When Words Really Matter
It has been over 900 days since Russia launched its so-called ‘three-day crusade’ to capture Kyiv. The way we talk about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has far-reaching implications, not only for public perception but also for international policy and accountability. How we label this conflict—whether we call it the ‘war in Ukraine’ or ‘Russia’s war against Ukraine’—influences how we understand responsibility, justice, and the path to peace.
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Wartime Constitutionalism and the Politics of Constitutional Review in Ukraine
On 18 July 2024, Ukraine’s Constitutional Court issued a decision concerning the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings under martial law. The extension of detention, the Court ruled, can only be issued based on a reasoned court decision—this applies even in times of war. In this blogpost, we examine how the war has influenced the ways in which various actors engage with constitutional complaints, before discussing the Constitutional Court's recent decision on Article 615.6 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We argue that this ruling exemplifies how the Constitutional Court can maintain the relevance and practical significance of its decision-making in wartime.
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Ukraine, the Netherlands and 26 Third States Without Russia Before the ECtHR
The hearing in the case of Ukraine, the Netherlands v Russia lasted four hours and twenty-five minutes. more than double than an “ordinary” Grand Chamber hearing. These four hours and twenty-five minutes are an important milestone in what is undoubtedly one of the most important set of cases in the history of European Convention on Human Rights. They cover more than ten years of Russian activities in Eastern Ukraine, including the open war of aggression since February 2022. The number of third parties involved in the proceedings likewise renders the case extraordinary.
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The EU’s Eastern Border and Inconvenient Truths
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, alongside with the EU’s confrontation with Russia’s ally Belarus, however, has deeply impacted the securitisation of migration within the EU. Highly politicised conflict-related securitisation narratives have rarely found their way so swiftly into Member States’ domestic migration and asylum laws, leading to open and far-reaching violations of EU and international human rights law. Hardly ever before have ill-defined concepts and indiscriminate assumptions been so broadly accepted and used to shift from an individual-focused approach to blanket measures stigmatising, dehumanising and excluding entire groups. And rarely before have radical changes of this kind received so little criticism - a deeply unsettling and dangerous trend.
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The Curious Fate of the False Claim of Genocide
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered another blow to Ukraine’s litigation strategy. The ICJ only confirmed its jurisdiction for considering Ukraine’s narrow claim that it had not committed genocide in Donbas. As we have previously argued, given the expected modest outcome of the case for Ukraine, it would make sense for Ukraine to expand its litigation strategy beyond the false claim of genocide. Ukraine may consider lodging a new lawsuit before the ICJ under the Genocide Convention, alleging that Russia breached the Convention by committing genocide against Ukrainians as a protected national group.
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Accountability for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine
Two years have passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine – an act of aggression which 141 states of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) condemned as such shortly after. This crime of aggression has brought unimaginable suffering to the people of Ukraine. As this blog will highlight in the following, a reform of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) concerning the crime of aggression is necessary and long overdue. The current jurisdictional regime leaves accountability gaps, which have become painfully visible in the past two years. Plausible suggestions for the reform are already out there – it ultimately “all depends on the political will” of the 124 ICC state parties.
Continue reading >>A Shortcut at the Expense of Justice
On 31 January 2024, the International Court of Justice rendered its judgment on the merits of a case initiated by Ukraine against the Russian Federation in 2017. Ukraine alleged numerous violations by Russia of two treaties: the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This blog post provides a brief overview of the decision and argues that the Court sidestepped the task of reconstructing what has happened in reality via judicial fact-finding. This approach comes at the expense of several legal errors. The harsh realities of the conflict and, most importantly, the human suffering on the territories of Ukraine occupied by Russia seem far removed from the grandeur of the Peace Palace.
Continue reading >>The EU’s Faustian Bargain
Twelve years into the EU’s rule of law crisis, this week has demonstrated that EU leaders are still unwilling to confront their own complicity in Orbán’s rise and to do something about it. Is this sad spectacle a price worth paying in exchange for a symbolic gesture of goodwill to Ukraine? That is the wrong question to ask. The right question to ask is this: if the EU continues to treat the rule of law as a bargaining chip and to make promises it won’t keep, for how much longer will our Union remain a club worth joining?
Continue reading >>Fighting Impunity Through Intermediaries
The 24th of February 2022 lastingly altered Europe’s security architecture. The European Union and its member states have continued to support Ukraine in a multitude of ways, including direct financial assistance, political support in relevant international fora, far-reaching sanctions against Russian citizens and businesses, and massive arms supplies. What has, however, remained ambiguous is within which (legal) framework the EU has provided different means of support towards Ukraine. In other words: what legal principle – that may also be derived from its treaty framework – determined and guided EU support towards Ukraine? This contribution argues that at least certain streams of EU assistance for Ukraine in countering the Russian Federation’s aggression – namely those aimed at ending impunity for international crimes – have been organized within a distinct rule of law context.
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Wartime Elections as Democratic Backsliding
The topic of the next elections to the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine unexpectedly surfaced in public discourse towards the end of spring this year. Julia Kyrychenko and Olha Ivasiuk’s recent article on Verfassungsblog outlines major legal and practical obstacles to holding wartime elections in Ukraine. In their illuminating analysis, the authors make a strong case against wartime elections, a viewpoint largely shared by civil society. My argument is a bit different. I will argue that (1) wartime parliamentary elections are expressis verbis inconsistent with the Ukrainian Constitution, and (2) wartime elections would undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions and potentially lead to democratic backsliding.
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No Voting Under Fire
Can Ukraine hold elections while it is in the midst of a full-scale invasion by Russia? This question has recently received international attention, including comments from US Senator Lindsey Graham advocating for elections during the war. However, holding elections during the current state of war faces not only factual but also legal obstacles. Genuine democratic elections cannot be conducted under fire from Russian troops.
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Cluster Munition and International Law
In recent weeks, there has been intense discussion about the delivery of cluster munitions by the United States of America to Ukraine and the subsequent use of these munitions. The use of such ammunition can be an effective military tool, which is why Ukraine has specifically sought the supply of such ammunition from its allies in order to make its defence against Russia’s war of aggression more effective. This blog post sheds light on the international law dimension of the discussion and illustrates the consequences of the delivery of cluster munitions for allied states of Ukraine, which are parties to the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions.
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Streumunition und Völkerrecht
In den zurückliegenden Wochen ist intensiv über die Lieferung von Streumunition durch die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika an die Ukraine und den nachfolgenden Einsatz dieser Munition diskutiert worden. Der Einsatz solcher Munition kann ein wirksames militärisches Mittel darstellen, weswegen die Ukraine gezielt bei ihren Verbündeten nach der Lieferung solcher Munition nachgesucht hat, um ihre Verteidigung gegen den völkerrechtswidrigen russischen Angriffskrieg effektiver zu gestalten. Es kann aber nach den für eine Abwägung zwischen militärischer Notwendigkeit und Schutzstandards offenen Regeln des humanitären Völkerrechts Situationen geben, in denen Streumunition völkerrechtskonform von Staaten eingesetzt werden darf, die nicht Vertragsparteien des Osloer Abkommens sind. Dies wird insbesondere dann der Fall sein, wenn der Einsatz der Streumunition in einem Kontext erfolgt, bei dem zivile Opfer praktisch ausgeschlossen werden können.
