Why the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction Doctrinally Attaches to Israeli and Russian Nationals
As the storm of ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan’s request for arrest warrants loomed and landed on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, ardent supporters of Israel within the U.S. and U.K. governments and beyond appear to have seized upon a jurisdictional objection. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is reported as saying that the “ICC has no jurisdiction over this matter.” The U.K. Foreign Secretary David Cameron is reported to have said the same thing. There is a basic flaw, though, in the treaty-based objection to the ICC jurisdiction as has been made. It ignores the nature of the mandate of international criminal tribunals as mechanisms for the effective preservation of the basic fabric of the international order.
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Ukraine, the Netherlands and 26 Third States Without Russia Before the ECtHR
The hearing in the case of Ukraine, the Netherlands v Russia lasted four hours and twenty-five minutes. more than double than an “ordinary” Grand Chamber hearing. These four hours and twenty-five minutes are an important milestone in what is undoubtedly one of the most important set of cases in the history of European Convention on Human Rights. They cover more than ten years of Russian activities in Eastern Ukraine, including the open war of aggression since February 2022. The number of third parties involved in the proceedings likewise renders the case extraordinary.
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No Backdoor for Mass Surveillance
Bulk data retention is the evergreen of European security policy. On February 13, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – once again – ruled in Podchasov on Russia’s collection of and access to citizens’ private communication. The Court made it clear that weakening the encryption of all citizens cannot be justified. This sends an important message not only to the Russian state, but also to other European governments that contemplate installing “backdoors” on encrypted messenger services like Telegram, Signal or WhatsApp.
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The EU’s Eastern Border and Inconvenient Truths
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, alongside with the EU’s confrontation with Russia’s ally Belarus, however, has deeply impacted the securitisation of migration within the EU. Highly politicised conflict-related securitisation narratives have rarely found their way so swiftly into Member States’ domestic migration and asylum laws, leading to open and far-reaching violations of EU and international human rights law. Hardly ever before have ill-defined concepts and indiscriminate assumptions been so broadly accepted and used to shift from an individual-focused approach to blanket measures stigmatising, dehumanising and excluding entire groups. And rarely before have radical changes of this kind received so little criticism - a deeply unsettling and dangerous trend.
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The Curious Fate of the False Claim of Genocide
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered another blow to Ukraine’s litigation strategy. The ICJ only confirmed its jurisdiction for considering Ukraine’s narrow claim that it had not committed genocide in Donbas. As we have previously argued, given the expected modest outcome of the case for Ukraine, it would make sense for Ukraine to expand its litigation strategy beyond the false claim of genocide. Ukraine may consider lodging a new lawsuit before the ICJ under the Genocide Convention, alleging that Russia breached the Convention by committing genocide against Ukrainians as a protected national group.
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Why the Russian Constitution Matters
Russia’s failure to become a democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union is not an inevitable product of its history. On the contrary, it has been shaped by the adoption of a constitutional system of centralised power in the office of the president. Long term democratic reform will require more than just Putin leaving the office of the presidency. Avoiding a system of ‘Putinism without Putin’ will also require a new Russian constitutional foundation that breaks with centralisation and reshapes the later structural chapters of the constitution to balance power between institutions.
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A Shortcut at the Expense of Justice
On 31 January 2024, the International Court of Justice rendered its judgment on the merits of a case initiated by Ukraine against the Russian Federation in 2017. Ukraine alleged numerous violations by Russia of two treaties: the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This blog post provides a brief overview of the decision and argues that the Court sidestepped the task of reconstructing what has happened in reality via judicial fact-finding. This approach comes at the expense of several legal errors. The harsh realities of the conflict and, most importantly, the human suffering on the territories of Ukraine occupied by Russia seem far removed from the grandeur of the Peace Palace.
Continue reading >>Teaching Human Rights in Russian Legal Education
The growing mistrust towards the West in Russia since the early 2000s, as well as general disillusionment with the results of political transition and economic reforms, along with the aggressive anti-human rights propaganda of the Russian regime for a long time, has led to a perception of human rights as a "Western theory" that does not fit the Russian people. This context made it easy in the 2010s to weaponize human rights in the Kremlin’s foreign policy rhetoric and subsequent direct aggression; the rhetoric of "protecting human rights" became the justification for both the annexation of Crimea and the initiation of full-scale aggression against Ukraine.
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Can the Russian Constitution Still Strike Back?
Three decades after the adoption of the Russian Constitution, we must admit that it has not become an effective safeguard against the usurpation of power and state terror. The conditions under which the Russian Constitution could have served as a secure barrier to the revival of authoritarianism and state terror is a profound question warranting a separate discussion. I suggest that we should look a few steps ahead and imagine an optimistic scenario of a new attempt to establish democracy and rule of law in Russia – regardless of how improbable such a scenario may seem at present. One of the priorities of such an attempt will be to overcome impunity for the perpetrators of crimes of the Putin regime.
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What Went Wrong and What Could be Done?
The question should perhaps be “what went right?”. I argue that for more than 30 years, as a result of a key provision in the Constitution, and the work of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (CCRF) there were many positive changes to Russian law and practice. These advances were only possible as a result of Russia’s membership of the Council of Europe and ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). But that chapter in Russia’s constitutional history has been closed.
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Legitimizing Authoritarian Transformation
In the early 1990s, the Constitutional Court of Russia (RCC) was viewed as an important institution for protecting human rights and facilitating the democratic transition. However, the good intentions of the constitutional drafters were insufficient to overcome the country’s totalitarian legacy and practices. An examination of the RCC’s evolution over three decades reveals two significant trends: Firstly, the RCC transformed into a machine for legitimizing laws designed to dismantle political competition, civil society, and civil liberties. Secondly, this dynamic did not prevent the RCC from losing its independence and political weight after the constitutional amendments of 2020. In this blog post, I will provide a brief overview of the RCC’s most controversial decisions over the past 30 years, along with the measures taken to destroy independent constitutional review in Russia.
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Women’s Rights and the Russian Constitution
Since the beginning of Russia’ aggression against Ukraine, the government’s rhetoric has become more conservative and nationalistic. In 2022-2023, Russia witnessed the introduction of a slew of oppressive legislation directly violating human rights. Against the backdrop of Putin’s focus on the fight against the ‘enemies’ and Russia’s isolation due to ‘fighting for the right cause’ women once again became the target of regulation with a steady and consistent assault on their human rights, particularly reproductive rights. Moreover, as women actively participate in anti-war protests, the authorities have been treating women more harshly during arrest, trial and sentencing as various reports show. Nevertheless, women continue to fight for their rights and freedoms in courts and on the streets, hoping for change.
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Regime Adaptation Within Russia’s Judicial Elites
The case of Valery Zorkin, chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, shows how elites prioritize their own survival and therefore do not oppose a repressive and aggressive regime, most likely because they fear revenge from liberal peers and victims of the system. And since the war against Ukraine, elites have another reason to stay loyal. For those who fear being held responsible for a war of aggression and war crimes, Putin is the only “guarantor of stability.”
