Fighting Impunity Through Intermediaries
The 24th of February 2022 lastingly altered Europe’s security architecture. The European Union and its member states have continued to support Ukraine in a multitude of ways, including direct financial assistance, political support in relevant international fora, far-reaching sanctions against Russian citizens and businesses, and massive arms supplies. What has, however, remained ambiguous is within which (legal) framework the EU has provided different means of support towards Ukraine. In other words: what legal principle – that may also be derived from its treaty framework – determined and guided EU support towards Ukraine? This contribution argues that at least certain streams of EU assistance for Ukraine in countering the Russian Federation’s aggression – namely those aimed at ending impunity for international crimes – have been organized within a distinct rule of law context.
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Wartime Elections as Democratic Backsliding
The topic of the next elections to the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine unexpectedly surfaced in public discourse towards the end of spring this year. Julia Kyrychenko and Olha Ivasiuk’s recent article on Verfassungsblog outlines major legal and practical obstacles to holding wartime elections in Ukraine. In their illuminating analysis, the authors make a strong case against wartime elections, a viewpoint largely shared by civil society. My argument is a bit different. I will argue that (1) wartime parliamentary elections are expressis verbis inconsistent with the Ukrainian Constitution, and (2) wartime elections would undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions and potentially lead to democratic backsliding.
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No Voting Under Fire
Can Ukraine hold elections while it is in the midst of a full-scale invasion by Russia? This question has recently received international attention, including comments from US Senator Lindsey Graham advocating for elections during the war. However, holding elections during the current state of war faces not only factual but also legal obstacles. Genuine democratic elections cannot be conducted under fire from Russian troops.
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Cluster Munition and International Law
In recent weeks, there has been intense discussion about the delivery of cluster munitions by the United States of America to Ukraine and the subsequent use of these munitions. The use of such ammunition can be an effective military tool, which is why Ukraine has specifically sought the supply of such ammunition from its allies in order to make its defence against Russia’s war of aggression more effective. This blog post sheds light on the international law dimension of the discussion and illustrates the consequences of the delivery of cluster munitions for allied states of Ukraine, which are parties to the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions.
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Streumunition und Völkerrecht
In den zurückliegenden Wochen ist intensiv über die Lieferung von Streumunition durch die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika an die Ukraine und den nachfolgenden Einsatz dieser Munition diskutiert worden. Der Einsatz solcher Munition kann ein wirksames militärisches Mittel darstellen, weswegen die Ukraine gezielt bei ihren Verbündeten nach der Lieferung solcher Munition nachgesucht hat, um ihre Verteidigung gegen den völkerrechtswidrigen russischen Angriffskrieg effektiver zu gestalten. Es kann aber nach den für eine Abwägung zwischen militärischer Notwendigkeit und Schutzstandards offenen Regeln des humanitären Völkerrechts Situationen geben, in denen Streumunition völkerrechtskonform von Staaten eingesetzt werden darf, die nicht Vertragsparteien des Osloer Abkommens sind. Dies wird insbesondere dann der Fall sein, wenn der Einsatz der Streumunition in einem Kontext erfolgt, bei dem zivile Opfer praktisch ausgeschlossen werden können.
Continue reading >>World War 2 Memories in Lithuania and Ukraine
On May 8, 2023, Lithuania and Ukraine, along with other European countries, meet the annual anniversaries of the end of World War 2 in Europe in 1945. Meanwhile, Russia holds a national holiday tomorrow on May 9 to commemorate the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, which is the most important holiday in Russia and became a cult practice for uniting Russians after 2000. The anniversary finds Ukraine in the midst of fighting off present-day Russian aggression. Lithuania finds itself worrying about its defense, dealing with memory incidents and among the biggest supporters of Ukraine. Russia, however, finds itself more isolated than ever and scaling back the celebration: According to Moscow because of expected ‘drone strikes’, but more likely due to ‘fear of popular protests.’ This blog entry takes stock of legal measures by two nations to countervail Russia’s decades-long mnemo-political aggressiveness.