Continue reading >>World War 2 Memories in Lithuania and Ukraine
On May 8, 2023, Lithuania and Ukraine, along with other European countries, meet the annual anniversaries of the end of World War 2 in Europe in 1945. Meanwhile, Russia holds a national holiday tomorrow on May 9 to commemorate the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, which is the most important holiday in Russia and became a cult practice for uniting Russians after 2000. The anniversary finds Ukraine in the midst of fighting off present-day Russian aggression. Lithuania finds itself worrying about its defense, dealing with memory incidents and among the biggest supporters of Ukraine. Russia, however, finds itself more isolated than ever and scaling back the celebration: According to Moscow because of expected ‘drone strikes’, but more likely due to ‘fear of popular protests.’ This blog entry takes stock of legal measures by two nations to countervail Russia’s decades-long mnemo-political aggressiveness.
Continue reading >>Investing Immobilized Russian Assets, Monetarizing the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Again, the Commission and EU Member States are talking about new sanctions against Russia. The focus, according to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, should be on tackling sanctions circumvention and loopholes. In a scoop, however, it was also uncovered that the Commission has drawn up a non-paper “on the generation of resources to support Ukraine from immobilized Russian assets”. The idea behind this non-paper is to invest the immobilized assets of the Russian Central Bank in EU Member States’ bonds and bills and use the proceeds to support the reconstruction of Ukraine. The plan, as the non-paper indicates, is fraught with a number of legal and technical issues. These do not only relate to the question of whether or not such an investment of immobilized assets is compatible with international law and EU law, but also to the question of who should undertake and oversee these investments.
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On the Side of International Law
This Wednesday, the United Nations General Assembly resumed its Emergency Special Session on Ukraine, amidst a turbulent week that witnessed US President Biden’s surprise trip to Kyiv, Russian withdrawal from the New START Treaty, and Chinese top diplomat Wang Yi’s visit to Moscow, amongst other things. On Thursday, the Assembly adopted resolution ES-11/6 (draft here) with 141 votes in favor, seven against, 32 abstentions and 13 countries not voting. If the Russian aggression last year was a watershed moment for the United Nations, then the organ to watch these days is the General Assembly, and not the Security Council.
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What can(’t) international criminal justice deliver for Ukraine?
One year ago, Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, committing an act of aggression in violation of the UN Charter. Many more incidents of international crimes followed, adding to an already large number of unaddressed crimes going back to 2014. While investigations are underway, the failures to pursue accountability for international crimes committed by Russia in the past still need to be addressed in this context.
Continue reading >>Was nutzen Panzer ohne Ziele?
Die Bundesrepublik wird Leopard-2-Kampfpanzer an Kiew liefern, ukrainische Soldaten in Deutschland trainieren sowie Exportgenehmigungen an Partnerländer ausstellen. Während die russische Führung über die angeblich erneute Bedrohung durch deutsche Panzer fabuliert, sind deutsche Entscheidungsträger*innen in erster Linie mit sich selbst zufrieden. In Deutschland nicht diskutiert, jedoch zentral für alle politischen Entscheidungen in diesem Konflikt ist die Frage: Unterstützung wofür?
Continue reading >>Enteignen für den Wiederaufbau?
Jeden Tag bringt der Krieg in der Ukraine unerträgliches und unvorstellbares menschliches Leid mit sich. Vor diesem Hintergrund fällt es schwer, schon heute einen nüchternen Blick auf die Zeit nach Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen in der Ukraine und einer Zurückdrängung des russischen Aggressors zu werfen. Das allerdings scheint notwendig, um moralisierender Politik notwendige rechtsstaatliche Rationalität entgegenzusetzen. Konkret geht es dabei um die Frage, ob es möglich ist, staatliches und/oder privates russisches Vermögen entschädigungslos zu enteignen, um so den Wiederaufbau der Ukraine zu finanzieren. Diese Überlegung liegt insbesondere der Erkenntnis zugrunde, dass die durch die russische Aggression verursachten Schäden in der Ukraine schon jetzt auf über eine Billion US-Dollar geschätzt werden.
Continue reading >>Is Criminality a Russian Virtue Worth Cultivating?
On 13 December 2022, the Russian State Duma unanimously approved, in the first reading, the bill on the imposition of Russian criminal law and criminal procedure upon the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia provinces of Ukraine. The Bill flagrantly infringes the Russian Constitution, criminal legislation and international law, essentially transforming the occupied territories of Ukraine into a lawless area. Yet again, the Bill underscores the imperial nature of the Russian war of aggression.
Continue reading >>A Ukraine Special Tribunal with Legitimacy Problems?
The call for a Special Tribunal for the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine ('UkrTrib') is also getting louder in the German political discourse. The proposal goes back to an initiative by the British international lawyer and writer Philippe Sands, who was quickly joined by a number of prominent politicians and international (criminal) lawyers), but this is misleading for several reasons, not least because the IMT was a consequence of the defeat of Nazi Germany and the following regime change, which in the case of Russia is unforeseeable.
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Ukraine-Sondertribunal mit Legitimationsproblemen?
Der Ruf nach einem Sondertribunal für den russischen Angriffskrieg in der Ukraine wird auch hierzulande im politischen Raum lauter. Der Vorschlag geht auf eine Initiative um den britischen Völkerrechtler und Publizisten Philippe Sands zurück, der sich innerhalb kürzester Zeit eine Reihe prominenter Politiker/innen und Völker(straf)rechtler/innen angeschlossen haben. Bisweilen wird ein Vergleich mit dem Nürnberger Militärgerichtshof gezogen, der aber aus mehreren Gründen hinkt.
Continue reading >>Фрагментарне реагування на загрозу свободі 3МІ в ЄС
Як відомо, шляхи польського та угорського урядів розійшлися щодо відповідей на російсько-українську війну. Однак на внутрішньому рівні обидві країни продовжують покладатися на схожі структурні зміни в медіа-середовищі, які допомагають їм впливати на виборців і підривають чесність виборів. Реакція ЄС на кризу свободи та плюралізму 3MI в Угорщині та Польщі була більш стриманою та якісно відрізнялася від реакції на кризу суддівської незалежності або загрози академічним свободам та правам меншин.
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A fragmented response to media freedom at risk in the Union
The Polish and Hungarian governments have famously parted ways over responses to the Russo-Ukraine war. However, internally, both continue to rely on similar structural changes in the media environment that help them target voters and undermine elections fairness. The EU’s response to the media freedom and pluralism crisis in Hungary and Poland has been more restrained and also qualitatively different from its answer to the judicial independence crisis or threats to academic freedoms and minority rights.