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Paving the Way for Violence
The negative effects of the 1993 conflict prevailed over the benefits from the end of a confrontation. Its outcomes raised a major barrier to the democratization of Russia and paved the way for the use of violence as a means of preserving power. This conflict contributed to the maximization of presidential power and to the weakening of checks and balances in the constitution, which included significant authoritarian potential. The political order established in Russia after the 1993 conflict largely determined the subsequent trajectory of Russian political evolution and its drift towards a personalist authoritarian regime.
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Constitutional Identity vs. Human Rights
In two recent Latvian cases concerning the Russian-speaking minority decided respectively in September and November 2023, the ECtHR made clear that protection of constitutional identity has now been elevated to a legitimate aim for a differential treatment under the Convention. This post explores how the protection of constitutional identity has been deployed to enable a collective punishment by association with a former occupier, and how the ECtHR’s reasoning has effectively endorsed such a punishment, which is unbefitting of a liberal democratic system the ECHR aspires to represent. Until the three cases were decided, no liberal European democracy could argue without losing face that suppressing a large proportion of its population was its constitutional identity – one of the goals of its statehood. Today, this claim is seemingly kosher, marking a U-turn in the understanding of what the European human rights protection system is for minorities in Europe.
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Challenging the ‘Post-Soviet’ Label and Colonial Mindsets
The international discourse long depended on the term ‘post-Soviet’ to refer to the 15 sovereign states that emerged and re-emerged from the Soviet Union following its dissolution in 1991. The list includes European and Asian countries with contrasting backgrounds. Rooted in the context of the Cold War, the term fails to capture the crucial ongoing metamorphosis and challenges of these states for the past thirty years. For Lithuania and the Baltic region at least, the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July 2023 is a chance to emphasize the strong European identity and to challenge the deep colonial mindsets, which overlooks Eastern European perspectives in favor of those built in Moscow since the beginning of the 20th century.
Continue reading >>Weaponizing Russia’s Memory Law
Russia is increasingly using its “memory law” to put pressure on potential critics of the Russian attack on Ukraine. While it is being used to crack down on anti-war dissenters, it also provides a (false) pretext of a legitimate societal cause for its application. In this way, the laws are used to create a mood of paranoia and fear among the population, and a feeling as if the country were in a besieged fortress.
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Wagner ist keine Söldnertruppe
Spätestens seit Wagners Putsch-Versuch von letztem Samstag gerät die Gruppe immer stärker in den Fokus der Öffentlichkeit. Dabei nimmt das Interesse an Söldnern und die Forderung nach ihrer Kontrolle und Verboten von allen Seiten zu. Die Mitglieder der Gruppe Wagner sind jedoch keine Söldner. Sie sind private military contractors (PMCs) – und damit eine weitaus größere Bedrohung für das Gewaltmonopol, die Einhaltung des humanitären Völkerrechts und den Schutz von Betroffenen. Echte Regulierung von PMCs ist nicht erst seit Wagners brutalem Einsatz bitter nötig. Jetzt könnte sich zuletzt durch den gescheiterten Staatsstreich das erste Mal ein Fenster auftun, indem auch der Westen sich einer echten Kontrolle von PMCs nicht mehr verschließen kann. Wagner könnte damit zum Kipppunkt werden, die Haltung zum Outsourcing von Gewalt zu überdenken.
Continue reading >>Yevgeny Prigozhin and Russia’s Expanding Prerogative State
Over the weekend, the world’s attention was gripped as a well-equipped Russian private military company led by Evgeny Prigozhin seized control of a key Russian city and military hub, and marched on Moscow. Prigozhin’s actions reveal a deeper truth about Putin’s Russia: the absence of formalised, legal mechanisms for peacefully resolving high-level, intra-elite disputes. As the war in Ukraine drags on, what Ernst Fraenkel called the ‘prerogative state’ is expanding. This lawless realm of unchecked public power has no rules or institutions that can settle disputes among the Russian elite; these can only be resolved by Putin himself.
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World War 2 Memories in Lithuania and Ukraine
On May 8, 2023, Lithuania and Ukraine, along with other European countries, meet the annual anniversaries of the end of World War 2 in Europe in 1945. Meanwhile, Russia holds a national holiday tomorrow on May 9 to commemorate the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, which is the most important holiday in Russia and became a cult practice for uniting Russians after 2000. The anniversary finds Ukraine in the midst of fighting off present-day Russian aggression. Lithuania finds itself worrying about its defense, dealing with memory incidents and among the biggest supporters of Ukraine. Russia, however, finds itself more isolated than ever and scaling back the celebration: According to Moscow because of expected ‘drone strikes’, but more likely due to ‘fear of popular protests.’ This blog entry takes stock of legal measures by two nations to countervail Russia’s decades-long mnemo-political aggressiveness.
Continue reading >>Investing Immobilized Russian Assets, Monetarizing the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Again, the Commission and EU Member States are talking about new sanctions against Russia. The focus, according to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, should be on tackling sanctions circumvention and loopholes. In a scoop, however, it was also uncovered that the Commission has drawn up a non-paper “on the generation of resources to support Ukraine from immobilized Russian assets”. The idea behind this non-paper is to invest the immobilized assets of the Russian Central Bank in EU Member States’ bonds and bills and use the proceeds to support the reconstruction of Ukraine. The plan, as the non-paper indicates, is fraught with a number of legal and technical issues. These do not only relate to the question of whether or not such an investment of immobilized assets is compatible with international law and EU law, but also to the question of who should undertake and oversee these investments.
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Rosneft am Ende?
Als das Bundeswirtschaftsministerium im September zwei deutsche Tochtergesellschaften des russischen Staatskonzerns Rosneft unter Treuhandverwaltung der Bundesnetzagentur stellte, ließ die Reaktion aus Moskau nicht lange auf sich warten: Man werde mit allen zur Verfügung stehenden rechtlichen Mitteln gegen diese „Zwangsenteignung“ vorgehen, verkündete Rosneft und klagte vor dem BVerwG. Mit Urteil vom 14. März 2023 hat das BVerwG diese Klagen nun als unbegründet abgewiesen.Aus verwaltungsgerichtlicher Perspektive mag durch das Urteil alles gesagt sein. Im Bereich des Verfassungs-, Unions- und Völkerrechts sind indes viele Fragen offen.
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Enteignen für den Wiederaufbau?
Jeden Tag bringt der Krieg in der Ukraine unerträgliches und unvorstellbares menschliches Leid mit sich. Vor diesem Hintergrund fällt es schwer, schon heute einen nüchternen Blick auf die Zeit nach Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen in der Ukraine und einer Zurückdrängung des russischen Aggressors zu werfen. Das allerdings scheint notwendig, um moralisierender Politik notwendige rechtsstaatliche Rationalität entgegenzusetzen. Konkret geht es dabei um die Frage, ob es möglich ist, staatliches und/oder privates russisches Vermögen entschädigungslos zu enteignen, um so den Wiederaufbau der Ukraine zu finanzieren. Diese Überlegung liegt insbesondere der Erkenntnis zugrunde, dass die durch die russische Aggression verursachten Schäden in der Ukraine schon jetzt auf über eine Billion US-Dollar geschätzt werden.
Continue reading >>Is Criminality a Russian Virtue Worth Cultivating?