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Investing Immobilized Russian Assets, Monetarizing the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Again, the Commission and EU Member States are talking about new sanctions against Russia. The focus, according to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, should be on tackling sanctions circumvention and loopholes. In a scoop, however, it was also uncovered that the Commission has drawn up a non-paper “on the generation of resources to support Ukraine from immobilized Russian assets”. The idea behind this non-paper is to invest the immobilized assets of the Russian Central Bank in EU Member States’ bonds and bills and use the proceeds to support the reconstruction of Ukraine. The plan, as the non-paper indicates, is fraught with a number of legal and technical issues. These do not only relate to the question of whether or not such an investment of immobilized assets is compatible with international law and EU law, but also to the question of who should undertake and oversee these investments.
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On the Side of International Law
This Wednesday, the United Nations General Assembly resumed its Emergency Special Session on Ukraine, amidst a turbulent week that witnessed US President Biden’s surprise trip to Kyiv, Russian withdrawal from the New START Treaty, and Chinese top diplomat Wang Yi’s visit to Moscow, amongst other things. On Thursday, the Assembly adopted resolution ES-11/6 (draft here) with 141 votes in favor, seven against, 32 abstentions and 13 countries not voting. If the Russian aggression last year was a watershed moment for the United Nations, then the organ to watch these days is the General Assembly, and not the Security Council.
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What can(’t) international criminal justice deliver for Ukraine?
One year ago, Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, committing an act of aggression in violation of the UN Charter. Many more incidents of international crimes followed, adding to an already large number of unaddressed crimes going back to 2014. While investigations are underway, the failures to pursue accountability for international crimes committed by Russia in the past still need to be addressed in this context.
Continue reading >>Was nutzen Panzer ohne Ziele?
Die Bundesrepublik wird Leopard-2-Kampfpanzer an Kiew liefern, ukrainische Soldaten in Deutschland trainieren sowie Exportgenehmigungen an Partnerländer ausstellen. Während die russische Führung über die angeblich erneute Bedrohung durch deutsche Panzer fabuliert, sind deutsche Entscheidungsträger*innen in erster Linie mit sich selbst zufrieden. In Deutschland nicht diskutiert, jedoch zentral für alle politischen Entscheidungen in diesem Konflikt ist die Frage: Unterstützung wofür?
Continue reading >>Enteignen für den Wiederaufbau?
Jeden Tag bringt der Krieg in der Ukraine unerträgliches und unvorstellbares menschliches Leid mit sich. Vor diesem Hintergrund fällt es schwer, schon heute einen nüchternen Blick auf die Zeit nach Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen in der Ukraine und einer Zurückdrängung des russischen Aggressors zu werfen. Das allerdings scheint notwendig, um moralisierender Politik notwendige rechtsstaatliche Rationalität entgegenzusetzen. Konkret geht es dabei um die Frage, ob es möglich ist, staatliches und/oder privates russisches Vermögen entschädigungslos zu enteignen, um so den Wiederaufbau der Ukraine zu finanzieren. Diese Überlegung liegt insbesondere der Erkenntnis zugrunde, dass die durch die russische Aggression verursachten Schäden in der Ukraine schon jetzt auf über eine Billion US-Dollar geschätzt werden.
Continue reading >>Is Criminality a Russian Virtue Worth Cultivating?
On 13 December 2022, the Russian State Duma unanimously approved, in the first reading, the bill on the imposition of Russian criminal law and criminal procedure upon the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia provinces of Ukraine. The Bill flagrantly infringes the Russian Constitution, criminal legislation and international law, essentially transforming the occupied territories of Ukraine into a lawless area. Yet again, the Bill underscores the imperial nature of the Russian war of aggression.
Continue reading >>A Ukraine Special Tribunal with Legitimacy Problems?