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Несподівані ускладнення: вплив російського вторгнення в Україну на кризу верховенства права в ЕС
Якби наприкінці 2021 року мене запитали, які події визначатимуть кризу верховенства права в Європейському Союзі у 2022 році, я б відповів, що вибори в Угорщині стануть найвідповідальнішим моментом у боротьбі за цінності ЄС. 24 лютого 2022 року Володимир Путін зробив застарілими майже всі прогнози щодо європейської політики. Невиправдане, брутальне вторгнення Росії в Україну не лише зруйнувало понад 30-річну парадигму безпеки на континенті, але й мало масштабні наслідки для багатьох аспектів європейського життя, включаючи кризу верховенства права у двох державах-членах ЄС: Угорщині та Польщі.
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Unexpected Complications: The impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the rule of law crisis in the EU
If somebody had asked me in late 2021 what events would define the rule of law crisis in the European Union in 2022, I would have said that the elections in Hungary would be the most crucial moment for the struggle for EU values. On 24 February 2022, Vladimir Putin made almost all predictions concerning European politics obsolete. Russia’s unjustified, brutal invasion of Ukraine not only obliterated an over 30-year-old paradigm of security on the continent but also had massive ripple effects on many aspects of European life, including the rule of law crisis in two EU Member States: Hungary and Poland.
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Ризик тунельного бачення у боротьбі з російською дезінформацією
Протиставлення кінетичної війни, яка розпочалася після повномасштабного вторгнення Росії в Україну 24 лютого 2022 року, та зіткнень у цифровому просторі показує, що обидві арени війни мали різні наслідки для країн-членів НАТО та ЄС. Якщо західні держави змогли значною мірою утриматися від фізичних бойових дій, обмеживши свою участь наданням зброї та військових матеріалів українським силам, то в цифровій сфері таке утримання виявилося неможливим.
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The Risk of Tunnel Vision in Targeting Russian Disinformation
Contrasting the kinetic warfare that broke out after Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 with confrontations in the digital space shows that both war arenas came with different implications for NATO and EU member states. While Western powers were able to largely abstain from physical hostilities, limiting their involvement to providing weapons and military material to Ukrainian forces, in the digital sphere such abstention was not possible.
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The Soviet Famine and Criminalising “Denialism”
The precedent set by international human rights law and the case law of European constitutional courts allows the exceptional criminalisation of Holocaust denial. But the same “exceptional” treatment does not apply to other events which may or may not consist of a “genocide, crime against humanity or a war crime”. Thus, EU Member States struggle to strike a balance between their obligations deriving from international human rights law and those deriving from EU law.
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Getting Ready
The accession of Ukraine to the EU would, like any other expansion, have profound implications on the Union’s institutions. Even putting aside the extraordinary circumstances of the accession process which started in the middle of a war, the accession of Ukraine would also raise relevant issues for the EU from a purely institutional perspective. The accession of Ukraine would, especially if taken together with Moldova and the countries of the Western Balkans, raise serious issues for the absorption capacity of the EU in all of its major institutions.
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Готуємося
Потенційний вступ України до ЄС, як і будь-яке інше розширення, матиме глибокі наслідки для інституцій Союзу. Навіть якщо не брати до уваги надзвичайні обставини процесу вступу, який розпочався в розпал війни, вступ України до ЄС також поставив би перед ним актуальні питання з суто інституційної точки зору. Вступ України, особливо разом з Молдовою та (частково) країнами Західних Балкан, підніме серйозні питання щодо поглинальної спроможності ЄС в усіх його основних інституціях.
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Як Європейське політичне спільнотовариство могло би сприяти вступу України до ЄС
Мало хто очікував, що президент Зеленський і його уряд навіть подумають про членство в ЄС на тлі лавиноподібного вторгнення російської армії. Паралельно з прискоренням вступу України ЄС шукав нові форми політичної співпраці для зміцнення своєї стійкості та забезпечення взаємної солідарності в часи страшної безпеки та економічної кризи в Європі. Європейське політичне співтовариство містить кілька важливих переваг, які Україна має враховувати під час процесу вступу до ЄС.
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How the European Political Community Could Support the Accession of Ukraine to the EU
Very few people expected President Zelensky and his government to even think about EU membership amidst the avalanching invasion of the Russian army. In parallel with the accelerating speed of Ukraine’s accession, the EU was searching for new forms of political cooperation to strengthen its resilience and ensure mutual solidarity in times of intimidating security and economic crises in Europe. The European Political Community contains several important advantages to be considered by Ukraine against the backdrop of its accession process to the EU.
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The Ukrainian Wonder
Ukraine will win this war. As a democracy.
Continue reading >>Mobilisation
Putin’s speech did not explicitly mention concrete plans to annex Ukrainian occupied territories, but Putin did announce a quick “recognition” of the fake “referenda” on joining Russia in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, scheduled in just a few days. In terms of international law, planned annexations will change nothing. States are under international legal obligation not to recognise any territorial changes declared by Russia. Any territorial concessions imposed on Ukraine under nuclear blackmail would also be legally null and void. Putin’s desperate attempt to change the game is unlikely to influence the resilience of Ukraine and its allies.
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The “Year of Historical Memory” and Mnemonic Constitutionalism in Belarus
On 1st of September 2022, the academic year in all Belarusian schools started with an atypical lesson, on “historic memory” – led in Minsk by none other than the country’s “President” himself, Aliaksandr Łukašenka. There is a constitutional dimension to historical memory in Belarus, which is better grasped through the looking glass of mnemonic constitutionalism.
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Fighting on the Business Front
Since 24th February 2022, international criminal justice has moved to ‘warp speed’: Russia’s flagrant aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine as well as the ensuing (and continuing) war has spawned a plurality of transformative developments across the whole realm of international criminal law. Last week, on 26th June 2022, these developments were further amplified by a statement issued by the Ukrainian government, which called for bringing war crimes charges against leaders and chairpersons of major international banks, including JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, or HSBC.
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The Selective Nature of a pan-European Willkommenskultur
Four months into Russia’s war on Ukraine, there has been a tremendous show of support for Ukrainians fleeing violence and the atrocities of war – in Europe and elsewhere in the world. As is well-known, European states have hammered out pragmatic administrative solutions to accommodate large numbers of incoming person, going to great lengths to provide for beneficial welfare arrangements. Against this backdrop, it may not be unreasonable to present the crisis in Ukraine as a tipping point for humanitarian protection more generally.
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Die grenzenlose Aufnahme der ukrainischen Flüchtlinge und was wir daraus lernen
Mit der spontanen Aufnahme der ukrainischen Frauen, Kinder und Hilfsbedürftigen hat die europäische Zivilgesellschaft gezeigt, wie gut sie mit Flüchtlingen interagieren kann, wenn die Grenzen sich öffnen und hemmende Regulierungen entfallen. Die Staaten lernen in den letzten Wochen, eher unterstützend als kontrollierend zu wirken. Diese Erfahrungen sollten motivieren, kritischer als bisher zu hinterfragen, wieweit Einschränkungen der freien Entfaltung Geflüchteter und ihrer Unterstützer sinnvoll sind.