On 13 December 2022, the Russian State Duma unanimously approved, in the first reading, the bill on the imposition of Russian criminal law and criminal procedure upon the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia provinces of Ukraine. The Bill flagrantly infringes the Russian Constitution, criminal legislation and international law, essentially transforming the occupied territories of Ukraine into a lawless area. Yet again, the Bill underscores the imperial nature of the Russian war of aggression.
Continue reading >>Ukraine-Sondertribunal mit Legitimationsproblemen?
Der Ruf nach einem Sondertribunal für den russischen Angriffskrieg in der Ukraine wird auch hierzulande im politischen Raum lauter. Der Vorschlag geht auf eine Initiative um den britischen Völkerrechtler und Publizisten Philippe Sands zurück, der sich innerhalb kürzester Zeit eine Reihe prominenter Politiker/innen und Völker(straf)rechtler/innen angeschlossen haben. Bisweilen wird ein Vergleich mit dem Nürnberger Militärgerichtshof gezogen, der aber aus mehreren Gründen hinkt.
Continue reading >>The Soviet Famine and Criminalising “Denialism”
The precedent set by international human rights law and the case law of European constitutional courts allows the exceptional criminalisation of Holocaust denial. But the same “exceptional” treatment does not apply to other events which may or may not consist of a “genocide, crime against humanity or a war crime”. Thus, EU Member States struggle to strike a balance between their obligations deriving from international human rights law and those deriving from EU law.
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Moving On in Strasbourg
Russia’s justified expulsion from the Council of Europe after the beginning of the full-scale military invasion in Ukraine continues to pose problems for the European Court of Human Rights and the European Convention machinery in general. Even though Russia remained bound by the Convention until 16 September 2022, a number of decisions in Moscow, but also in Strasbourg, made matters complicated. Especially processing the outstanding 17,000 cases and enforcing those judgments now require innovative solutions.
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No Rainbow without Rain?
On 6 December 2022, Latvian National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP) revoked the broadcasting licence of the independent Russian TV channel ‘TV Rain’. The measures taken against TV Rain in Latvia raise intricate legal questions from an EU law point of view: Is the crackdown on the anti-war Russian TV channel compatible with EU-wide rules on audiovisual media? Can the Latvian government lawfully request YouTube to make TV rain’s channel inaccessible in Latvia? This blogpost argues that EU law is powerless when confronted with possibly unjustified national restrictions against media outlets and their growing spillover into the Internet sphere.
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Russland und das Anti-Folter Komitee (CPT)
Trotz Ausschluss aus dem Europarat und dem damit verbundenen Ende der Bindung Russlands an die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (EMRK) bleibt Russland an die „Europäischen Konvention zur Verhütung von Folter und unmenschlicher oder erniedrigender Behandlung oder Strafe“ von 1989 gebunden. Russland muss daher Besuche der Anti-Folter-Kommission des Europarates zulassen.
Continue reading >>Mobilized to Commit War Crimes?
In that earlier post, I argued that states have a legal obligation to recognize the refugee status of Russian troops who flee to avoid participating in what is a war of aggression. That argument applies equally to this new scenario. Those who refuse to fight and who leave Russia to avoid doing so should be recognized as refugees. However, there is now an additional way to ground that claim.
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Why EU Countries Should Open Their Borders to Russian Draft-Evaders
In a significant escalation of his war in Ukraine, Russia’s President Putin announced a partial mobilisation on the 21st of September. Attempting to avoid the draft, thousands of Russian men are reported to be fleeing the country. Are EU countries obliged to grant asylum to Russians who are (pre-emptively) evading Putin’s draft?
Continue reading >>Mobilisation
Putin’s speech did not explicitly mention concrete plans to annex Ukrainian occupied territories, but Putin did announce a quick “recognition” of the fake “referenda” on joining Russia in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, scheduled in just a few days. In terms of international law, planned annexations will change nothing. States are under international legal obligation not to recognise any territorial changes declared by Russia. Any territorial concessions imposed on Ukraine under nuclear blackmail would also be legally null and void. Putin’s desperate attempt to change the game is unlikely to influence the resilience of Ukraine and its allies.
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Gorbachev’s Legacy in Lithuania
The last President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, who oversaw its largely peaceful collapse, passed away last week at the age of 91. Despite the praise from Western leaders, Lithuanian's public view is mostly unaffected by "Gorbamania". Gorbachev's reputation in Lithuania was irreparably damaged by the crackdown of January 13, 1991. After failing to seize control of important institutions in Vilnius, Soviet forces killed 14 individuals and injured hundreds more in a bloody massacre.
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The “Year of Historical Memory” and Mnemonic Constitutionalism in Belarus
On 1st of September 2022, the academic year in all Belarusian schools started with an atypical lesson, on “historic memory” – led in Minsk by none other than the country’s “President” himself, Aliaksandr Łukašenka. There is a constitutional dimension to historical memory in Belarus, which is better grasped through the looking glass of mnemonic constitutionalism.
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Why Banning Russians from Schengen Is Unlawful
Volodymyr Zelensky, the Prime Minister of Finland and others have been calling for an EU-wide ban of Russian citizens from Schengen visas. Unquestionably, the horrible crimes perpetrated by the Russian state should be punished. But Russians are citizens of a totalitarian state, they are not Putin. And whether we like it or not, there is no legal way under current EU law to adopt a blanket citizenship-based ban against Russians acquiring Schengen visas. Even more: political attention paid to it by persons in leadership positions is deeply surprising, if not irresponsible.
Continue reading >>Those Dazzling Stars of Peace, Democracy and Freedom
In the dark, post-Soviet 1990s, Europe and America were viewed as shining spots by us, the young people, born in the Soviet Union. Embodying the West, they served as dazzling stars, relieving the darkness and promising freedom, security and happiness. I associate the brightest star with the symbol of human rights. I fondly remember myself, as a third-year law student, getting a strong sense of pride over the Chapter Two of the newly adopted Constitution of Georgia that is devoted to human rights.
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Die nukleare Option als ultima ratio im Ukraine-Krieg
Die nukleare Drohung ist ein ständiger Begleiter des Ukraine-Krieges – von seinen Anfängen über alle bisherigen Wendungen hinweg. Ausgerechnet ein IGH-Gutachten von 1996 hält die Tür zu einem zulässigen Einsatz von Nuklearwaffen einen Spalt weit offen, durch den die russische Föderation mit der Macht der Faktenverdrehung drängt. Es wird Zeit, den Einsatz von Nuklearwaffen pauschal zu ächten und zu verbieten.
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Russian Crown-Presidentialism
Many studying Russia have pointed to Vladimir Putin’s deliberate cultivation of charismatic authority through carefully staged photo ops and messaging campaigns. Yet, Putin’s power also draws on rational-legal authority. Putin draws his authority from detailed, constitutional rules that allow the president to dominate the Russian political system. The surprising importance of rational-legal authority in Putin’s Russia carries a number of important lessons for better understanding Russia and the role of constitutional rules in democratic governance.
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Unberechenbare Autokratien – verunsicherte Demokratien
Was wir brauchen, ist mehr Wissen für die Entwicklung eines (Völker)Rechts der Uneindeutigkeit. Der Ukraine-Krieg ist kein Unfall, aus dem das Völkerrecht gestärkt hervorgehen wird. Er ist ein Alarmsignal der Dominanz der Unordnung, gegen die es kein schnell verfügbares Mittel geben wird.
