be a persecutor against the proceedings which the German jurisprudence provides, "the secret crypt in which the seeds of its spirit will be protected...". (Carl Schmitt).
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Pedro Cruz Villalón
As I see it, the central question is whether Germany, just as it is an economic and a political power in the EU, is also a legal power. This would, of course, beg the question whether this notion makes sense by itself. Is it permitted to speak of legal power in the way it is preached for other forms of power? And supposing the notion applies to Germany as a Member State of the EU, may this national condition be aptly described as hegemonic? The ultimate question behind the questions just mentioned would be ‘How can this problem be tackled?’, assuming that it indeed turns out to be a problem.
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Argelia Queralt Jiménez
Before starting my reflections on the arguments presented in Professor von Bogdandy’s text, a number of caveats need to be made. First of all, as I will explain below, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and Spanish democratic constitutional law have been deeply influenced by German constitutional law. This is a fact that is both well-known and unquestioned. It may also explain why, at present, there is no debate about the matter. For this reason, before I began to write this article, I felt it necessary to discuss with some legal colleagues how they saw the questions put forward, as I did not consider myself to be entitled to reply on behalf of the Spanish academia as a whole. Secondly, the article that we have been asked to reflect on mixes different questions. Some of them may be significant from a German standpoint, but, in contrast, are not salient topics from a Spanish one. Finally, and in relation to the point that has just been mentioned, I will attempt to provide a response in the case of those aspects that are susceptible of being considered from outside, in this case from Spain.
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Joseph H.H. Weiler
I have been politically aware for around, sigh, five decades. And with unerring regularity once every ten years or so, we have been treated to a kind of decennial Oktoberfest of German public hand-wringing. Very public – group therapy writ large. Sometimes it comes with the label of ‘Legitimacy Crisis’. Oftentimes it is a variation on the theme of ‘Are We Back to Weimer Times – and You Know What Followed That!’ It has all the hall marks of a ritual.
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Oreste Pollicino
It was already clear to Seneca, almost 2000 years ago, that “[i]f a man knows not to which port he sails, no wind is favourable”. Now, almost 2000 years later, as mentioned by Armin von Bogdandy in his inspiring introduction to this symposium, we are faced with a crucial question of existential significance: Are we moving towards a Europeanised Germany or a Germanised Europe? In order to answer to the question, we have to draw a distinction between intention and practical effect.
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András Jakab
German constitutional thinking has been central in EU law, in ECHR law, and even in some domestic constitutional systems outside of Germany. It is, however, gradually and unstoppably losing influence in Europe. This is largely due to the fact that Karlsruhe has lost its status as the most influential court in constitutional issues in Europe, with this title now belonging to the Strasbourg Court and likely to do so for the foreseeable future. This trend (i.e. the fading international influence of German constitutional thinking) cannot be reversed by German constitutional lawyers, as it is the result of major institutional and structural (“tectonic”) changes that have taken place over the last 20-25 years. German lawyers can, however, somewhat mitigate this trend by constructively participating in the formation of a common European Constitutional Language (in English).
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Koen Lenaerts
In my view, three direct implications flow from the principle of ‘equality of the Member States before the Treaties’. First, the uniform interpretation and application of EU law are key for guaranteeing that equality. Second, the uniform interpretation of EU law needs to be ensured by one court and one court only, i.e. the Court of Justice. Third and last, the principle of primacy underpins the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. That law – as interpreted by the Court of Justice – is ‘the supreme law of the land’ as primacy (Anwendungsvorrang) guarantees that normative conflicts between EU law and national law are resolved in the same fashion. Primacy thus guarantees that both the Member States and their peoples are equal before the law.
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Helen Keller, Sebastian Bates
Our focus is a postwar development, namely the European Convention on Human Rights and its interpretation in the case-law of the Court. That case-law evinces the adoption of certain ‘imports’ from the doctrine developed and applied by German domestic courts that, as Judge Wildhaber implied, the concept of German legal thinking must encompass if it has any meaning at all. Without them, the ‘legal world’ inhabited by specialists in the Convention would be entirely different. They accordingly demonstrate the salience of such thinking to the Convention system. But for reasons that we will briefly explore, they do not demonstrate that this thinking is uniquely dominant in the deliberation rooms of the Human Rights Building.
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Daniel Sarmiento
The influence of the German legal tradition in the European legal community is unquestionable. No other European country has displayed, like Germany has, such an articulate and institutionalized effort of promotion of its own legal system and thinking. The project paid off. EU Law displays an obvious German imprint that is now enforced in twenty-seven Member States. Lawyers throughout the European continent learn German to read the high-quality legal literature produced in German universities and research centers, courts and public institutions. The ultimate sign of intellectual distinction of a European lawyer is to “read the Germans”. No other feature can surpass in pedigree a lawyer’s fluency and ability to dominate German concepts in their very own words.
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Başak Çalı
I write this blog post just as I complete my fourth year as a professor of international law in Berlin. I am, as von Bogdandy calls, a Bildungsausländerin. My university education was first in Turkey and then in the United Kingdom. My academic career has been, for the most part, in the UK and then in Turkey. When I moved to Berlin from Istanbul four years ago to take up the professorship of international law at the Hertie School, I imagined Berlin to be somewhere between Istanbul and London. I hoped that it would be the best of both worlds, I would find a home in a city with a handsome Turkish speaking community at a university that conducts education and research in English. I also hoped that speaking Berlin’s two oft-spoken languages, Turkish and English, I would survive with my basic German, and learn more of it along the way and become a late Berliner.
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Antoine Vauchez
The specter of national hegemony has haunted the field of European law ever since in its emergence in the 1950s in the wake of creation of the European Communities. As the circulation and competition between national and professional models of law have always been central to its dynamics, this transnational field has developed as a reflexive field questioning its own “European-ness” -that is its capacity to produce authentically “European” norms that are not just a mask for new forms of domination, influence or hegemony.
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