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Die nukleare Option als ultima ratio im Ukraine-Krieg
Die nukleare Drohung ist ein ständiger Begleiter des Ukraine-Krieges – von seinen Anfängen über alle bisherigen Wendungen hinweg. Ausgerechnet ein IGH-Gutachten von 1996 hält die Tür zu einem zulässigen Einsatz von Nuklearwaffen einen Spalt weit offen, durch den die russische Föderation mit der Macht der Faktenverdrehung drängt. Es wird Zeit, den Einsatz von Nuklearwaffen pauschal zu ächten und zu verbieten.
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The Placeless Parliament
Parliaments form a structural fixture in government districts around the world, they are the pivotal place where public affairs are negotiated and formulated. The Russian assault on Ukraine has made it abundantly clear that this place no longer exists in Kiev. At least it is no longer available to the representatives, and the parliament is forced to reinvent itself as a "placeless actor“. It is not very surprising that this reinvention is taking place in the digital space.
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The United Parliament
While we frequently hear about Presidents taking the role of a commander in chief in times of war, the legislature, too, can play an important role. Whether a country succeeds in a war depends not least on how well its legislature is able to adjust to face the challenges of war. This blog post takes a closer look at the Ukrainian Parliament – the Verkhovna Rada (the Rada hereafter) – and its roles and activities during the war of the Russian Federation on Ukraine.
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“We the Territorial People” and the Russia-Ukraine War
Not enough attention has been devoted to Russia’s demands that Ukraine amend its constitution to recognize Crimea as Russian territory as well as accept the independence of the separatist regions in eastern Ukraine – Donetsk and Luhansk. Though it may not seem intuitive, constitutional law and its accompanying methods of holding referenda to amend constitutions is at the heart of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Is constitutional amendment the way to achieve a breakthrough? What conditions must be met to legitimize secession, which includes the breaking apart of citizens along with the state’s territory, on which they reside?
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Ukraine’s Parliament in Wartime
To defend Ukraine is to defend constitutional democracy and the rule of law. But the defence of Ukraine must occur through constitutional democracy and the rule of law. The Verkhovna Rada is a central institution in the Ukrainian constitutional order. The Verkhovna Rada’s legislative authority continues to exist during armed conflict and states of emergency. Indeed, the Verkhovna Rada plays a vital role in such situations. However, the routine operations of the Verkhovna Rada in these extraordinary circumstances have been very challenging.
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How Canada Capitalizes on Ukrainian Refugees
For those fleeing the war in Ukraine, Canada launched a new temporary residence pathway, the Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel (CUAET) program on March 17, 2022. Offered in conjunction with a special family reunification program, CUAET is open to an unlimited number of Ukrainians regardless of their existing ties to Canada. While seemingly an open and benevolent gesture, Ukrainians are welcomed inside the Canadian nation not as humanitarian subjects but primarily as workers to potentially contribute to the Canadian economy.
Continue reading >>Passportization
Putin’s alleged arguments to conduct a “special military operation” to “demilitarise and denazify” Ukraine revolve around protecting the people of the Donbas, including citizens of the Russian Federation, “facing humiliation and genocide.” One of the tools Russia used to justify its political and military engagement in the post-Soviet space has been passportization. This policy effectively created Russian citizens in the contested territories of neighbouring states in the context of protracted conflicts of secession. Just as in Georgia, passportization worked as a tool of interference with Ukrainian sovereignty.
Continue reading >>Take Down the Wall. And Make Russia Pay for It
EU law allows admitting Ukraine into the Union immediately. This is not only the moral imperative, it would also not require any Treaty revision and mark a return to the classical approach of the first EU accession: accession first, full taking on of the acquis later, with lengthy transitional periods. Ukraine will also require a super Marshall plan to ensure speedy reconstruction. This is doable: the seized – say confiscated – “Russian” money, a bit short of a trillion by now, will be enough, with the EU hopefully topping this amount.
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We Should Take the Ukrainian – Russian Negotiations Seriously
If Russia suddenly becomes serious about an agreement, drops its absurd demands of “denazification” and demilitarization, a deal may be more plausible than we now think. The Ukrainian government has sent numerous constructive signals. Governments in Europe and beyond should be prepared to respond to a sudden turn of events and be ready to offer what may be needed to get a deal done.
Continue reading >>Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine als Ausdruck eines wertebasierten Völkerrechts
Waffenlieferungen an den rechtswidrig angegriffenen Staat sind das Mindeste was Deutschland und andere Staaten angesichts der Untätigkeit des Sicherheitsrats zur Wahrung und Wiederherstellung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit und zur Verteidigung der Völkerrechtsordnung tun können. Das Völkerrecht verdammt die Staaten nicht dazu, der Aggression tatenlos zuzusehen. Ganz im Gegenteil.
Continue reading >>No New Cold War for International Law
With Russia’s war against Ukraine not being the Blitzkrieg that Putin had planned for, there has been discussion that we are entering a new Cold War. During the (old) Cold War, development of international law was stunted due to the need of agreement between opposing political blocs that had fundamentally differing views on the role and content of international law. This blog post argues that even if we enter a new Cold War, we won’t soon have a similar adverse situation for international legal development because the legal understanding of one of the alleged “camps” lacks consistency, legitimacy and broad geopolitical support.
Continue reading >>Zeitenwende? Zeitenwende!
Der Krieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine, so heißt es in Politik und Medien, demonstriert die Rückkehr eines Politikstils, der längst überwunden und vergangen geglaubt wurde: die traditionelle Großmachtpolitik, die Kriege um Territorien und Grenzverschiebungen „kleinerer Staaten“ nicht ausschloss, sondern als legitimes Mittel der Politik und Machtbalance stets mitdachte und ausführte. Diese Rede ist aus historiographischer Perspektive betrachtet aus mindestens zwei Gründen problematisch. Einerseits verkennt die Rhetorik den Charakter der traditionellen Großmachtpolitik, die in der Geschichte auch eine Form des europäischen Friedenssystems war. Andererseits ist fraglich, ob diese traditionelle Großmachtpolitik jemals verschwunden war.
Continue reading >>Temporary Protection for Ukrainians
One might have expected that the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive would witness a remake of the toxic disputes about ‘burden sharing’ following the mass influx of 2015/16. None of this happened, although the contents of the Implementing Decision is quite different from what many might think intuitively. Inter-state distribution keys or quotas give way to a simple allocation mechanism: ‘free choice’ is the surprise outcome of Thursday’s Council meeting.
Continue reading >>The Rule of Law in a Time of Emotions
The aggression against Ukraine is brazen, ruthless and shameless. Images of women and children at border crossings, shelters and subway stations filled with civilians evoke very strong emotions, almost crowding out everything else. And yet the ongoing aggression is defined by another adjective: "lawless". There is a link between lawlessness and violence, between brutality and disrespect for the law as such. This is why, even in times like these, we must continue talk about the Polish rule of law crisis if Poland wants to be a credible international actor.
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Extraterritoriale Einbürgerungen als Hegemonialinstrument
Der russische Einmarsch in die Ukraine wurde seit 2019 durch eine systematische Einbürgerungspraxis Russlands im Donbas vorbereitet. Russland hat weit vor seinem Krieg gegen die Ukraine das Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht als Mittel der Außenpolitik instrumentalisiert - und bereits hierdurch die Ukraine in ihrer territorialen Souveränität verletzt.