Continue reading >>Letters from Brussels with Love and the Issue of Mutual Trust in Nationality Matters
In a recent article on this blog, I have set out that the spotlight will soon be turning on the European passportization of Russian oligarchs. And well, what shall I say, it did not take long for the Commission to come out swinging. In a recommendation issued on March 28, the Commission urged “Member States to immediately repeal any existing investor citizenship schemes and to ensure strong checks are in place to address the risks posed by investor residence schemes”.
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The Council of Europe’s Sharp Turn
The Council of Europe (CoE) responded promptly to Russia’s act of aggression against Ukraine first by suspending Russia’s representation rights on 25 February 2022, and then by expelling it on 16 March 2022 in accordance with Article 8 of the Statute. The Committee of Ministers used the Article 8 procedure for the first time in the history of the CoE. This might have crucial implications for the broader CoE context and could make the threat of suspension and expulsion more credible for other member states as well.
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Passportization
Putin’s alleged arguments to conduct a “special military operation” to “demilitarise and denazify” Ukraine revolve around protecting the people of the Donbas, including citizens of the Russian Federation, “facing humiliation and genocide.” One of the tools Russia used to justify its political and military engagement in the post-Soviet space has been passportization. This policy effectively created Russian citizens in the contested territories of neighbouring states in the context of protracted conflicts of secession. Just as in Georgia, passportization worked as a tool of interference with Ukrainian sovereignty.
Continue reading >>Are We in for a New Wave of Investment Arbitrations?
In response to the sanctions imposed on Russia, the country has doubled-down and announced a set of retaliatory measures affecting investors from ‘unfriendly’ countries. The scale of potential losses foreign investors face in Russia is probably the largest since the aftermath of the revolution in 1917, which saw mass nationalization and Russia’s default on the foreign debt. However, the legal landscape protecting foreign investors has significantly changed since 1918. Consequently, they have much better legal options today for redressing their financial losses.
Continue reading >>We Should Take the Ukrainian – Russian Negotiations Seriously
If Russia suddenly becomes serious about an agreement, drops its absurd demands of “denazification” and demilitarization, a deal may be more plausible than we now think. The Ukrainian government has sent numerous constructive signals. Governments in Europe and beyond should be prepared to respond to a sudden turn of events and be ready to offer what may be needed to get a deal done.
Continue reading >>The Oligarchs Among Us
It is no secret that Russian oligarchs have not only been collecting fancy toys but also various golden passport, that not only have allowed them to make them feel like home in the Europe Union, but also to be a part of “us”. And since the spotlight is already shifting towards how it is that some of these Russian oligarchs are indeed “our” very own oligarchs, there will be questions of what it is that validates the legal status of nationality actually. It is an old question to be fair, but the apparent answer of the day that nationality is what any State makes of it is therefore no less unconvincing and should lead to some soul searching.
Continue reading >>Sanctions for Abramovich, but Schröder Goes Scot-Free
What is the role of citizenship – Russian and European – in the context of the deployment and operation of the sanctions? The question is far from trivial. Indeed, effective rights-focused judicial review of such measures is very weak, allowing the matters of foreign policy and perceived political expediency and retribution to override core constitutional principles and guarantees of the European legal systems at all levels. Let us start with history, to understand what is going on and give it a legal assessment.
Continue reading >>Der Krieg in der Ukraine, Putin und das Völkerstrafrecht
Die Ereignisse in der Ukraine haben das Bedürfnis ausgelöst, die Initiatoren der Gewalt persönlich zur Verantwortung zu ziehen. So haben 39 Staaten, darunter Deutschland, den IStGH ersucht, sich der Situation in der Ukraine anzunehmen. Fünf Tage später haben Gerhart Baum und Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger in Deutschland Strafanzeige gegen Putin und die Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrates wegen Verletzung des Völkerstrafrechts gestellt. Dieses parallele Vorgehen ist grundsätzlich sinnvoll: Völkerstrafrecht kann nur im Zusammenspiel von nationalen und internationalen Mechanismen effektiv durchgesetzt werden. Dies liegt auch daran, dass sie sich in Reichweite und Wirkungsmacht durchaus unterscheiden.
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Zeitenwende? Zeitenwende!
Der Krieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine, so heißt es in Politik und Medien, demonstriert die Rückkehr eines Politikstils, der längst überwunden und vergangen geglaubt wurde: die traditionelle Großmachtpolitik, die Kriege um Territorien und Grenzverschiebungen „kleinerer Staaten“ nicht ausschloss, sondern als legitimes Mittel der Politik und Machtbalance stets mitdachte und ausführte. Diese Rede ist aus historiographischer Perspektive betrachtet aus mindestens zwei Gründen problematisch. Einerseits verkennt die Rhetorik den Charakter der traditionellen Großmachtpolitik, die in der Geschichte auch eine Form des europäischen Friedenssystems war. Andererseits ist fraglich, ob diese traditionelle Großmachtpolitik jemals verschwunden war.
Continue reading >>Extraterritoriale Einbürgerungen als Hegemonialinstrument
Der russische Einmarsch in die Ukraine wurde seit 2019 durch eine systematische Einbürgerungspraxis Russlands im Donbas vorbereitet. Russland hat weit vor seinem Krieg gegen die Ukraine das Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht als Mittel der Außenpolitik instrumentalisiert - und bereits hierdurch die Ukraine in ihrer territorialen Souveränität verletzt.
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Kann Straßburg den Krieg zähmen?
Nur wenige Tage nach seinem Beginn hat der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine gleich mehrere internationale Gerichte erreicht. Der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR) hat bereits gehandelt. Auf einen Antrag der Ukraine hat er am 1. März 2022 vorläufige Maßnahmen seiner Verfahrensordnung ergriffen. Die Entscheidung des EGMR vom 1. März 2022 ist bemerkenswert und ernüchternd zugleich.
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Strasbourg Has No Chance and Uses It
On 28 February 2022, Ukraine lodged a request for interim measures against Russia before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Ukraine referred to “massive human rights violations being committed by the Russian troops in the course of the military aggression against the sovereign territory of Ukraine”. Within one day of the Ukrainian request, the Strasbourg Court granted “urgent interim measures” under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
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The Legal Obligation to Recognize Russian Deserters as Refugees
The European Union (EU) and its member states are reportedly considering offering asylum to Russian deserters. They and other states around the world have a legal obligation to do precisely that. Soldiers who flee punishment for refusing to fight in aggressive wars are properly understood as refugees under international law.
Continue reading >>Too Little Politics in EU Defense Policy
The arming of Ukraine with European financial means may enjoy widespread support among European populations scandalized by Putin's egregious actions. But this should not obscure the fact that it is the result of largely arcane decision-making processes: Neither the establishment of the European Peace Facility nor the breaking of the Union's rules on arms exports by supplying weapons to the war zone Ukraine was the subject of a substantively open public discourse and will formation.
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Crypto-assets as a blind spot in sanctions against Russia?
On 24 February 2022, Russia illegally invaded the territory of Ukraine. The international community was quick to condemn this military aggression and to issue sanctions. Missing in today's sanctions strategy, however, is the inclusion of crypto-assets. This is worrying, as it is highly likely that crypto-assets are used to fund the Russian war machine without anyone really seeing it.