The call for a Special Tribunal for the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine ('UkrTrib') is also getting louder in the German political discourse. The proposal goes back to an initiative by the British international lawyer and writer Philippe Sands, who was quickly joined by a number of prominent politicians and international (criminal) lawyers), but this is misleading for several reasons, not least because the IMT was a consequence of the defeat of Nazi Germany and the following regime change, which in the case of Russia is unforeseeable.
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Ukraine-Sondertribunal mit Legitimationsproblemen?
Der Ruf nach einem Sondertribunal für den russischen Angriffskrieg in der Ukraine wird auch hierzulande im politischen Raum lauter. Der Vorschlag geht auf eine Initiative um den britischen Völkerrechtler und Publizisten Philippe Sands zurück, der sich innerhalb kürzester Zeit eine Reihe prominenter Politiker/innen und Völker(straf)rechtler/innen angeschlossen haben. Bisweilen wird ein Vergleich mit dem Nürnberger Militärgerichtshof gezogen, der aber aus mehreren Gründen hinkt.
Continue reading >>Фрагментарне реагування на загрозу свободі 3МІ в ЄС
Як відомо, шляхи польського та угорського урядів розійшлися щодо відповідей на російсько-українську війну. Однак на внутрішньому рівні обидві країни продовжують покладатися на схожі структурні зміни в медіа-середовищі, які допомагають їм впливати на виборців і підривають чесність виборів. Реакція ЄС на кризу свободи та плюралізму 3MI в Угорщині та Польщі була більш стриманою та якісно відрізнялася від реакції на кризу суддівської незалежності або загрози академічним свободам та правам меншин.
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A fragmented response to media freedom at risk in the Union
The Polish and Hungarian governments have famously parted ways over responses to the Russo-Ukraine war. However, internally, both continue to rely on similar structural changes in the media environment that help them target voters and undermine elections fairness. The EU’s response to the media freedom and pluralism crisis in Hungary and Poland has been more restrained and also qualitatively different from its answer to the judicial independence crisis or threats to academic freedoms and minority rights.
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Несподівані ускладнення: вплив російського вторгнення в Україну на кризу верховенства права в ЕС
Якби наприкінці 2021 року мене запитали, які події визначатимуть кризу верховенства права в Європейському Союзі у 2022 році, я б відповів, що вибори в Угорщині стануть найвідповідальнішим моментом у боротьбі за цінності ЄС. 24 лютого 2022 року Володимир Путін зробив застарілими майже всі прогнози щодо європейської політики. Невиправдане, брутальне вторгнення Росії в Україну не лише зруйнувало понад 30-річну парадигму безпеки на континенті, але й мало масштабні наслідки для багатьох аспектів європейського життя, включаючи кризу верховенства права у двох державах-членах ЄС: Угорщині та Польщі.
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Unexpected Complications: The impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the rule of law crisis in the EU
If somebody had asked me in late 2021 what events would define the rule of law crisis in the European Union in 2022, I would have said that the elections in Hungary would be the most crucial moment for the struggle for EU values. On 24 February 2022, Vladimir Putin made almost all predictions concerning European politics obsolete. Russia’s unjustified, brutal invasion of Ukraine not only obliterated an over 30-year-old paradigm of security on the continent but also had massive ripple effects on many aspects of European life, including the rule of law crisis in two EU Member States: Hungary and Poland.
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Ризик тунельного бачення у боротьбі з російською дезінформацією
Протиставлення кінетичної війни, яка розпочалася після повномасштабного вторгнення Росії в Україну 24 лютого 2022 року, та зіткнень у цифровому просторі показує, що обидві арени війни мали різні наслідки для країн-членів НАТО та ЄС. Якщо західні держави змогли значною мірою утриматися від фізичних бойових дій, обмеживши свою участь наданням зброї та військових матеріалів українським силам, то в цифровій сфері таке утримання виявилося неможливим.
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The Risk of Tunnel Vision in Targeting Russian Disinformation
Contrasting the kinetic warfare that b