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Kann Straßburg den Krieg zähmen?
Nur wenige Tage nach seinem Beginn hat der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine gleich mehrere internationale Gerichte erreicht. Der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR) hat bereits gehandelt. Auf einen Antrag der Ukraine hat er am 1. März 2022 vorläufige Maßnahmen seiner Verfahrensordnung ergriffen. Die Entscheidung des EGMR vom 1. März 2022 ist bemerkenswert und ernüchternd zugleich.
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Strasbourg Has No Chance and Uses It
On 28 February 2022, Ukraine lodged a request for interim measures against Russia before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Ukraine referred to “massive human rights violations being committed by the Russian troops in the course of the military aggression against the sovereign territory of Ukraine”. Within one day of the Ukrainian request, the Strasbourg Court granted “urgent interim measures” under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
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The Legal Obligation to Recognize Russian Deserters as Refugees
The European Union (EU) and its member states are reportedly considering offering asylum to Russian deserters. They and other states around the world have a legal obligation to do precisely that. Soldiers who flee punishment for refusing to fight in aggressive wars are properly understood as refugees under international law.
Continue reading >>Too Little Politics in EU Defense Policy
The arming of Ukraine with European financial means may enjoy widespread support among European populations scandalized by Putin's egregious actions. But this should not obscure the fact that it is the result of largely arcane decision-making processes: Neither the establishment of the European Peace Facility nor the breaking of the Union's rules on arms exports by supplying weapons to the war zone Ukraine was the subject of a substantively open public discourse and will formation.
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Crypto-assets as a blind spot in sanctions against Russia?
On 24 February 2022, Russia illegally invaded the territory of Ukraine. The international community was quick to condemn this military aggression and to issue sanctions. Missing in today's sanctions strategy, however, is the inclusion of crypto-assets. This is worrying, as it is highly likely that crypto-assets are used to fund the Russian war machine without anyone really seeing it.
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Hot War and Cold Freezes
In light of mounting pressure to take effective action against Putin, the European Commission and six states (UK, USA, Canada, Germany, France, Italy) agreed last Saturday on yet another bundle of sanctions against Russia. Some of them had been expected, like the exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT. Others like the freezing of central bank assets came as a bit of a surprise, allegedly even for Vladimir Putin. He should have watched the news more carefully. The United States did the exact same thing to Afghan central bank assets after the Taliban takeover last year. The purpose of this note is to explore the practical and legal implications of this freeze.
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Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Russland und ihre rechtlichen Grenzen
In der Dynamik der letzten Tage wurden von den USA, der Europäischen Union und anderen Staaten Sanktionen gegen Russland beschlossen, die als „beispiellos“ und „verheerend“ bezeichnet wurden. Russland spricht von „illegitimen“ Sanktionen und droht gar mit atomarer Abschreckung. Tatsächlich stehen die erlassenen Wirtschaftssanktionen auf sicherem rechtlichen Boden. Sie sind in einem gewissen Maß sogar Voraussetzung dafür, dass der Boden des Völkerrechts nicht wegbricht
Continue reading >>Wird Deutschland durch Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine zur Konfliktpartei?
Nach dem altehrwürdigen Neutralitätsrecht ist das Territorium neutraler Mächte „unverletzlich“. Konfliktparteien dürfen es deshalb in keiner konfliktbezogenen Weise nutzen. Doch wann verliert ein Staat seine Neutralität?
Continue reading >>A Terrible Crime
International law, it is often said, has lost its normative power. The opposite is true.
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Ein furchtbares Verbrechen
Das Völkerrecht, heißt es oft, hat seine normative Kraft verloren. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall.
Continue reading >>Erklärung zum russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine / Statement on the Russian attack on Ukraine
Vorstand und Rat der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Internationales Recht erklären: […]
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Would Ukraine Breach its own Constitution if it Dropped its NATO Bid?
Among the many issues discussed in the context of the current Russian threat of aggression against Ukraine, Ukraine’s NATO aspirations and Russian opposition to it joining this organization is prominent. Some may think that dropping these aspirations might help avoiding a disastrous war. This, however, is no longer just a matter of political will but of constitutional law.
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Keine Waffenlieferungen in Krisengebiete?
Dass Deutschland durch Waffenlieferungen nicht dazu beitragen will, Konflikte anzuheizen, ist ein auf den ersten Blick einleuchtendes Ziel, das in der deutschen, tendenziell militärskeptischen Öffentlichkeit überwiegend Zustimmung findet. Gleichwohl deckt die verfassungs- und auch die völkerrechtliche Perspektive auf diesen Grundsatz deutscher Rüstungsexportpolitik Wertungswidersprüche auf, die die Frage aufwerfen, aus welchen Gründen und mit welcher Zielsetzung Deutschland überhaupt Rüstungsgüter exportiert.
Continue reading >>Court without a Head
On 16 October 2021, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine will celebrate its 25th anniversary. The Court’s anniversary falls in the middle of a constitutional crisis of unprecedented scale and with no clear prospects of solution.
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Smothered by Russia’s Brotherly Embrace
On 12 July 2021, Putin’s article ‘On historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians’ was published on the official website of the Kremlin, followed by a video to explain the article’s main ideas. Russia’s president repeatedly refers to the past, making use of historical narratives to frame and legitimize Russia’s security policy and geopolitics.
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No Country for ‘Old Men’
On 2 June 2021, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a bill on the status of oligarchs before the Ukrainian parliament. The bill would have wide-ranging implications. It does not only provide a definition of who counts as an oligarch but also provides measures to reduce the influence of oligarchs in media and public life.
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To Trust is to Choose
Countries where state institutions are perceived as corrupt all share a similar dilemma: Why should citizens trust a candidate for public office who was selected by a state body which citizens simply don’t trust? In light of this dilemma, Ukraine came up with an innovative mechanism: Giving international experts a decisive role in selecting candidates for public office.
Continue reading >>Pandemic and Fragile Government: A Year of COVID-19 Fatigue and Disorder in Ukraine
The pandemic has exposed all the weaknesses and shortcomings of the Ukrainian health protection system, which has been on a periphery of the national reforms agenda for many years. In many regards, the Ukrainian way to protect the population against infectious diseases remains ineffective and fragmented and based of outdated Soviet-time approaches and methods. To date, Ukraine is one of the unfortunate leaders among European countries in confirmed Covid-19 cases and coronavirus death tolls. There is still no clear national strategy on how to prevent the further spread of Covid-19 in Ukraine is in place. The President of Ukraine and the Ministry of Health of Ukraine forecasted the terms of vaccination under the WHO COVAX initiative. However, detailed arrangements are far from being in place.
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False Dilemma
On 29 December 2020, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, President of Ukraine, suspended the Constitutional Court’s Chairman Oleksandr Tupytskyi from office by Decree 607/2020. This step is part of his ongoing conflict with the Constitutional Court caused by Decision 13r-2020 of the Constitutional Court in late October 2020. Although the rule of law is being undermined in this conflict this is not due to the false dilemma between the rule of law and the fight against corruption as purported by the president.