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Hot War and Cold Freezes
In light of mounting pressure to take effective action against Putin, the European Commission and six states (UK, USA, Canada, Germany, France, Italy) agreed last Saturday on yet another bundle of sanctions against Russia. Some of them had been expected, like the exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT. Others like the freezing of central bank assets came as a bit of a surprise, allegedly even for Vladimir Putin. He should have watched the news more carefully. The United States did the exact same thing to Afghan central bank assets after the Taliban takeover last year. The purpose of this note is to explore the practical and legal implications of this freeze.
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Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Russland und ihre rechtlichen Grenzen
In der Dynamik der letzten Tage wurden von den USA, der Europäischen Union und anderen Staaten Sanktionen gegen Russland beschlossen, die als „beispiellos“ und „verheerend“ bezeichnet wurden. Russland spricht von „illegitimen“ Sanktionen und droht gar mit atomarer Abschreckung. Tatsächlich stehen die erlassenen Wirtschaftssanktionen auf sicherem rechtlichen Boden. Sie sind in einem gewissen Maß sogar Voraussetzung dafür, dass der Boden des Völkerrechts nicht wegbricht
Continue reading >>Wird Deutschland durch Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine zur Konfliktpartei?
Nach dem altehrwürdigen Neutralitätsrecht ist das Territorium neutraler Mächte „unverletzlich“. Konfliktparteien dürfen es deshalb in keiner konfliktbezogenen Weise nutzen. Doch wann verliert ein Staat seine Neutralität?
Continue reading >>A Terrible Crime
International law, it is often said, has lost its normative power. The opposite is true.
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Ein furchtbares Verbrechen
Das Völkerrecht, heißt es oft, hat seine normative Kraft verloren. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall.
Continue reading >>Der Europarat muss Russland jetzt suspendieren
Der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine hat zahlreiche europäische Akteure unsanft aus dem Schlaf gerissen und die Träume von einem friedlichen Europa zerplatzen lassen. Nun gilt es Antworten zu finden, um den Krieg möglichst schnell zu beenden, aber auch zu fragen, welche Fehler gemacht wurden und wie die Zukunft Europas als Wertegemeinschaft gestaltet werden kann. Dies gilt auch in der aktuellen Situation für den Europarat und die Europaratspolitik der Mitgliedstaaten.
Continue reading >>Erklärung zum russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine / Statement on the Russian attack on Ukraine
Vorstand und Rat der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Internationales Recht erklären: […]
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Jenseits der roten Linien
Abgeordnete aus Russland sollten nicht an der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarats (PACE) teilnehmen können. Dies haben am vergangenen Montag, zu Beginn der neuen Sitzungsperiode, Abgeordnete aus der Ukraine und dem Baltikum gefordert und die Beglaubigungsschreiben der russischen Delegation angefochten. Am Mittwoch muss nun über diese abgestimmt werden, damit die russische Delegation ihr Mandat in der PACE aufnehmen kann. Auch die deutschen Delegierten sollten die russischen Beglaubigungsschreiben, wenn überhaupt, dann nur unter Auflagen ratifizieren.
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Beware of the Bulldozer
The case of Russia teaches us how dangerous extra-constitutional constitution making can be – and that it should always be just a last resort. No substantive institutional changes should be made outside of the constitutional bounds. Otherwise, there will always be the danger that breaking the rule of law will continue even after constitutional change has taken place. This is precisely what Russian intellectuals and jurists, who supported Yeltsin in 1993, learned under the rule of Vladimir Putin. We should try to avoid repeating their mistakes.
Continue reading >>Smothered by Russia’s Brotherly Embrace
On 12 July 2021, Putin’s article ‘On historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians’ was published on the official website of the Kremlin, followed by a video to explain the article’s main ideas. Russia’s president repeatedly refers to the past, making use of historical narratives to frame and legitimize Russia’s security policy and geopolitics.
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Will Russia Yield to the ECtHR?
On 13 July 2021, the European Court of Human Rights published its judgment in Fedotova and Others v. Russia, a case which concerned the lack of legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the Russian legal system. The judges found the Russian laws to be in violation of Article 8 – the right to respect for private and family life and Article 14 – prohibition of discrimination. However, it is highly unlikely that Russia will enforce the judgment.
Continue reading >>A Year of Zeros? Legal Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic in Russia
As the end of the year 2020 approached, the Vice-President of the French Conseil d’État Bruno Lasserre commented on one line of the case-law that appeared in the pandemic year: urgent application judges had to decide on the legality of rules found in press-releases and interviews by first deciphering legal rules and their hierarchy from those texts. This reflected exactly my experience as a practitioner in 2020 Russia: advising a client having weighed whether a blog of the Speaker of the Moscow City Duma carried more authority than a televised interview of the Moscow Mayor.
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Human Rights in the Line of Fire
On 21 January 2021, the Grand Chamber of the European Court delivered its judgment in the case of Georgia v Russia (II). The Court did establish Russia’s responsibility for the consequences of one of the gravest military confrontations the continent has seen since Russia has joined the Strasbourg club. The Court is visibly not at ease with its role to adjudicate human rights violations in an armed conflict between two States. It left the five-day exchange of hostilities to the realm of humanitarian law, however, not exclusively. The white spots on the map of human rights protection in Europe the Court identifies have broad ramifications for the pending cases between Ukraine, The Netherlands and Russia as well as the cases between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Continue reading >>Corona Constitutional #46: Diktatoren haben es auch nicht immer leicht
In Belarus kämpft Alexander Lukaschenka mit ungezügelter Brutalität um seine Macht. Und ob es ihm gelingt, sie zu behalten, davon hängt auch für den russischen Präsidenten Vladimir Putin ungeheuer viel ab. Im gleichen Moment wird Putins schärfster Kritiker Alexei Navalny mit einer akuten Vergiftung ins Krankenhaus eingeliefert und dann nach Deutschland ausgeflogen. Wie hängt das zusammen? Ist der Anschlag ein Zeichen von Stärke oder von Schwäche? Diese Fragen diskutiert Max Steinbeis mit der Politikwissenschaftlerin und Russland-Expertin Silvia von Steinsdorff von der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
Continue reading >>When International Rules Come in Handy for an Autocratic Regime
Russian law is moving away from the acceptance of international rules in the domestic legal order. Under the thick fog of isolationist rhetoric, however, lay areas where quite a different attitude towards international rules thrives: one of overzealous implementation - for example when it comes to fighting money laundering.
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Farewell to the European Constitutional Tradition
On 1 July 2020, with Russia’s coronavirus cases passing 650,000 and following an elaborate spectacle of public affirmation, the Russian electorate eventually confirmed the constitutional amendments. First proposed by Russian president Vladimir Putin in January, the 2020 Russian Constitutional Amendments were initially planned to enter into force only three months later upon approval in an ‘all-Russian vote’ scheduled for 22 April 2020 but had to be postponed due to the spread of the coronavirus. Although many of these amendments have to be considered mainly symbolic, they constitute the most fundamental changes of Russia’s Constitution in its 26-year history.