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A Damaged Court Causing a Constitutional Crisis
In late October 2020, Ukraine’s Constitutional Court found major elements of Ukraine’s legal framework on combatting corruption unconstitutional. The decision was met with so much backlash that the rule of law in Ukraine is now at stake. Additionally, it has caused a deep rift within the Constitutional Court itself, which is currently unable to take decisions as a number of justices refuse to participate in proceedings. The decision has thus not only undermined the ongoing efforts to fight corruption but has thrown Ukraine into a veritable constitutional crisis.
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Ukraine’s Presidents and the Judiciary: An Uneasy Relationship
On March 11, 2020, Ukraine’s Constitutional Court issued a decision dealing with the judicial reform of President Volodymyr Zelensky. The Court cooled down the reformist zeal of the presidential office by proclaiming major changes to the legislation on the judiciary unconstitutional. The Court’s decision strengthens judicial independence in Ukraine which is tainted with the legacy of politicization of past presidencies.
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‘Ze-Gate’: Excepting Accountability
On September 24, the democrats in the House of Representatives announced a formal impeachment inquiry of President Trump for allegedly having pressured Ukrainian President Zelenskiy during a call to probe Joe Biden, former US Vice-President and Trump’s political rival. The content of the conversation raises questions about the integrity of Ukraine’s President. Impeaching Zelenskiy, however, is not a viable option as Ukraine’s constitution sets a practically unattainable threshold for impeachment.
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Strengthening the President – Betraying Maidan?
Last Sunday's parliamentary elections resulted in a composition of the Verkhovna Rada – the Ukrainian parliament – which guarantees a solid majority to the President's party. The circumstances leading to the prematurely held elections, however, were more than doubtful from a constitutional law perspective. The Constitutional Court (CC) confirmed the dissolution of Ukraine’s parliament as constitutional in a controversial decision which strengthens the position of the president and thereby ignores the intentions and objectives of the Maidan revolution of 2014.
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Ze-Situation: A Constitutional Law Perspective on Ukraine’s Elections and What is Coming Next
On 21 April, 41-year-old actor and comedian Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who entered the political scene only in January 2019, won the second ballot of Ukraine’s presidential election with 73 percent of the national vote. Ukrainians are placing high hopes on their new President to improve the country’s politicial and economic situation. But political games and Ukraine’s constitution will make it difficult for Zelenskiy to bring about the change he was elected for.
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A Juncture of Transitional Justice: Ukraine’s Constitutional Court and the National Lustration Law
The presidential race and upcoming second round of elections currently take all attention in the news coverage on Ukraine. Meanwhile there is a case pending before the Constitutional Court that challenges the constitutionality of the 2014 lustration law. The outcome of these proceedings could shatter the post-transition constitutional law order in Ukraine in a profound way.
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Lessons Learned? Fifth Anniversary of Euromaidan
On the fifth anniversary of the Euromaidan, during an escalation of Russia’s undeclared war, the first days of martial law in Ukraine, and on the threshold of Ukrainian presidential elections, this post seeks to analyze the main results and lessons of the Revolution of Dignity.
Continue reading >>Wo für Straßburg der Spaß aufhört
Spiegeleier auf der Flamme des Grabmals des Unbekannten Soldaten braten ist eine krasse Form des Protests – aber so krass, dass sie mit drei Jahren Gefängnis auf Bewährung bestraft werden darf, ohne die Meinungsfreiheit zu verletzen? In seinem Urteil Sinkova v. Ukraine zeigt sich der EGMR außerstande, satirischem Protest gegen staatliche Erinnerungspolitik den nötigen Spielraum zu verschaffen.
Continue reading >>Memory Wars: The Polish-Ukrainian Battle about History
Recent events show that the conflict between Ukraine and Poland over the interpretation of controversial historical events of World War II has reached a point to be classified as ‘memory war’. These political initiatives from the both sides have destroyed the first achievements of the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue on mutual repentance, forgiveness and commemoration of the innocent victims killed during the conflict in 1940s.
Continue reading >>Decommunization in Times of War: Ukraine’s Militant Democracy Problem
The Ukrainian parliament Verkhovna Rada adopted four ‘memory laws’ shortly after the Maidan revolution in the spring of 2015: One contains a legislation criminalizing both Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes, prohibiting the propaganda of their symbols; two laws commemorating, respectively, Ukraine’s fighters for twentieth-century independence movement and the victory over Nazism during the Second World War, and a law guaranteeing access to archives of repressive Soviet-era organs. These laws raise fundamental questions about the legitimate defense of democracy in times of political transformation and war.
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Ukraine’s Ban on Russian Social Media: On The Edge Between National Security and Freedom of Expression
Can Ukraine's ban of Russian social media be legally justified? While the international community mostly condemns the ban, a closer look at the European Convention of Human Rights reveals that the matter is not so easy.
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Towards a Solution for the Ratification Conundrum of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement?
The ratification process of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement has been stalled following "No" victory in the Dutch referendum of 6 April 2016. Yesterday, the EU heads of states have adopted a decision addressing the Dutch concerns. The option which is currently on the table is by far the easiest to solve the ratification conundrum while responding to the arguments of the ‘no-camp’ in the referendum campaign. Any alternatives, such as the inclusion of formal reservations or a procedure leading to a Dutch withdrawal from the agreement, entail the risk of long-term legal uncertainty which would only be detrimental for the EU, the Netherlands and Ukraine.
Continue reading >>EuG-Urteil zur Ukraine: Scheitert die europäische Außenpolitik an den eigenen Ansprüchen?
In seinem neuesten Urteil vom 26. Oktober 2015 zum Einfrieren von Konten, auf denen veruntreute ukrainische Staatsgelder zu vermuten sind, unterwirft sich die europäische Justiz strengen Maßstäben. Obgleich es grundsätzlich wünschenswert ist, dass Eingriffe der EU in die Handlungsfreiräumer Einzelner so restriktiv wie möglich behandelt werden, scheint das Gericht der Europäischen Union (EuG) in diesem Fall die außenpolitische Handlungsfreiheit des Rates der Europäischen Union über Gebühr zu beschränken.
Continue reading >>Die Logik des Krieges: eine Anmerkung zur ukrainischen Verfassungsreform
Die Verfassungsreform in der Ukraine droht zu scheitern. In dem Vorgang zeigt sich das große ukrainische Dilemma im Kleinen: der Westen setzt Moskaus Zugriff auf die Ukraine wenig entgegen. Der Druck durch Merkel und Hollande auf Porošenko, die Verfassungsreform nach Minsk II umzusetzen, diente dem Ziel, Minsk II nicht scheitern zu lassen, nicht aber den Interessen der ukrainischen Staatsreform mit einer neuen Verfassung als freiwilligem Vertrag der Bürger über die Form ihres Zusammenlebens.
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Lustration and guilt: Evolution of the Venice Commission’s approach
On 19 June 2015 the Venice Commission issued its final opinion on the Law on government cleansing (lustration law) of Ukraine. Compared to the interim opinion, the final document is much more favorable to the Ukraine’s lustration initiative. One of the most interesting changes concerns the role of guilt in the lustration framework.
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Lustration in Ukraine: Political Cleansing or a Tool of Revenge?
To tackle corruption and disloyalty the Ukrainian government has proposed a law on government cleansing which is also known as the lustration law. This draft law has recently been examined by the Venice Commission resulting in the opinion adopted on 20 June 2015. Despite the opinion been quite critical the Ukrainian government was quick to announce that the Venice Commission has confirmed that the law in question does not violate any international human rights standards or any of the resolutions of the Council of Europe. The announcement also states that the Venice Commission suggested some technical amendments to the draft law which will be taken into account by the Ukrainian authorities. This statement however does not really reflect what the Venice Commission has observed in its opinion.
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The European Court of Human Rights and the Armed Conflict between Russia and Ukraine
The European Court of Human Rights has announced that it has communicated to the government of Russia two inter-state complaints that the Ukraine has brought against it concerning the events that took place in the Crimea and the Eastern regions of Ukraine (‘the Donbas’) in the spring and summer of 2014. It seems that the ongoing conflict in Ukraine will pose a number of complex normative questions to the Court.
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Lustration durch Kahlschlag: Wie die Ukraine Justiz und Verwaltung säubert
An Radikalität fehlt es dem jüngsten Versuch der ukrainischen Regierung, Justiz und Verwaltung von Anhängern des alten Regimes zu säubern, gewiss nicht – doch ob ihm auch Erfolg beschieden sein wird, ist mehr als ungewiss. Das Gesetz "Über die Säuberung des Regierungsapparats", das am 15. Oktober in Kraft getreten ist, sieht programmatisch einen Rundumschlag vor - ehemalige KGB-Agenten sind genauso von Entlassung und Ausschluss aus dem Staatsdienst betroffen wie Führungskräfte und einfache Vollzugsbeamte aus der Janukowitsch-Ära. Der Adressatenkreis umfasst mindestens eine halbe Millionen Beamte.
Continue reading >>The Legal Status and Modern History of Crimean Autonomy
Over the past weeks, much has been said about the Republic of Crimea’s secession/annexation to the Russian Federation and on its illegality (see on this blog here) and I personally agree with these statements. At the same time, I believe that the Crimean problem is much more complex at its roots and that some of Crimea’s history and its struggle for independence in the past have been overlooked in most of the recent discussion. I will provide some historical overview of the Crimean struggle for independence. It will dispel the widespread myth that Crimea for centuries had been part of Russia and was “gifted” to Ukraine and illustrate that yet another annexation of Crimea by Russia does not solve the Crimean problem.Over the past weeks, much has been said about the Republic of Crimea’s secession/annexation to the Russian Federation and on its illegality, and I personally agree with these statements. At the same time, I believe that the Crimean problem is much more complex at its roots and that some of Crimea’s history and its struggle for independence in the past have been overlooked in most of the recent discussion. I will provide some historical overview of the Crimean struggle for independence. It will dispel the widespread myth that Crimea for centuries had been part of Russia and was “gifted” to Ukraine and illustrate that yet another annexation of Crimea by Russia does not solve the Crimean problem.
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„Wie viele Divisionen hat der Papst?“ Die EU, Putins Russland und der lange Atem normativer Außenpolitik
„Der Papst? Wie viele Divisionen hat der denn?“ Mit diesen Worten verhöhnte Josef Stalin im Jahre 1935 den Vatikan und sprach diesem somit jede außenpolitischer Beachtung aus Sicht der Sowjetunion ab. Heute, fast achtzig Jahre später, gibt es schon lange keine Sowjetunion mehr. Der Papst, seinerseits, herrscht auch weiterhin ohne die Hilfen von Panzerkolonnen im Vatikan und zieht regelmäßig Menschenmengen auf den Petersplatz in Rom oder auf seinen Auslandsreisen um die Welt an. Auch die EU hat keine Divisionen, wenn wir einmal von den kleinen und eher auf Papier ihr Dasein fristenden „Battle Groups“ absehen, und verschreibt sich einer Außenpolitik basiert auf ‚soft power’ und normativen Inhalten. Doch auch sie wird Putins Russland überdauern.‘The Pope? How many divisions has he got?’ With these scoffing words, Joseph Stalin dismissed in 1935 the Vatican as a factor of any significance for the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. Today, almost 80 years later, the Soviet Union is long gone. The Pope, on his part, continues to rule from the Vatican without the help of armored divisions and attracts on a regular basis vast crowds to St. Peter’s Square or on his trips abroad. The European Union does not have any divisions either, if we leave aside the small ‘battle groups’, which in any event exist to a greater extent on paper than on the ground. It, too, commits itself to a foreign policy based on ‘soft power’ and normative influence. And it, too, will outlast Putin’s Russia.
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GASP: Reden oder Angst haben?
Wie einst Lyndon B. Johnsohn behauptet die EU, in ihrer Außenpolitik auf die Eroberung der Herzen zu setzen. Sie positioniert sich als Wertegemeinschaft und transferiert und implementiert ihre (exklusiven und richtigen) Werte auch in die Welt, denn diese sind übertragungsfähig und befolgungswürdig, sie machen das Leben der Völker weltweit besser und die Missionare dieser Werte zu besseren Menschen. Dabei bleibt leider die Frage offen, ob diese Werte wirkungsvoll in der empirischen Realität einer höchst heterogenen Gesellschaft implementiert werden können. Like Lyndon B. Johnsohn, the EU claims to struggle with its foreign policy for the "hearts and minds" of people. It itself as a community of shared values that is exporting its (exclusive and universally valid) values to the entire world. This export is the “thing to do” because these European values (are likely to?) improve the living conditions of people worldwide and at the same time morally perfect the missionaries of the right. Still the question remains whether it is empirically possible to realise such noble ideas within the deeply heterogenous Ukranian enviroment.
Continue reading >>EU Sanctions against Russia – Halfhearted or Best Response?
Much has already been written about the European Union’s sanctions against a number of Russian officials following the actions of the Putin government in the region of Crimea. One main point of criticism is that they are unlikely to have any effect because the measures are too weak and the circle of targets is too limited. However due to the lack of better alternatives, the EU’s targeted sanctions may be the best response. This is perhaps not an argument that can win hearts but it should certainly win minds.Much has already been written about the European Union’s sanctions against a number of Russian officials following the actions of the Putin government in the region of Crimea. One main point of criticism is that they are unlikely to have any effect because the measures are too weak and the circle of targets is too limited. However due to the lack of better alternatives, the EU’s targeted sanctions may be the best response. This is perhaps not an argument that can win hearts but it should certainly win minds.