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Demoralisierung als Verfassungsfunktion
Bis zum 1. Juli 2020 findet nun in Russland die ursprünglich für den 22. April 2020 geplante, durch die Corona-Pandemie aber verschobene Volksabstimmung über die Verfassungsreform statt. Das Änderungsverfahren sagt viel aus über die Bedeutung der Verfassung im autoritär regierten Russland. Es zeigt auch den starken Zynismus in der russischen Verfassungspolitik und führt die Machtlosigkeit des politischen Gegners vor. Dies gilt auch für den Europarat.
Continue reading >>Homophobia Disguised as Children’s Rights in Russia’s Constitutional Referendum
From the 25th of June to the 1st of July, Russia is holding a referendum, in which citizens are asked to vote on a package of amendments to the country’s constitution. The amended constitution could enable President Putin to remain in power until 2036. State officials reportedly played down the resetting of presidential term limits. Instead, they focused on other amendments, especially those concerning faith in god, the preeminence of the Russian language, and the definition of marriage exclusively as a union between a man and a woman.
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Russia – With Scepter and Corona
Since the first cases of COVID-19 were registered in Zabaikalsky kray and Tumenskaya oblast on 31 January 2020, the Russian government has reacted to the challenge of the epidemic by enacting new legislation and introducing some emergency measures. The pandemic is bringing new and unpleasant surprises, creating specific social, economic and legal hardships which is making the unstable life of Russian citizens even worse.
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Der Wille des Volkes
Die sogenannte Verfassungsreform in Russland geht weit über die bloße Amtszeitverlängerung Putins hinaus. Sie stärkt die präsidentielle Macht und schreibt die Verfassungspraxis und die zentralen Rechtfertigungstopoi Putins als Aufträge an die Regierung in der Verfassung fest. Während die russische Verfassung von 1993 im Hinblick auf Freiheitsrechte und Gewaltenteilung zuletzt weitgehend nur auf dem Papier existierte, wird dieses Papier nun an die Realität angepasst.
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Imitating Democracy
Russia is moving fast with its constitutional reform. On 10 March, the State Duma supported an amendment, which, if it enters into force, will allow Putin to participate in the presidential elections 2024. Although the amendment is constitutionally questionable – substantively as well as procedurally – Russia’s Constitutional Court is likely to give its approval.
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The Struggle of Strasbourg
This year’s Winter Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) saw three distinct yet interrelated developments. On Tuesday, the Assembly decided to open a monitoring procedure with regard to Poland on behalf of the ongoing rule of law backsliding. On Wednesday, the Assembly decided to ratify the credentials of the Russian delegates which had previously been challenged both on procedural and on substantive grounds. Still on Wednesday, the Assembly backed the proposal for the introduction of a new ‘complementary joint procedure’, together with the Committee of Ministers, in response to violations of fundamental principles underlying the work of the organisation.
Continue reading >>Was qualmt denn da so komisch?
Über Polen, Russland und andere "gelenkte Demokratien", UK und andere (noch) nicht gelenkte Demokratien. Und Deutschland. Und Europa. Und, erwähnte ich das schon? natürlich Polen.
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Herrschaft über die Verfassung
Die Nachricht kam überraschend. Am Mittwoch unterbreitete der russische Präsident Putin in seiner jährlichen Botschaft an die Föderalversammlung einen Katalog von Vorschlägen zu einer Reform der Verfassung. Und nur fünf Tage später brachte Putin einen entsprechenden Änderungsvorschlag in die Duma ein. Die Änderungsvorschläge wirken aus verfassungsjuristischer Sicht widersprüchlich und kaum durchdacht. Obwohl die Bedeutung des Vorrangs der Verfassung in Putins Rede stark betont wird, zeugen die Ausführungen von einer Geringschätzung ihrer freiheitsschützenden Inhalte und wirken in Teilen gar „sarkastisch“.
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Personal instead of Institutional Power
The gist of the constitutional reform suggestions in Russia is to cement the power of Vladimir Putin once he leaves the office, and to make this in a safe, controlled environment. The latter aim cannot be achieved within the boundaries established by the Constitution. Thus, the constitutional requirements are thrown into the litter bin of necessity. However, circumventing formal procedures still calls for a sort of justification. That is why the proposed plan relies on substitutes that would mask its deficiencies.
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Kein Appeasement
Neues aus Russland, Polen, Spanien, Indien, Deutschland und Italien.
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Voting in Russia: Please Don’t Call it “Elections”
On September 8, numerous Russian regions voted in the framework of a so-called “single voting day”. Most significantly, Moscow voted for the members of City Council (“Duma”), and Russia’s second-largest city Saint Petersburg was to elect its governor. It would be a mistake, however, to draw any conclusions on the sentiments of the Russian people from the results as the voting process was skewed at every stage of the so-called “election”.
Continue reading >>Putin and the Costs of Being Wrong
Since mid-2019, Moscow experiences a wave of public protests, triggered by the decision of the government not to allow several opposition candidates to run for the city parliament in the elections scheduled for September. How can we explain this unprecedented rise of spontaneous protests activity? For me, the protests in Moscow are an example of a core problem any authoritarian regime faces but which is frequently overlooked by the analysts and scientists: the risks of mistakes.
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Being a Good Dictator is not so Easy
On investigative journalists, homeless people, aberrant academics and other sources of civic unrest and discomfort.
Continue reading >>Gemeinsam für den Frieden und die Einheit Europas? Der Europarat und Russland
Der 70. Geburtstag des Europarats am heutigen Tage gibt Anlass zu Stolz und Freude. Doch gleichzeitig befindet sich der Europarat in einer tiefen politischen und finanziellen Krise. Zentrale Frage ist, inwieweit er bei der Durchsetzung der Pflichten der Mitgliedstaaten die Desintegration in Kauf nehmen muss. Die aktuelle Rhetorik sendet jedenfalls das falsche Signal.
Continue reading >>Fundamental Rights as Bycatch – Russia’s Anti-Fake News Legislation
On 18 March, following approval by President Putin, Russia’s controversial anti-fake news legislation entered into force. While Russia is not the only state to address the issues of hate speech or fake news with legislative means, its new legislation raises serious constitutional concerns, particularly due to its imprecise and overly broad scope of application.
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All Bark and no Bite? A Domestic Perspective on a Possible Russian Withdrawal from the Council of Europe
The prospect of Russian withdrawal from the Council of Europe has been actively discussed during the past two months, including two excellent contributions on this blog. However, as often in cases of state backlash/pushback against international courts, the focus has mostly been on the external dimensions. States, though, are rarely ‘black boxes’, where different political actors have a uniform approach. Russia, despite its highly centralized appearance, is no exception. This post outlines the domestic state of play and contrasts the positions of interested parties.
Continue reading >>Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemma of Continuing or Ceasing Russian Membership in the Council of Europe
Last week the Washington Post reported that top Russian officials are contemplating withdrawal from the Council of Europe. This latest development illustrates the growing tensions between Russia and the Council of Europe which could ultimately lead to the cessation of Russia's membership. Both Russia and the Council of Europe, however, face a dilemma when it comes to deciding what steps should be taken.