Continue reading >>The ENP: A policy without a strategy…
Finally, the EU has woken up to geopolitics. Most crucially, the government in Berlin shed the last glimmer of hope it entertained when it was dreaming that the man in the Kremlin might be amenable to dialogue and win-win reasoning. But the EU policy in the European East is still lacking strategic thinking. Before revamping any European Neighborhood Policy, it is a strategy vis-à-vis Russia that is in dire need.Finally, the EU has woken up to geopolitics. Most crucially, the government in Berlin shed the last glimmer of hope it entertained when it was dreaming that the man in the Kremlin might be amenable to dialogue and win-win reasoning. But the EU policy in the European East is still lacking strategic thinking. Before revamping any European Neighborhood Policy, it is a strategy vis-à-vis Russia that is in dire need.
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Russlands Selbstwertgefühl und die Kurzsichtigkeit der Ukraine-Politik der EU
Der größte Fehler der EU im Konflikt um die Ukraine besteht in der offensichtlichen Kurzsichtigkeit des eigenen Handelns. Gerade wenn damit zu rechnen war, dass Russland jeden Moment sein „wahres Gesicht“ zeigen und militärisch eingreifen würde, bleibt unverständlich, warum sich offenbar bislang niemand in der EU Gedanken über mögliche Reaktionen auf diesen worst case gemacht hat.
Continue reading >>Europe’s Eastern Partnership – a successful failure?
The depiction of the European Union as an economic giant but political dwarf is a classic, and criticisms for its failure to get its act together when it comes to foreign and security policy are an old hat. With the recent events in Ukraine, however, EU bashing has reached a new dimension. While the EU might have failed to actively shape the developments in its Eastern neighbourhood, arguably because it has refused to buy into Putin’s world of geopolitics, it did have influence. Despite its external failures, it is the internal success of the EU in transforming Europe into a region of lasting peace, prosperity and security that draws post-Soviet countries to the European Union.
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Another litmus test for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently observed, the crisis in Ukraine is “the gravest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War.” It is somewhat ironic that this crisis unfolded as a result of discussions surrounding the planned signature of an Association Agreement, which essentially aims to create a zone of stability, prosperity and security on the European continent. This raises the need for self-reflection on the part of the EU. Does the crisis in Ukraine illustrate the limits of the European Neighbourhood Policy? And, how can the EU play a constructive role to solve the crisis? As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently observed, the crisis in Ukraine is “the gravest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War.” It is somewhat ironic that this crisis unfolded as a result of discussions surrounding the planned signature of an Association Agreement, which essentially aims to create a zone of stability, prosperity and security on the European continent. This raises the need for self-reflection on the part of the EU. Does the crisis in Ukraine illustrate the limits of the European Neighbourhood Policy? And, how can the EU play a constructive role to solve the crisis?
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Die EU muss sich stärker für Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Osteuropa engagieren
Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechte sind Grundsätze, die die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik leiten sollen. Gleichwohl hat die EU in der Vergangenheit keine Strategien gefunden, die Ukraine bei der Umsetzung dieser Werte wirkungsvoll zu unterstützen. In der Zeit nach der Orangen Revolution wurde das Feld im Bereich der Verfassungskonsolidierung weitgehend dem Europarat überlassen. Stattdessen ließ sich die EU auf die Putinsche Logik der Integrationskonkurrenz ein. Will die EU aber ihre rechtsstaatlichen Ziele ernstnehmen, muss sie ihre Strategien zur Rechtstaatsentwicklung deutlich erweitern. The European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the EU’s negotiated Association Agreement with Ukraine are based on the joint undertaking to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance. The special significance of these values reflects the normative requirement relating to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy based on Art. 21 of the EU Treaty. Nevertheless, the EU has not in the past found any strategies to effectively support Ukraine in its implementation of these values. During the period after the Orange Revolution, the field of constitutional consolidation was largely left to the European Council. Instead of making concentrated efforts to counteract Ukraine's constitutional decline, the EU accepted Putin’s concept of integration rivalry. If the EU plans to take its targets of establishing the rule of law seriously, it will have to significantly extend its relevant strategies.
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(K)ein Mythos? – Unsere Abhängigkeit vom russischen Gas
Sanktionen gegen Russland zu verhängen würde wegen der deutschen Abhängigkeit vom russischen Gas die Energiewende in Gefahr bringen. Stimmt das überhaupt?
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Zwischen Völkerrecht und Selbstbestimmung
Gegenwärtig kann es in Kiew, Berlin und Brüssel nur um Schadenbegrenzung gehen. Auf der Ebene der internationalen Politik müssen Signale an Russland ausgesandt werden, dass seine Aggressionspolitik keine Zukunft hat. Hier muss dem Denkmodell des Völkerrechts gefolgt werden. Auf der Ebene des Selbstbestimmungsrechts sollte die ukrainische Regierung dagegen davon überzeugt werden, der Selbstbestimmungsdiskussion in der Ostukraine konstruktiv entgegenzutreten.
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Der EGMR, zerrieben im Konflikt Russland-Ukraine?
Der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR) hat vor wenigen Tagen im Wege einer vorläufigen Maßnahme gem. Art. 39 der Verfahrensordnung in den laufenden Konflikt zwischen Russland und der Ukraine eingegriffen (vgl. Pressemitteilung ECHR 073 (2014)). Man mag fragen: Warum mutet sich der EGMR das zu? Oder auch: Was maßt sich der Gerichtshof an? Glaubt er wirklich, im Wege des vorläufigen Rechtsschutzes einen internationalen Konflikt befrieden zu können, an dem sich die internationale Diplomatie die Zähne ausbeißt? Der Versuch einer Standortbestimmung.On 13th March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has intervened in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine by indicating provisional measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (cf. Press Release ECHR 073 (2014)). One might ask: Why does the Court undergo such a burden? Or, seen from another perspective: Why is the Court attributing itself such a power? Do the judges really belief that they can pacify an international conflict, which international diplomacy is unable to solve, just by means of an interim injunction? The attempt of defining a position.
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Eine kurze Geschichte des ukrainischen Verfassungsrechts
Ein starker Präsident oder ein starkes Parlament? Zwischen diesen beiden Polen ist die ukrainische Verfassung in den letzten 20 Jahren mehrfach hin- und heroszilliert. Anastasiia Tatarenko liefert einen Überblick über den Verfassungswandel in der Ukraine vom Fall der Sowjetunion bis heute. A strong president or a strong parliament? The Ukrainian constitution has oscillated back and forth between these two poles several times during the last 20 years. Anastasiia Tatarenko provides an overview on Ukrainian constitutional changes from the fall of the Soviet Union till today.
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Ukraine: Morgendämmerung des Parlaments?
Seit etwa einer Woche überstürzen sich die politischen Ereignisse in der Ukraine. Der Umsturz in Kiew wirft viele, gerade auch verfassungspolitische Fragen auf. Wir haben mit dem Osteuropaexperten und DAAD-Fachlektor an der Nationalen Universität „KiewMohyla-Akademie“, Dr. Dr. Andreas Umland, über die aktuellen Entwicklungen gesprochen.
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Ukrainisches Versammlungsrecht: Rechtslücke als Menschenrechtsverstoß
Die ukrainische Verfassung garantiert, wie jede vernünftige und auch sehr […]
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