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Sandu and Others v Russia and Moldova: The High Costs of Occupation
On 17 July 2018, the European Court on Human Rights reminded again that occupation of foreign lands and support of separatist regimes is a costly affair. This cost is not only calculated in terms of monetary repercussions but also in terms of reputational losses. On that day the chamber of the Court delivered a judgment in the case of Sandu and Others v Russia and Moldova. This judgment is a new one in the line of cases dealing with a breakaway region of Moldova – the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria.
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„Ehe für alle“ eher nicht: Traditionalismus und Staatshomophobie – Russlands Weg im Umgang mit Diskriminierung
Homophobe Rechtspraktiken in Russland haben eine lange Tradition, die von der russischen Regierung wie auch von der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche bewahrt werden. Das ohnehin schon zerrüttete Verhältnis Russlands zum EGMR wird durch das jüngste Urteil des Gerichtshofes zu einer Verurteilung wegen „Propaganda für Homosexualität“ weiter auf die Probe gestellt.
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Ukraine’s Ban on Russian Social Media: On The Edge Between National Security and Freedom of Expression
Can Ukraine's ban of Russian social media be legally justified? While the international community mostly condemns the ban, a closer look at the European Convention of Human Rights reveals that the matter is not so easy.
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Judicial Review of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Lessons from the Rosneft case
On 28 March 2017, the Grand Chamber of the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) decided in a preliminary ruling that the restrictive measures adopted by the Council against Russian undertakings, including oil company Rosneft, are valid. The judgment is of constitutional significance. It clarifies the scope of the CJEU’s jurisdiction with respect to acts adopted in the sphere of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In particular, it reveals that the EU system of judicial protection fully applies in relation to restrictive measures against natural and legal persons (so-called ‘targeted sanctions’).
Continue reading >>Money Makes the Court Go Round: The Russian Constitutional Court’s Yukos Judgment
On 19 December 2017 the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) ruled that payment of just satisfaction in the Yukos case was contrary to the Russian Constitution. It is the first time the apex court of a Council of Europe member state concluded that it should not pay just satisfaction. This blog post provides the background of the case, sums up the reasoning of the RCC and assesses the implications of its judgment of 19 December 2017.
Continue reading >>Russland, der EGMR und das Wahlrecht für Strafgefangene
Russland und Großbritannien Seite and Seite gegen Europa? Das ist in fast jeder Hinsicht weit hergeholt – aber nicht unbedingt im Verhältnis zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und zum Gerichtshof in Straßburg. Beide suchen nach Wegen, ihre Bindungen an die Vorgaben des Menschenrechts-Gerichtshofs zu lockern. Und beide nutzen als Anlass die unpopuläre Straßburger Rechtsprechung, dass auch Strafgefangenen nicht pauschal der Zugang zum Wahlrecht verwehrt werden darf.
Continue reading >>Russisches Eingreifen in Syrien: Eine Frage der Anerkennung
In Syrien geht es immer mehr ans Eingemachte. Die ersten russischen Luftangriffe wurden bereits geflogen, der dortige Krieg ist somit nun auch formell um eine Konfliktpartei reicher. Obendrein richteten sich diese laut den USA nicht gegen den Islamischen Staat, sondern von der CIA ausgebildete Gruppen – der Frieden scheint ferner denn je. Wie ist es völkerrechtlich um die Legalität der russischen Intervention bestellt?
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Welcoming Russian Navy to Cyprus Should Be a Violation of EU Law
The struggle for the continued observance of Article 2 TEU values in the EU is on-going. Arguably, it is now much more acute than ever before. The news that Cyprus considers granting the Russian military access to military bases on its territory is just another urgent reminder of the mounting necessity to upgrade the Union’s role in dealing with values crises in the Member States – both internally and externally – issues which are indispensable for the Union’s survival.
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At a crossroads: Russia and the ECHR in the aftermath of Markin
As part of Verfassungsblog’s topical focus on the prevailing tensions between international and national constitutional law, we go east and take a look at Russia and its unsteady relationship with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) – particularly the lately arisen tensions between the Russian Constitutional Court (CCR) and Strasbourg in the wake of the ECtHR’s decision in the Markin case. First, and in a more general manner, we briefly review the theories conceptualizing the relationship between domestic and international law, which traditionally go by the names of monism and dualism. In doing so, we do not miss the point that, as national constitutional practice in a variety of member states of the ECHR shows, conceptual clarity in terms of commitment to one or the other grand theory is often blurred, if not contradicted (I.). Clearly, Russia is no exception (II.). The Markin case marks a turning point in the relationship between the CCR and the ECtHR as Strasbourg, for the first time, overruled a decision of the CCR, which spurred a heated constitutional debate. The repercussions are yet to be seen (III.).
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Der Gazprom-Fall vor dem EuGH: Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und europäisches Prozessrecht
Die Enttäuschung gleich am Anfang: Es geht in diesem Beitrag weder um TTIP noch um CETA. Immerhin aber sind einige andere zeitgerechte Schlagworte im Angebot: Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (allgemein), Gazprom, Russland, Litauen, Gaslieferungen. Politisch geht es um einen hochbrisanten Komplex: Die Entflechtung der Gasmärkte im Baltikum. Das findet auch der EuGH spannend, weshalb er das Vorabentscheidungsersuchen des Kassationsgerichtshofs von Litauen Ende September vor der Grand Chamber verhandelte (C-536/13). Anfang Dezember hat nun der Erste Generalanwalt Melchior Wathelet seine Schlussanträge vorgelegt.
Continue reading >>The European Court of Human Rights and the Armed Conflict between Russia and Ukraine
The European Court of Human Rights has announced that it has communicated to the government of Russia two inter-state complaints that the Ukraine has brought against it concerning the events that took place in the Crimea and the Eastern regions of Ukraine (‘the Donbas’) in the spring and summer of 2014. It seems that the ongoing conflict in Ukraine will pose a number of complex normative questions to the Court.
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Soll sie halt ins Heim: Pflege für gelähmte alte Mutter ist kein geschütztes Familienleben
In unserer alternden Gesellschaft sind erwachsene Kinder, die sich um ihre kranken Eltern kümmern, zunehmend normal, und nicht nur das: sie sind auch eine sozialpolitisch dringend benötigte und ziemlich kostbare Ressource. Der EGMR hat heute eine Kammerentscheidung verkündet, die dieser Entwicklung Hohn spricht.
Continue reading >>The Legal Status and Modern History of Crimean Autonomy
Over the past weeks, much has been said about the Republic of Crimea’s secession/annexation to the Russian Federation and on its illegality (see on this blog here) and I personally agree with these statements. At the same time, I believe that the Crimean problem is much more complex at its roots and that some of Crimea’s history and its struggle for independence in the past have been overlooked in most of the recent discussion. I will provide some historical overview of the Crimean struggle for independence. It will dispel the widespread myth that Crimea for centuries had been part of Russia and was “gifted” to Ukraine and illustrate that yet another annexation of Crimea by Russia does not solve the Crimean problem.Over the past weeks, much has been said about the Republic of Crimea’s secession/annexation to the Russian Federation and on its illegality, and I personally agree with these statements. At the same time, I believe that the Crimean problem is much more complex at its roots and that some of Crimea’s history and its struggle for independence in the past have been overlooked in most of the recent discussion. I will provide some historical overview of the Crimean struggle for independence. It will dispel the widespread myth that Crimea for centuries had been part of Russia and was “gifted” to Ukraine and illustrate that yet another annexation of Crimea by Russia does not solve the Crimean problem.
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„Wie viele Divisionen hat der Papst?“ Die EU, Putins Russland und der lange Atem normativer Außenpolitik
„Der Papst? Wie viele Divisionen hat der denn?“ Mit diesen Worten verhöhnte Josef Stalin im Jahre 1935 den Vatikan und sprach diesem somit jede außenpolitischer Beachtung aus Sicht der Sowjetunion ab. Heute, fast achtzig Jahre später, gibt es schon lange keine Sowjetunion mehr. Der Papst, seinerseits, herrscht auch weiterhin ohne die Hilfen von Panzerkolonnen im Vatikan und zieht regelmäßig Menschenmengen auf den Petersplatz in Rom oder auf seinen Auslandsreisen um die Welt an. Auch die EU hat keine Divisionen, wenn wir einmal von den kleinen und eher auf Papier ihr Dasein fristenden „Battle Groups“ absehen, und verschreibt sich einer Außenpolitik basiert auf ‚soft power’ und normativen Inhalten. Doch auch sie wird Putins Russland überdauern.‘The Pope? How many divisions has he got?’ With these scoffing words, Joseph Stalin dismissed in 1935 the Vatican as a factor of any significance for the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. Today, almost 80 years later, the Soviet Union is long gone. The Pope, on his part, continues to rule from the Vatican without the help of armored divisions and attracts on a regular basis vast crowds to St. Peter’s Square or on his trips abroad. The European Union does not have any divisions either, if we leave aside the small ‘battle groups’, which in any event exist to a greater extent on paper than on the ground. It, too, commits itself to a foreign policy based on ‘soft power’ and normative influence. And it, too, will outlast Putin’s Russia.
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GASP: Reden oder Angst haben?
Wie einst Lyndon B. Johnsohn behauptet die EU, in ihrer Außenpolitik auf die Eroberung der Herzen zu setzen. Sie positioniert sich als Wertegemeinschaft und transferiert und implementiert ihre (exklusiven und richtigen) Werte auch in die Welt, denn diese sind übertragungsfähig und befolgungswürdig, sie machen das Leben der Völker weltweit besser und die Missionare dieser Werte zu besseren Menschen. Dabei bleibt leider die Frage offen, ob diese Werte wirkungsvoll in der empirischen Realität einer höchst heterogenen Gesellschaft implementiert werden können. Like Lyndon B. Johnsohn, the EU claims to struggle with its foreign policy for the "hearts and minds" of people. It itself as a community of shared values that is exporting its (exclusive and universally valid) values to the entire world. This export is the “thing to do” because these European values (are likely to?) improve the living conditions of people worldwide and at the same time morally perfect the missionaries of the right. Still the question remains whether it is empirically possible to realise such noble ideas within the deeply heterogenous Ukranian enviroment.
Continue reading >>Russlands Selbstwertgefühl und die Kurzsichtigkeit der Ukraine-Politik der EU
Der größte Fehler der EU im Konflikt um die Ukraine besteht in der offensichtlichen Kurzsichtigkeit des eigenen Handelns. Gerade wenn damit zu rechnen war, dass Russland jeden Moment sein „wahres Gesicht“ zeigen und militärisch eingreifen würde, bleibt unverständlich, warum sich offenbar bislang niemand in der EU Gedanken über mögliche Reaktionen auf diesen worst case gemacht hat.
Continue reading >>Die EU muss sich stärker für Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Osteuropa engagieren
Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechte sind Grundsätze, die die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik leiten sollen. Gleichwohl hat die EU in der Vergangenheit keine Strategien gefunden, die Ukraine bei der Umsetzung dieser Werte wirkungsvoll zu unterstützen. In der Zeit nach der Orangen Revolution wurde das Feld im Bereich der Verfassungskonsolidierung weitgehend dem Europarat überlassen. Stattdessen ließ sich die EU auf die Putinsche Logik der Integrationskonkurrenz ein. Will die EU aber ihre rechtsstaatlichen Ziele ernstnehmen, muss sie ihre Strategien zur Rechtstaatsentwicklung deutlich erweitern. The European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the EU’s negotiated Association Agreement with Ukraine are based on the joint undertaking to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance. The special significance of these values reflects the normative requirement relating to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy based on Art. 21 of the EU Treaty. Nevertheless, the EU has not in the past found any strategies to effectively support Ukraine in its implementation of these values. During the period after the Orange Revolution, the field of constitutional consolidation was largely left to the European Council. Instead of making concentrated efforts to counteract Ukraine's constitutional decline, the EU accepted Putin’s concept of integration rivalry. If the EU plans to take its targets of establishing the rule of law seriously, it will have to significantly extend its relevant strategies.
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(K)ein Mythos? – Unsere Abhängigkeit vom russischen Gas
Sanktionen gegen Russland zu verhängen würde wegen der deutschen Abhängigkeit vom russischen Gas die Energiewende in Gefahr bringen. Stimmt das überhaupt?
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Zwischen Völkerrecht und Selbstbestimmung
Gegenwärtig kann es in Kiew, Berlin und Brüssel nur um Schadenbegrenzung gehen. Auf der Ebene der internationalen Politik müssen Signale an Russland ausgesandt werden, dass seine Aggressionspolitik keine Zukunft hat. Hier muss dem Denkmodell des Völkerrechts gefolgt werden. Auf der Ebene des Selbstbestimmungsrechts sollte die ukrainische Regierung dagegen davon überzeugt werden, der Selbstbestimmungsdiskussion in der Ostukraine konstruktiv entgegenzutreten.
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Der EGMR, zerrieben im Konflikt Russland-Ukraine?
Der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR) hat vor wenigen Tagen im Wege einer vorläufigen Maßnahme gem. Art. 39 der Verfahrensordnung in den laufenden Konflikt zwischen Russland und der Ukraine eingegriffen (vgl. Pressemitteilung ECHR 073 (2014)). Man mag fragen: Warum mutet sich der EGMR das zu? Oder auch: Was maßt sich der Gerichtshof an? Glaubt er wirklich, im Wege des vorläufigen Rechtsschutzes einen internationalen Konflikt befrieden zu können, an dem sich die internationale Diplomatie die Zähne ausbeißt? Der Versuch einer Standortbestimmung.On 13th March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has intervened in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine by indicating provisional measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (cf. Press Release ECHR 073 (2014)). One might ask: Why does the Court undergo such a burden? Or, seen from another perspective: Why is the Court attributing itself such a power? Do the judges really belief that they can pacify an international conflict, which international diplomacy is unable to solve, just by means of an interim injunction? The attempt of defining a position.
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EGMR schafft sich das blutige 20. Jahrhundert vom Hals
Kriegsverbrechen aus der Nazi- und Stalin-Ära und andere Entsetzlichkeiten des […]
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Väterrechte II: Auch Russlands Armee darf nicht Gender Stereotyping betreiben
Die andere bedeutetende Entscheidung des heutigen Tages zum Thema Rechte […]
Continue reading >>Gleiches Recht für Väter
Elternzeit für Mütter zu ermöglichen, nicht aber für Väter ist […]
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